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The Investigation and Prosecution of Serious Fraud in England and Wales 
Theresa Amelia Frances Searl 
This study sought to examine the principles and practice of investigation and 
prosecution of serious fraud by criminal justice agencies within the English and 
Welsh legal system. It commenced with an examination of the literature in relation to 
the status of fraud within the English legal system together with that in relation to the 
principles and operation of several of the agencies identified as dealing primarily with 
fraud. 
This identified that the English legal system did not recognise fraud as an offence 
and that the criminal and civil justice systems dealt with what was popularly accepted 
as constituting "fraud". To make meaningful analysis of the systems' response to 
this, the study would have to be confined to a specific type of fraud and to either the 
civil or criminal the branches of the justice system. Fraud committed by companies 
or individuals against other companies or individuals, involving large sums of money, 
and dealt with by the criminal justice system was adopted as the focus of the study. 
The main agencies responsible for this type of fraud were identified as being the 
police, the Crown Prosecution Service; the Serious Fraud Office and the Department 
of Trade and Industry. Examination of the literature revealed the possible overlap of 
remit and operation between these and regulatory agencies. 
Access was granted to the staff and files of police, CPS and DTI. Approximately 
three months was spent conducting fieldwork in the offices of each of these 
agencies; interviewing staff, examining files and attending case conferences. 
Examination of these agencies operation revealed common themes that supported a 
conclusion that fraud was not a high priority within the criminal justice system. The 
lack of a substantive offence of fraud is discussed and analysis made of the results 
with a view to possible improvements to the current systems. 
V 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this chapter is to detail the context within which the study was undertaken. 
Examination is made of the concept of fraud as it occurs within the Zimbabwean and 
English legal systems, with particular reference to the criminal justice systems of both 
countries. Thereafter the development of concept of fraud within the English criminal 
justice system is considered. Following this is a section on the development of a 
definition of fraud for the purposes of the study. Determination of this definition 
enabled the establishment of the parameters of the study, which are detailed in this 
chapter. Unlike the Zimbabwean context, there is provision within the English justice 
system for regulatory and criminal justice agencies to deal with fraud. For this 
reason this chapter briefly examines Ahe concept and operation of regulation in the 
context of responding to fraud. 
Backqround to the stud 
The interest in the investigation and prosecution of fraud that led to undertaking this 
study began whilst I was working as a prosecutor in Zimbabwe, within Harare 
Magistrates Courts, that was and remains the largest court of first instance in 
Zimbabwe. At the time I worked within those courts, the complex comprised twelve 
courts. It was established practice that three courts were set aside for remand only; 
guilty pleas and road traffic prosecutions. The remaining nine courts were available 
for general criminal prosecutions, with two courts allocated solely to the prosecution 
of fraud cases. Unlike the other courts, these two courts had designated 
prosecutors. 
After working in the courts for some months, I was appointed as lead prosecutor in 
court 9. The cases in that court were predominantly straightforward deceptions that 
needed little preparation. However it soon became apparent to me that the vast 
majority of cases set down ('listed') for trial simply did not take place. The reason for 
this appeared to me to be a lack of interest or understanding on the part of the 
prosecutors, who frequently had not properly read or understood the police file, and 
had failed to ensured that the necessary witnesses had been warned to attend court. 
This situation appeared to be possible due to the arrangement in all the magistrates' 
courts whereby one prosecutor had responsibility for reading files and either setting 
the cases down for trial or requiring further police investigation, whilst another 
prosecuted cases in court. 
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This situation did not occur in the High Court, where I was posted in 1992. Unlike the 
magistrates court matters, all police files for the High Court were submitted by 
officers from a specialist CID fraud squad, not uniformed officers. The Attorney- 
General's (A-G's)Office had a corresponding specialist group of prosecutors, to 
which I was appointed. As a result of this system, police officers and prosecutors 
came to know each other's ways and requirements, working very closely with each 
other as a matter of routine. 
Even with the improvements in officers and lawyers with personal responsibility for 
investigation and prosecution of fraud, it appeared to me numerous cases were 
poorly presented and that unacceptable delays in investigation and trial were 
common place. At this time, the early 1990s, several British based organisations 
provided training material and officers to Zimbabwe. These included lawyers sent by 
the British Council to both the A-G's Office and Zimbabwe Republic Police. The 
influence of and regard with which these people were held is hard to overstate. 
Unlike the current political position, in the early 1990s the broad body of 
Zimbabweans, of all ethnic origins, viewed the British as providing a 'better' way of 
doing things, from running businesses to operating courts. The stance of the 
Zimbabwean government reinforced the public's perception. Its acceptance of the 
training and the training providers had an implicit, sometimes explicit, acceptance of 
the specific remit of the trainers, this being to improve local systems by moulding 
them along British lines. 
The books and training material provided to the A-G's Office confirmed my feeling 
that the Zimbabwean system of investigation of fraud could be improved by learning 
from, and possible adopting, the British methods of investigation and prosecution of 
such offences. This feeling, unsupported by relevant evidence or knowledge of the 
British justice system, underpinned early plans for the study. 
The study had one certainty. This was that many Zimbabweans considered fraud to 
be a real problem and an impediment to the social and economic development of the 
country. Reports and cartoons in the local newspaper fuelled this belief and may be 
viewed as supporting the suggestion that a similar situation operated in a number of 
other Southern African Commonwealth (SADAC) countries. 
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Despite commentary in local and international publications, little government 
attention appeared to be paid to the negative impact of fraud on national economies. 
In 1996 the United Nations African Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the 
Treatment of Offenders, had expressly called for greater examination of the issues, 
(UNAFRI Press Release 21 October 1996). However little research has been 
undertaken by SADAC government bodies or universities into either the offences or 
the response of the Southern Africa Commonwealth legal systems to them. 
Several possible explanations may be suggested for this. Differing legal influences 
operate in the various countries. The impact of these should not be ignored. Whilst 
all SADAC countries have a system of indigenous, tribal or customary law and an 
imposed or received legal system from colonising nations, the extent of the 
amalgamation of customary and colonial law varies from country to country. This 
makes meaningful comparison between countries' systems and criminal justice 
responses difficult, given that the types of laws operating in each may differ. 
Additionally, it is apparent that, within some Southern African countries, a lack of 
political will exists to tackle issues of crime and responses. This is highlighted in the 
UNAFRI Press Release (18 December 1998) that notes, 
The African Regional Preparatory Meeting for the Tenth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders -- held 
here last week -- had declared that the "root causes of corruption have to be 
addressed, and the political will to combat it has to be accompanied by 
instruments designed to bring the perpetrators to justice". Government 
representatives attending that meeting had noted that "the high economic and 
political status of perpetrators of corrupt practices and the circumstances 
under which such crimes are committed make law enforcement agencies 
relatively powerless, decreasing the likelihood of the perpetrators being 
reported or prosecuted". 
Not only can these factors result in a lack of funding to study the issues, it can create 
a culture of police/ prosecutor and judicial indifference to creating, promoting and 
maintaining a coherent legal response to criminal activity. 
Most Southern African police forces experience a significant lack of investigative 
resources of various types. These range from vehicles to travel to the reporting of a 
crime; telephone lines to assist the conduct of enquiries or text books to which to 
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refer as part of the investigation. An associated lack of public confidence in the 
police's ability to meaningfully assist or compensate victims of economic crime may 
discourage many from ýeven reporting crime. 
At the beginning of this study, one of the main study aims was to contrast the 
situation in Zimbabwe with that of England. The English context, of significant 
research into the substance of the law, the operation of police officers and of 
prosecutors, was felt to offer an opportunity to examine, in an inter-related manner, 
the substance of the law on fraud and deception and how that was applied by 
investigators and prosecutors. As the study developed, the unconscious acceptance 
of an assumption that the British approach would be better than the Zimbabwean, 
became both recognised and questioned. This progress is described in Chapter 
eight. 
Fortunately in the early stages of the study, when, with hindsight, this assumption 
was most pronounced, it did not appear to have any negative impact on the study. 
As the study progressed, it was realised that the British approach to the investigation 
and prosecution of serious fraud was not automatically better than the Zimbabwean 
approach. 
A perceived quasi insider status may have assisted in preventing such a response. 
My experience as a prosecutor in Zimbabwe, in charge of a unit of prosecutors with 
specific responsibility for the prosecution of fraud, provided points of reference for 
both the police officers and lawyers to whom I spoke. As with all Zimbabwean 
prosecutors, I had directed and required the action police officers take in their 
investigations, and had daily contact with senior officers in large scale fraud 
investigations. In addition, I had also been a lecturer at the Harare based Police 
College and, in 1990, had been a member of a working group into the administration 
of police files. These experiences had provided me with an understanding not only of 
some investigation methods, but also of the working practices, rank structure and its 
effects within the police. 
The Zimbabwean police had developed, since 1980 and formal independence from 
Britain, from the British South Africa Police. It had retained the rank structure and 
disciplined, hierarchical service structure introduced by the British. As such, I was 
familiar with the rank structure and discipline ethos in which the first batch of 
respondents, the police force that I studied, operated. Terms specific to certain 
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aspects of policing and police work did not require explanation. Cases could be 
described without officers having to explain what they were talking about. However 
other factors prevented me from being too familiar with those with whom the 
respondents worked. I had been a prosecutor in a foreign jurisdiction and had been 
firearms trained, so was able to present myself as distinctly 'foreign' to the CPS 
lawyers with whom the respondents had contact. Whilst having worked within a 
similar system to that of the respondents, I did not present a threat, not being a CPS 
lawyer or part of the prosecution system, either of which they might comment upon. 
This status as both insider and foreigner changed during the course of the study. 
Towards the end of the first stage of the study, one of the police respondents advised 
me of a short term employment contract with that force. That officer and others within 
the unit studied assisted my application for the post. That application being 
successful, by the time of the study of the CPS, I was employed within a criminal 
justice agency. However, my employment was within a unit unconnected with 
criminal investigations, being in the Policy Unit of the Corporate Development 
Department. This enabled my past work experience as a prosecutor to dominate the 
determination of my status within the eyes of the second respondents, the CPS. 
In addition, in the first stage of the study, I had been assisted by a number of the 
police respondents advising friends and acquaintances in the CPS and IDTI that I 
would wish to study the operation of those agencies. Not only did this assist me in 
identifying the units most likely to be of interest and relevance to the study, but it also 
enabled those within the units to view me as 'pre-judged' and accepted by their 
friends in other agencies, without reference to my existing employment. 
In the second stage of the study with the CPS I was able to present myself to the 
CPS respondents as both a lawyer and former prosecutor, and as both foreign and 
English. My employment, as a policy advisor to the police, was not in a post that 
could be a threat to the work of the prosecutors to be interviewed or as potentially 
compromising their decisions in respect of any investigations that my employing force 
may have undertaken and referred to the CPS. However it did enable me to relate to 
comments as to police officers and their behaviour in a manner not open to someone 
who was not a lawyer and not familiar with current policing issues. As with the first 
respondents, my experience as a prosecutor meant frequently used expressions, 
certain procedures and structures did not require explanation. 
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By the time of the study of the DTI, the third set of respondents, my employment had 
altered to police solicitor, dealing with civil law matters. This role did not have 
contact with the conduct of investigations and it was felt that the prospect of any 
compromise of joint police/DTI or DTI investigations and prosecutions did not exist. 
However, it did enable aspects of insider status to operate. With the DTI lawyers, I 
could present myself as one of them, in as much as being a lawyer and ex- 
prosecutor. Again, the fact of not being directly involved in the type of work as my 
respondents, my interest in their work could appear non-competitive and 
unthreatening. With the DTI investigators, a number of whom had been police 
officers prior to their employment with the DTI, I was able to capitalise on my 
employment within the police and awareness of current policing issues. As with the 
other respondents, this provided a shared vocabulary and knowledge of topical 
issues. 
It was with this background and status that I approached an examination of the 
investigation and prosecution of fraud. However, before doing so examination had to 
be made of what it was that is described as 'fraud'. 
Fraud 
The regulation, investigation and prosecution of fraud have received increasing 
general public attention in recent years, as evidenced in newspaper reporting (The 
Times, The Guardian and The Independent) and academic works on the criminal 
justice system (Levi 1982,1987,2000). Despite this, the concept of what constitutes 
fraud, remains imprecisely defined. In England the word 'fraud' is used by the 
popular media; legal and socio-legal writers to describe differing acts in differing 
situations. Within the Zimbabwean context'fraud' is understood to be a crime. It is a 
common law offence with an established definition, being the making of a mis- 
representation to another, knowing the representation to be false, with the intention 
of inducing the other party to act and causing the other to act to their prejudice (be 
that actual or potential) (Feltoe 1982). In the event of the other party not acting upon 
the mis-representation the inchoate form of the offence, attempted fraud may be 
charged and found to have occurred. 
Early in the study it was realised that, for any results to be meaningful to a reader of 
any jurisdiction, there would have to be an explicit meaning given to the word 'fraud' 
within the context of this study. The understanding of fraud with which the study 
began was that provided by the Zimbabwean legal system. 
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The civil/criminal law divide in the Zimbabwean context 
Prior to the European colonisation of Southern Africa, several well-established 
systems of "customary IaWoperated in the region (Kerr 1980). These were systems 
of tribal regulation, observed by the first European settlers in the region to be tribe- 
specific and not involving laws in the European sense of the word. 
The systems of Mashona and Ndebele in what has become Zimbabwe shared some 
similarities, neither having the concept of disobedience to the state, instead operating 
in accordance with an acceptance of the observance of custom and practice. Whilst 
fraud, as understood by the Europeans arriving in Africa, did not form part of any 
customary law, indigenous tribes had a formal recognition and punishment of 
deception or the taking of advantage in a manner unacceptable to the tribe. 
Compensation for all types of deceptions, usually paid in the form of animals, was 
well established. This compensation was made to the aggrieved party, not the tribe. 
There was no notion of a "state" or that the tribe could have a legitimate interest in 
what were viewed as essentially private wrongs between individuals. 
With the imposition and development of a hybrid Roman-Dutch/English set of laws in 
Zimbabwe came notions of divisions between person and state, civil and criminal 
law. Unlike the existing systems, the colonial systems differentiated between types 
of harm in ways not previously recognised. Distinctions were drawn between wrongs 
to the person and those to the state or those in which the state had an interest. 
Under customary law any allegations of wrongdoing to another individual, where 
proved to the satisfaction of the tribal "court", would attract some compensation to 
them or their family. For example a complaint against a person that they had traded 
cattle knowing them to be ill/dry etc (i. e. fraudulent misrepresentation) could result in 
a direction that some compensation be given to the person complaining, be it beer, 
small livestock or other token of compensation. Any penalties having been provided, 
the character of the guilty party was restored. 
The introduction of colonial law to the indigenous peoples of Southern Africa brought 
completely foreign notions of that state having an interest in the maintenance of good 
order. With this came an allied concept of punishment, by the state, of a wrong to 
the greater good or society. These rights of the state may be viewed as having 
developed almost in opposition, or at least distinct from, the rights of the aggrieved 
party to exact compensation/punishment. Generally, it was, and remains, the case 
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that indigenous people do not accept the imposition of a state penalty, such as 
imprisonment, as giving them personal compensation for what had occurred. 
A good example of this in a non-fraud context is what in Zimbabwe is termed 
"statutory rape", being unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of 16. 
Most prosecutors within Zimbabwe had experience of cases in which the complainant 
or, more particularly her family, withdrew the 'complaint on an undertaking from the 
suspect to pay lobola (akin to a reverse dowry). The act of intercourse with a female 
minor was not recognised as inherently "wrong" and certainly not a matter being any 
concern of the state. Provided the male relatives were compensated for a girl's (by 
then, public) loss of virginity, the matter was regarded as satisfactorily resolved and 
of no legitimate concern to the state. Equally if a man refused compensation, the 
public did not generally view any legal proceedings, especially those in the rural 
areas, as being relevant to the loss to the family. 
Fraud in the Zimbabwean legal context 
In a similar way, fraud developed as the response of the criminal justice system to 
deception in a manner that ran parallel to an individual's right to seek civil 
compensation. The two forms of redress, civil and criminal, were separate, neither 
having much bearing on the other. Practical experience of working with the 
Zimbabwean criminal courts revealed that the use of restitution orders was rare and 
compliance with them still less common. Frequently cases would be withdrawn, after 
months of investigation and preparation of the prosecution "docket" (file), if at any 
time before trial, the suspect agreed to compensate the complainant. This may be 
suggested as occurring partly due to a complaint ethos of the criminal law not 
affording a complainant personal compensation, as was expected within certain 
groups. 
With reference to fraud, there was no concept in Zimbabwean law of the state 
regulating commercial enterprise to prevent fraud. The role of the state was 
specifically to investigate, prosecute and punish the behaviour of those complained 
of by another. It never regulated business. In the investigation and prosecution of 
certain business behaviour, neither the state nor the individual had a pro-active role. 
Legal activity, criminal or civil, arose only as a consequence of action on the part of 
the party. No aspect of the Zimbabwean legal system provided for maintenance of 
non-fraudulent activity. 
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Criminal and civil law in Zimbabwe provided for and supported the maintenance of a 
distinct division of approach to those who deliberately caused loss to others. 
Investigation and punishment of fraud were solely the concern of the state, whilst the 
individual could seek financial compensation only by reference to the civil courts. 
This context may explain the clarity of the definition of fraud as detailed by Feltoe 
(1982) being, 
Unlawfully making, with intent to defraud, a mis-representation which causes 
actual prejudice or which is potentially prejudicial to another. 
Definitions of fraud within the English and Welsh leqal svstem 
In the English criminal justice system "fraud" exists as neither a common law nor 
statutory offence (Kirk and Woodcock 1992). However the concept does have a 
degree of legal recognition, appearing in the Criminal Justice Act 1987, albeit being 
used without definition, and in the Companies Acts in the sense of 'fraudulent' 
business. Arlidge, Parry and Gatt (1996) describe the situation thus, 
Contrary to popular belief, English law knows no crime by the name of fraud. 
Instead it boasts of a bewildering variety of offences which might be 
committed in the course of what the layman (or for that matter the lawyer) 
would describe as a fraud. What the law does possess, however, is a 
concept of fraud, a broad notion (broader, indeed, than the layman's) of what 
it means to defraud someone. (p iv) 
This is the view put forward in a number of other legal texts on the subject, although 
not always in so succinct a manner. The introduction to Leigh's (1982) The Control 
of Commercial Fraud asks, 
'What is "Fraud"T, before stating, 
'This book is specifically concerned with fraud, rather than white collar crime 
or economic crime. Those are concepts that cannot be defined with 
precision, nor can the notion of business crime (Conklin 1977). Most 
definitions are unsatisfactory because agreed unifying elements are hard to 
find. For many years the standard formula was that of Buckley J. in Re 
London and Globe Finance Corporation Limited. 'To defraud is to deprive by 
deceit; it is by deceit to induce a man to act to his injury. More tersely it may 
be put, that to deceive is by falsehood to induce a state of mind; to defraud is 
by deceit to induce a course of action'. ( Leigh p 7)) 
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That formula, it is now accepted, is not exclusive; fraud can consist in depriving a 
person of what is his by any other dishonest means, including simple taking (Leigh 
1982 p7). 
Clarkson and Keating (1988) deal with fraud under the heading 'Offences involving 
Deception', stating that 
The terms 'theft', 'robbery and 'burglary' evoke immediate understanding in 
the hearer (even if that understanding is less than perfect); the same is less 
true of offences involving deception. 
Whilst this approach would include the white collar or economic crime that Leigh 
specifically excludes from his work, it does not immediately invoke images of 
offences under company law, a number of which refer specifically to actions of a 
fraudulent nature. 
In Cross, Jones and Card (1988) fraud was not indexed in any form other than under 
common law conspiracy. However the same work, in dealing with s 15(l) of the 
Theft Act 1968, at para 14.37 p 341 makes reference to the dicta of Buckley J in Re 
London and Globe Finance quoted by Leigh above. 
Similarly, the index of Smith and Hogan's (1992) Criminal Law reveals that fraud is 
dealt with in relation to offences of conspiracy to commit, but it is again cross 
referenced to other issues, including blackmail; cheating; company directors; 
deception; false accounting and theft. Research Study No 14 of the Royal 
Commission on Criminal Justice (1993) provides a detailed study of its title subject, 
'The Investigation, Prosecution and Trial of Serious Fraud', without defining the 
scope of the term 'serious fraud. 
Legislation relating to fraud tends to lack precise definition in a similar manner. The 
Criminal Justice Act 1987 that established the Serious Fraud Office described the 
Office's subject matter simply as the investigation and prosecution of 'serious or 
complex fraud'. Given that the enforcing body was to be responsible for defining its 
own ambit, this description allowed it a great deal of latitude. Those outside, or 
indeed within, that body who wish to have an understanding of the subject matter 
with which the SFO deals can not obtain such without reference to the SFO itself. 
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In contrast, legislation relating to the regulation of investments business provides 
definition clauses that clearly define the topics controlled by the Acts. Notable 
examples of this are to be found within the Companies Acts 1985 and 1989, together 
with the Financial Services Act 1986, which in part refer to the control of actions that 
fall within the in re: London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd definition of fraud. The 
Financial Services Act 1986 commences with a definition section, and contains 
several other sections throughout the Act that describe in detail the actions failing 
within the scope of the regulatory powers and bodies. Whilst none of these actions 
are described in the Acts as 'fraud', should the appropriate regulating authorities 
wish, they clearly could also fall within the jurisdiction of the police or Serious Fraud 
Office. In this regard Leigh (1982) comments, 
The forms which fraud takes are contingent upon the economic system in 
which they are found; the fact of fraud is not. (p3) 
The development of the [eqal concept of fraud in Enqland and Wales 
Recognition by justice systems of fraud as having occurred ('the fact of fraud') is also 
contingent upon who it is examines and what it is that defines a suspected fraud. 
Examination of the legal authorities demonstrated there to be no single definition of 
the concept of fraud and that what are regarded as 'frauds' could be any one of the 
'bewildering variety of offences' (Arlidge and Parry 1996). 
Legal texts reveal that the majority of frauds are described as 'offences involving 
deception', definitions of which are to be found in the Theft Acts. The first of the Acts 
was that of 1968 and represented a breakthrough in the development of the English 
criminal law of theft. Smith (1990) describes the situation thus, 
Until 1968 the English law. of stealing developed in a haphazard fashion over 
several centuries. The common law began with a crude notion of stealing, 
which covered only the most obvious and direct taking by one person of 
property that was in the possession of another. As the inadequacies of the 
law were exposed by the ingenuity of rogues, so the courts, and later, 
Parliament extended the law to punish the more sophisticated forms of 
dishonesty. 
The courts generally achieved their purpose by extending the ambit of the 
original crime of larceny by means of fictions and strained interpretations of 
the concepts which constitute the definition of that crime ... Parliament's 
method was to create a new crime to supplement the old. In one way or 
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another most varieties of dishonest appropriation of the property of another 
were brought within the ambit of the criminal law... But this was at the price of 
tolerating an immensely and unnecessarily complicated structure, full of 
distinctions of a purely technical character... 
Having set the scene as one of legal complexity and contortion, Smith continues, 
The Theft Act 1968 ... swept all this away and gave us a completely fresh start. 
The definition of theft embraces all - or virtually all - of the kinds of dishonest 
conduct that comes within the definitions of the old crimes of larceny. 
As socio-economic analysis developed in the second half of the twentieth century, it 
became apparent that this 'fresh start' would not be sufficiently comprehensive to 
deal with the various forms of criminality being experienced. With an increasingly 
sophisticated business environment, the 1968 Act required re-working so as to 
enable it to be used for the control of crime in changing times. 
The 1978 Theft Act commences with the preamble that it is 
An Act to replace section 16(2)(a) of the Theft Act 1968 with other provision 
against fraudulent conduct. 
Whilst section 16 of the 1968 Act had dealt with the obtaining of pecuniary advantage 
in its time, developments within world of business required new means of dealing 
with new forms of activity. The 1970s had seen the introduction of 'self service' into 
Britain. Enterprises that had formerly provided goods or services to customers 
through representatives were re-structured, removing the representatives and 
permitting the customer to obtain the goods or service for themselves. With this a 
new form of dishonest behaviour became possible; the taking of goods or services 
without subsequent payment. 
The 1980s and 90s would see similar developments in other spheres of commercial 
enterprise. The widespread use of computers introduced the possibility of 'computer 
hacking'. This included the unauthorised acquisition of information in a manner that 
did not necessarily involve an appropriation. Copies of data could be obtained from 
the system of another whilst the data itself remained in that system. Not only was the 
element of "appropriation" problematic for the then existing law, the concept of 
"property" had to be re-examined. A greater element of certainty within the legal 
system was introduced by the Computer Misuse Act 1990. 
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Implications of the lack of definition of fraud to the present stud 
Many of the offences failing within the ambit of the Theft Acts would fall within the 
range of actions that, using the Zimbabwean law, could be termed "fraud" and dealt 
with by the criminal justice system as such. However, the Theft Acts also excluded 
actions that could fall within the common law offence of fraud, and which were 
regulated as such within the English justice system. In addition these Acts contained 
offences which were not within the study's terms of reference of serious fraud. It was 
for these reasons that it was decided to retain use of the word 'fraud' as opposed to 
'offences involving deception'and to examine non-criminal law approaches to fraud. 
The choice to examine non-criminal law responses to fraud, specifically regulation, 
was based on acceptance of Smith's (1990) comment that the criminal law, "is 
merely one amongst several methods of social control in society". In addition, 
Zimbabwe provides no experience of this form of social control whilst England was 
thought, initially, to provide an established example of an alternative to a response 
that criminalised certain types of activity. 
Clarkson and Keating (1988) describe as 'crucial' the question of whether an action is 
criminalised, and the basis of that decision (p 77). Whilst it is accepted that this issue 
is of importance, this study was concerned more with the recognition that the criminal 
law is but a single form of control of fraud and that there may be interaction between 
the various controlling groups given the lack of definition of 'fraud'. 
In this situation it was thought that there could be potential for several instances of 
overlap between justice agencies of various forms and other groups in their approach 
to fraudulent acts. Acts that one agency defines as a form of theft in terms of the 
Theft Acts, another as fraudulent (in terms of the Companies Acts), and another as 
breach of fiduciary duties or other codes of practice may be given differing 
descriptive terms, yet all fall within the concept of fraud. Various agencies may take 
as falling within their own jurisdiction or sphere of operation acts that other bodies 
also view as within their jurisdiction. If this were so, any agency may approach 
regulation/investigation of certain acts as 'owned' by itself whilst a separate 
agency/body could hold an identical position in respect of the same acts. Such a 
situation is not difficult to envisage in relation to the police, regulatory inspectorates, 
Serious Fraud Office and DTI. This could increase the potential for conflict or lack of 
co-ordination amongst multi-agency partners with differing powers. Thirdly, given 
that there is no crime of fraud, there is potential for fraudulent acts to appear to be 
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within the operational jurisdiction or mandate of various agencies without those 
agencies having a defined framework of statute or common law within which to apply 
their powers. 
In order to examine the validity of these suggestions it was necessary to establish a 
definition of 'fraud' that could be applied to the work of various controlling groups. It 
was decided to use the in re: London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd sense of fraud, 
with some elaboration, given this was very close to the Zimbabwean common law 
crime of fraud. Such definition would also assist the results of the study be examined 
from the perspective of the Zimbabwean criminal justice system. 
As English law did not contain an offence of fraud and the Zimbabwean definition of 
that offence was so broad as to apply to almost all the situations of dishonest 
acquisition not failing within the offence of theft, it was decided to use 'fraud' in its 
conceptual sense. It was accepted that, without limitation, many respondents could 
have problems in using such a definition. It was decided that a degree of restricted 
application could be applied by confining use of the concept within the parameters of 
specific types of fraud. 
Theft, under the Zimbabwean common law, is an offence of dishonestly appropriating 
the property of another, with the intention of depriving the owner permanently of that 
property (Feltoe 1982). That it is very much of a physical nature is made clear by the 
wording of indictments drafted for this type of crime, that will assert, 'that X took and 
stole'. In contrast fraud may be charged where X does not take the property but fools 
its owner into handing it over or where the property never moves but benefit of it is 
unlawfully obtained. For example, whilst the author working within the Zimbabwean 
prosecution the following facts were present. A bank mistakenly credited X's 
account. X, knowing of the error, did not advise the bank but transferred the amount 
credited to him to an interest earning account within the same bank. When 
challenged X immediately released the original amount credited to him to the bank, 
but retained the interest earned. An investigation of such facts was referred to the 
Attorney - General's Office on a charge of theft, with a police request for withdrawal 
of charges on the basis that it would be difficult to prove the element of taking with 
the intention to deprive permanently, the funds never having left the bank's control. 
The charge was altered to one of fraud, on the basis that the opening of an account 
with the moneys amounted to a misrepresentation, and the matter continued to trial 
and conviction. 
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Producing a definition of fraud for the current stud 
Arlidge and Parry (1996) state, 
... the types of conduct which may constitute fraud are many and various ... and 
that elements of the conduct, such as deception and financial loss, whilst 
often occurring are not essential, as the factor that [ends this protean concept 
some semblance of unity is not so -much what is actually done as the 
character of what is done, the element of disregard for the rights of others and 
for ordinary standards of conduct.... This feature is commonly and 
conveniently referred to as 'dishonesty' (p 3 para 1.04) 
It was felt this approach encompassed too broad a range of actions, and that it could 
be applied to those that are not perceived to be fraud. Acts such as providing false 
details to the police at the scene of an accident may fall within the Arlidge and Parry 
(1996) definition of dishonesty but would not be described by the lay person or 
members of the criminal justice system as fraudulent. 
It was felt that fraud in the 'immediate understanding of the hearer' referred to by 
Clarkson and Keating (1988) would invariably include an element of financial 
prejudice (albeit that such prejudice may be potential). The Arlidge and Parry (1996) 
definition of the concept of fraud, whilst useful in its notion of an underlying character 
of the conduct, was too wide to be used without modification. The same was true of 
the traditional definition of in re: London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd. Whilst the 
latter definition contains the element of causing another to act to their prejudice, it 
does not convey what form that prejudice may take. 
The study was not concerned with fraud to the government, such as where prejudice 
is to the Department of Social Security, or false benefits claims as may prejudice 
local government social services or the Benefits Agency. Nor was it concerned with 
under-declaring of income, with the potential for under-assessment for taxes, or allied 
frauds on the Inland Revenue. Equally, this study did not seek to examine "plastic" 
fraud (Levi 1991,1998). This was due to the multi-faceted nature of such fraud, that 
can be against individual retailers, financial and other institutions, involving 
overdrawn individual accounts or'rung'cards by gangs of quasi-organised criminals. 
As the study was to be of frauds perpetrated by individuals or trading entities on each 
other a definition of fraud was required that would fulfil the requirements of 
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fitting within the context of both the English and Zimbabwean legal system; 
incorporating the element of causing action on the part of another through use of 
dishonesty or deceit; 
which conduct would result in action detrimental, or potentially detrimental, 
to the interests of the actor; and 
would incorporate specific reference to the injury or loss being of a high financial 
nature as opposed to any other form of fraudulent conduct that may fall under the 
Theft Acts. 
The formulation of such definition was assisted by all of the above noted sources, 
together with that supplied by Kirk and Woodcock (1992) as, 
Fraud, in criminal law terms is a generic term for a type of offence, of which 
the following ingredients are infinitely variable but comprise the following: the 
dishonest non-violent obtaining of some financial advantage or causing of 
some financial loss, 
Kirk and Woodstock's (1992) definition emphasises the non-violent nature of this 
form of crime. 
Use of the term 'economic prejudice' to describe the loss, or 'economic crime' to 
describe the dishonest conduct was unacceptable owing to their being far too broad 
and vague. Geis (1984) notes that, 
... as a classification category, 'economic crime' proves not notably 
enlightening, since virtually all property crimes, and many crimes against the 
person, are committed to achieve economic ends. (p 139) 
As the study was to be restricted to large scale financial prejudice it was thought that 
the conduct would, typically, occur in a business or corporate setting. If this were so 
the conduct could be described as 'corporate crime' or 'white-collar crime'. These 
descriptions also have their detractions. Not only have they acquired certain 
meanings but, in addition, those meanings are controversial. 
The term 'white-collar crime' was introduced to legal and criminological science in 
1939 by Edwin Sutherland. Whilst it is a generally understood that this form of crime 
involves dishonest conduct by the socially well placed person, white-collar workers, 
in a manner directly related to their professional activities, the exact meaning of the 
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term remains unclear. Geis and Stotland (1980), describing the problematic nature 
of the definition of white-collar crime held this general comprehension as, 
... an intuitively satisfying understanding of white-collar crime as a broad term 
that encompasses a wide range of offences, abuses and crimes whose outer 
boundaries are as yet ill-drawn and perhaps not precisely definable. (pl 1) 
This approach is unsurprising given that Sutherland himself, 
was not particularly concerned with definitional precision. (p 140). 
However it was not of assistance in a study that requires a clear understanding of 
what conduct is to be examined. The need for this clarity is discussed on the 
following pages, but may be summed up as necessary to ensure different groups 
have a shared appreciation of the nature of the conduct about which they are being 
asked, notwithstanding how they themselves may describe it. 
That white collar crime has come to have distinct and separate meanings was 
demonstrated by Levi (1987), when he described it as, 
The controversial and ambiguous term.... 
continuing, 
There is a growing tendency amongst 'white-collar crime academics to 
differentiate between crimes by business and crimes against business; the 
former are labelled 'corporate crime'; the latter 'white-collar crime'. (p xviii) 
There being no way of establishing what understanding of this phrase existed within 
the respondents to the surveys and interviews to be conducted as part of this study, 
the term "white collar crime" was also rejected. That it did not necessarily convey 
notions of misrepresentation and the causing of financially prejudicial action on the 
part of another that are explicit in a definition of fraud as would be understood in the 
Zimbabwean context were further reasons for rejecting this term. 
Having examined a number of possible definitions and found that none were covered 
every aspect of that form of fraud in which my interest lay, it was apparent that I 
would have to create a definition of fraud. The resultant definition -was an 
amalgamation of portions of all the sources referred to above, with care being taken 
to ensure that it would be immediately recognisable within both English and 
Zimbabwean legal systems as a legal concept with the appropriate judicial and 
administrative recognition and use. A concept that was not legally recognised would 
17 
be of as little use as one that was not in general professional use. Essentially it had 
to be one not only that could be applied, but one that is. 
It was for these reasons that in re: London and Globe Finance Corp Ltd provided the 
larger portion of the definition, with some elaboration. Thus the definition of 'fraud' to 
be applied in this study is; 
The intentional making of false statements by one party to another, causing 
that second party to act to their financial prejudice and to the advantage of the 
first party. 
The concept of parties, as opposed to persons, was adopted so as to avoid 
confusion as to whether legal persons were to be included in the discussion. The 
word 'unlawful' that occurs in a Zimbabwean definition of fraud was deliberately 
omitted. This was to ensure that conduct that may not be illegal in terms of English 
statute but may be nevertheless be viewed as morally reprehensible by 
enforcement/regulatory bodies and therefore as falling within their mandate, could be 
examined. 
The ideal 'type' of serious fraud would be a complex, high value fraud causing 
serious financial prejudice and threatening public or business confidence. This is 
highly likely to occur in the commercial sector. 
The parameters of the stud 
Given that the study accepts that the criminal law is not the only response to fraud, it 
was thought necessary that examination be made of regulatory agencies and 
criminal justice system agencies, together with forms of regulation other than 
contained in the criminal law. The police and the Crown Prosecution Service were to 
be the first agencies studied and thereafter examination was made of the views of 
personnel of the Department of Trade and Industry so as to include the operation of 
regulatory bodies. 
These choices had two direct consequence in terms of data collection. The first, as 
described above, was that a definition of the conduct in issue would be clearly 
understood by all respondents. There had also to be a means of evaluating how 
these various bodies work and the opinions of their staff which could be applied 
uniformly to all the agencies under examination. Hutter (1988) notes that research 
on the work of traditional policing agencies and regulatory agencies has reached a 
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stage at which useful comparisons can be drawn between the activities of the two (p 
7). This approach refers primarily to the styles of activity. It will be suggested that 
the approach can be taken further, and comparisons drawn between the actual work 
of the agencies (what they do), their activities (how they do it) and their motivation 
(why they act as they do). 
The suggestion that enforcement of laws and'regulations are both part of the same 
process has several bases. One is that of the political left's analysis of the criminal 
law and its enforcement as resulting from its role as supporting the dominant 
ideology. Sumner (1990) described this as, 
In that their task is to sustain, reinforce and restore power relations, and to 
articulate the dominant societal ideology amidst a field of social 
contradictions, chaos and struggle, the criminal law and the criminal justice 
system are institutions lodged within the realm of political practice. (p 42-3) 
Using this analysis, regulations and their enforcement may be treated in a similar 
manner, as they too are used to impose and maintain hegemony in situations of 
dissenting opinion and its related practices. 
That criminal laws and regulatory laws, together with their respective enforcement, 
may be analysed in similar manner can also be supported by reference to the two 
having a shared origin, in administrative law. 
Either perspective views both laws and regulations as grounded in perceptions of 
what constitutes acceptable behaviour. Their enforcement is based on acceptable 
means of ensuring such behaviour and punishing deviance from it. The perceptions 
that found legislation and regulation are those of the legislative arm of government. 
Regulation, as created by subsidiary legislation, may also be based upon the 
perceptions of those authorised by the legislature to regulate certain activity. Given 
the inherent improbability of the legislature empowering a group with views in marked 
opposition to its own, it is to be expected that such regulators will hold similar views 
to that of the government. 
The concept of there being limits to governmental control of social and economic life, 
is ancillary to the concept of laws and regulations as parts of the same form of social 
control by democratic governments. Government, whilst imposing the dominant (and 
therefore its own) ideology in the form of laws or regulations, has to retain sufficient 
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social consensus for it to continue to hold political power in addition to retaining 
social control. Sumner (1990) noted, 
... criminal justice is not just active as an external determinant of social 
practice and morality, it is effective also in that it is internal to the members of 
the body public, in particular in constituting their sense of order, safety, 
morality and unity as members of a collective unit ... When it is unjust, 
inefficient, authoritarian and corrupt, our commitment to the public realm, and 
even to the nation itself, is seriously reduced. (p43) 
This extract does not explicitly state that the above views apply to democratic 
societies as Sumner uses the term 'modern society', nor that regulation is to be 
viewed in the same manner. However this must be the case as dictatorships, or 
other forms of totalitarian leadership, base political power upon might, generally 
military, as opposed to legality. Whilst dictatorial governments remain in power their 
control of society is not affected by principles of accountability or popular acceptance, 
both features being required of regulation, as they are of legislation, in democratic 
society. 
Democratic governments have to have other methods of imposing societal control. A 
common theme that emerges from study of such governments is the increasing 
degree of their use of criminal law and codes of regulation. The British situation is 
described as being one of, 
... the creation of a plethora of criminal offences and the setting up of 
agencies to secure compliance with regulatory objectives (Rowan-Robinson 
1990 p 1) 
Similar views have previously been expressed by Hawkins and Thomas (1984), in 
respect of a variety of aspects of social and commercial life, by Cranston (1979) in 
respect of consumer rights, and by Hutter (1988) in relation to the environment. 
These examples provide an indication of the extent, in England, to which regulation is 
now part of societal control mechanisms. 
In this situation of increasing legislation and regulation it has been stated that the 
American position is one in that, 
To the present day Americans have failed to develop or agree upon a 
coherent philosophy of government activism in economic matters. (Freedman 
1978) 
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It is suggested that the use of 'activism' is of note and should be understood to refer 
to a variety of forms of intervention, including criminal justice and regulatory systems, 
whether the latter are under direct governmental administration, or administered in 
terms of a self-regulatory organisation. It is further suggested that the above 
comment applies with equal validity to a number of other countries, including Britain. 
In addition it may be applied to the increasing regulation of financial dealings, as it is 
to regulation of other spheres of social, economic and commercial activity. 
It has been noted that the growing realisation of the detrimental effects or 
consequences of certain enterprises has led the British government taking a more 
active role in such actions, demonstrated by increased legislative activity in relevant 
fields (Rowan Robinson 1990). This analysis is as true of -pollution control as it is of 
other control, including that of fraud and financial mis-dealing, albeit that it is not a 
complete explanation. 
Regulation by the government of various aspects of life (for example : the workplace; 
education system; welfare system; treatment of animals and children; protection of 
the environment) has been a part of British life for several decades. Whilst some 
form of regulation was imposed by legislation in the late 1800s, such as the Factory 
and Workshop Act regulation, a far greater degree was imposed from the 1950s 
onwards. This appears to correspond to the increases in industrialisation and 
production together with the associated increase in demographic movements. Thus 
the 1950s to 1980s saw the promulgation of numerous pieces of legislation designed 
to ensure stricter government control of aspects of life that had previously been 
largely in the private realm, leading to the 1990s 'plethora' of criminal offences and 
regulatory agencies. 
With this development came the growing body of study of regulation and its 
enforcement. These studies provided a framework within which similar means of 
control of other forms of conduct, in this case of fraud, could be examined. Therefore 
it is suggested that the theories of regulation, policing and prosecution that have 
developed in other fields of social and economic activity may properly be applied to 
the various forms of control of fraud. 
In addition these studies revealed shortcomings in the system. In 1970-72 the 
Secretary of State for Employment and Productivity commissioned the Robens 
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Committee to examine provisions for ensuring health and safety at work. The 
Committee concluded that there were too many provisions regulating this topic, and 
that these were administered by too many agencies (Robens Report 1972). The 
Committee's findings reveal that it accepted that control of the situation had to be 
maintained. However a new approach to ensuring control was suggested, it being 
accepted that regulation through legislation and statutory instruments had failed to 
provide a satisfactory level of control. Self-regulation was put forward, with 
responsibility for regulation or control being placed upon those directly involved in the 
situations being controlled, as an alternative to legislative and governmental control. 
The validity of the Committee's findings and recommendations was questioned by 
some. Woolf (1973) argued that the Committee undertook its examination With the a 
pfiofi premise that what he terms 'legal methods of regulation' (regulation by use of 
statute and statutory instruments) having failed to provide sufficient control in the 
past, they would continue to do so in the future. He suggests further that the 
recommendations in the Report demonstrate the Committee's confusion of criminal 
and civil duties in relation to culpability, together with the moral and technical aspects 
of this issue. Despite criticism, such as that of Woolf, to which official response was 
not made, the Report had government approval and marked the beginning of the 
adoption of a new form of approach. 
Under the system of self-regulation a move away from direct state intervention 
occurred. Baldwin (1987), writing in respect of health and safety at work, suggested 
that the legislative process would move from the creation of offences to the creation 
of frameworks of rules that would promote effective self-regulation. The trend in the 
legislative process of subsequent years, suggests there to have been a combination 
of these two features. Examples of this include the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, which established a new regulatory framework for the financial markets 
industry by combining in one body a number of previously existing self-regulatory 
bodies. The Act similarly brought together in one enactment previously existing 
offences and new offences, including those of a technical or administrative nature 
that appear in the traditional mould of regulatory legislation. 
The guiding theories of the 1980s legislative process have been assessed as being 
products of Thatcherism, being consensus and voluntary action within and amongst 
those directly involved in any particular situation (Redhead 1984). Despite its name, 
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self-regulation should not be seen as completely independent of governmental 
control. This is because it has two distinct forms. 
Self-regulation, together with its enforcement, may be of either a contractual or 
statutory form, as described by Page (1986). Both forms share the features of an 
acceptance by a group of individuals or organisations that regulation of their common 
business is in the common interest, together with a common acceptance of a set of 
standards, rules and duties for such business. The distinction between the two lies in 
the responsibility for the making and enforcing of such standards, rules and duties. 
In the second stage of its evidence to the Wilson Committee, the Bank of England 
described this distinction as being between intrinsic and common consensual 
regulatory forms (vol. 4p 89 para 5). 
It is suggested that this description does not make clear that statutory provision may 
be a prerequisite for common consensus to come about in any form other than 
internal agreement, or 'intrinsically. But for the enabling framework provided by 
statute there could be no common consensus, other than of a contractual nature. 
Thus described, it is not immediately apparent that the government retains a degree 
of control of a self-regulatory situation. That this is so is of relevance to establishing 
the theoretical and legal status of a regulatory system and of its enforcement. 
Traditionally there have been distinctions drawn between regulation and 'real crime', 
and the enforcement of both. It is suggested that this distinction is even more 
pronounced in the case of financial crimes and regulations. Financial crime may still 
be viewed as somehow different from other forms of crime, as noted by Hadden 
(1983), 
There is a temptation, to which many left-wing commentators succumb, to 
treat City frauds as if they were the same as other crimes and to criticise law 
enforcement agencies for not dealing with them in a comparable way. 
Hadden relies upon a number of assumptions to draw distinctions between what he 
terms "City frauds" and other crimes. However, it is suggested that the validity of his 
assumptions may be challenged and that the argument for distinction between City 
frauds and other offences must fail. His argument may be viewed as containing two 
flaws. The first is an implicit assumption that there exists a distinction between white 
collar fraud, and other fraudulent behaviour. This supports the second claim, that 
this is so because of changing notions of what are and are not acceptable standards 
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of behaviour. In terms of legal theory, it is suggested that the second assumption 
would apply, if at all, as a factor in mitigation, not as a complete defence. 
The first assumption is based upon the suggestion that there is a continuum between 
legitimate and illegitimate conduct of City business affairs. This is used in an a priori 
argument. This argument can not be used as a basis for the suggestion that this 
removes City or other white collar actions from criminal scrutiny, since the same is 
true of almost all non strict liability behaviour that is subject to criminal law scrutiny. 
All criminal acts that have the requirement of mens rea in the form of intention are on 
the wrong side of the line that demarcates acceptable social or business conduct 
from unacceptable. The fact that there may be fluctuations in social or business 
mores does not affect the criminal nature of such conduct unless and until the 
legislation is changed. 
As will be discussed more fully in the following chapters, two fundamental features of 
the difference exist between the English and Zimbabwean legal systems. The first is 
the exercise of discretion at all stages in the English criminal justice system's 
processing of suspected offences as opposed to the operation of the Zimbabwean 
criminal justice system. The second difference lies in the relationship of advice and 
review that operates between the investigators and prosecutors of crime in England 
and the system of instruction/orders made by Zimbabwean prosecutors to the police 
officers who submit crime files for prosecution. 
Within the Zimbabwean system the police conduct virtually all investigations. The 
only exceptions would be those matters, such as animal cruelty, that may be 
investigated by an independent agency, for example, the R. S. P. C. A. However these 
could never be referred to the prosecutors by that agency; the involvement of the 
police would be essential for a matter to be considered for prosecution. 
Unlike their counterparts in Zimbabwe, English and Welsh police officers operate 
within limits of discretion in the investigation of crime. In the Zimbabwean system an 
officer would be obliged to refer major investigative decisions, such as when to 
arrest, when and what offence to charge, to the prosecution service. The withdrawal 
of charges can not be undertaken by the police; only the prosecutors or courts can 
authorise the ending of criminal proceedings before completion of a trial. Unlike 
Britain, Zimbabwean police and prosecutors are servants of the state; neither are 
independent of direct government control. One effect of this status is that 
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prosecutors have the power to instruct or order police investigations and the manner 
in which such investigations should be conducted. Examination of discretion, as 
operated by both prosecutors and investigators, is identified as central to the study. 
With this background, one of the primary aims of the study was to examine the 
manner in which the English criminal justice system responded to instances of large 
scale fraud, in the context of the law not providing a specific offence of fraud. The 
study also sought to examine the impact of the operation of considerable discretion 
on the part of th e police and CPS as to whether and how matters progressed through 
the criminal justice system. Linked to these aims was an interest in examining 
whether any overlap of remit operated between the various criminal justice agencies 
that dealt with fraud. If an overlap was found to exist, it was intended to examine its 
nature and possible effects. 
The format of the study is reflected in the arrangement of the chapters of this thesis. 
The first stage was an examination of the history and current status of the 
organisations to be studied together with others within the justice system that were 
identified as being involved in the investigation, prosecution or regulation of fraud. 
This is detailed in chapter two. 
Chapter three details the literature review that was conducted. Chapter four 
describes the methodology on which the study was based. Chapters five, six and 
seven detail the research into the operation of specialist units dealing with fraud 
within the Police, Crown Prosecution Service and Department of Trade and Industry. 
These chosen units operated as specialists within agencies that had general 
investigative and prosecutorial functions. In chapter eight, the distinction between 
general and specific remit forms part of the analysis of the results obtained from 
examination of the operation of these agencies together with discussion of the 
relevance of the themes identified in chapter three. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
ESTABLISHMENT AND DEVELOPMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCIES 
DEALING WITH THE INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF FRAUD 
This chapter examines those agencies within the English justice system responsible for 
dealing with fraud and their historical development. Included is a description of those 
agencies' powers in relation to responding to fraud. As it was thought that all the 
agencies examined in this chapter could have dealings with each other in relation to 
fraud, an appreciation of the justice system within which they operated was thought 
necessary. In this chapter examination is made of those agencies within England 
thought to have the greatest responsibility for investigating and prosecuting fraud. 
English justice agencies that deal with complaints of fraud 
The roles and functions of the agencies within the English justice system responsible for 
the investigation and prosecution of fraud are closely linked. The Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) could not function but for the operation, in the most instances, of the 
police. The CPS came into existence following critical examination of the operation of 
the police within the criminal justice system in the 1970s and '80s. Similarly the Serious 
Fraud Office (SFO) developed following critical examination of the operation of the police 
and CPS, specifically in relation to the investigation and prosecution of fraud. Policing 
departments within the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) share codes of conduct 
established by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) to regulate the operation of 
the police. All these agencies operate within the same criminal justice system. 
Each of these agencies, with the exception of the Serious Fraud Office, deal with 
allegations of criminality other than economic crimes. In these agencies economic crime 
is investigated and prosecuted in the same manner as are allegations of other forms of 
criminal conduct. It was, therefore, thought necessary to examine their general 
investigative and prosecutorial powers together with the general duties of these 
agencies, so as to gain an insight into how they deal with the specific offences that may 
constitute fraud. 
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That all the agencies have specialist units to deal with allegations of fraud may 
demonstrate the importance that is attached to this form of crime by the government. 
Fraud has been described as a 1980s 'growth industry' in western and far eastern 
countries. The importance of this alternative industry lies in its effects, described by 
Sarker as, 
Economic crime destabilises the economy and security of the state. It 
undermines confidence, leads to uneconomic deployment of scarce national 
resources, corruption, and facilitates other subversive activity. It also has 
international repercussions given the interdependency of world economies. 
(Sarker 1995 p, 220) 
Adopting Lustgarten's description of the status of the police as, 
... in the edifice of English criminal justice the police are the keystone. 
(Lustgarten 1986 p 7), 
and the opinion expressed by Klocker that, 
... in order to examine the function and powers of the police it is necessary to 
establish what'the police'are. (Klocker 1985 p 5), 
this study's examination of investigatory and prosecutorial powers and responsibilities 
begins with an examination of the English police. 
The police 
The term "the police" may suggest a single entity, yet there are currently operating in 
England and Wales 43 police forces, and a variety of other policing bodies. Included in 
these other policing bodies are such agencies as the United Kingdom Atomic Energy 
Authority police, the British Transport police, Royal Parks Constabulary and Ports police. 
None of these were thought to have significant dealings with complaints of fraud and as 
such were not included in this study. 
The 1990 reprinted edition of the Macmillan Encyclopaedia provides the definition of 
police as being, 
A force established to maintain law and order and to prevent and detect crime. 
(Macmillan 1990) 
Whilst not incorrect, this definition does not include recognition of there being several 
systems of law and order operating within any area. The major forms of law and order 
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are based upon the civil, criminal, military and canon legal systems operating within an 
area. All are subject to the operation of the police in their own systems. The distinction 
between these systems lies in the civil police having authority superior to the other 
systems. The civil police powers can be exercised in respect of the operation of other 
systems. The reverse is not true of the canon or military police in democratic societies. 
Whilst certain countries, in which there is not the clear distinction between religious and 
civil law as exists in most Western nations, have police forces that operate in both 
sectors, it is not with these states or systems that this study will deal. Thus the definition 
in volume 14 of The New Encyclopaedia Britannia may be preferred, being, 
The term police is now used to denote a body of people organised to maintain 
civil order and to investigate breaches of the law. (1992) 
This definition includes the notion of the police operating within the legal system of a 
specific state. This study uses the word 'police' to refer to the 43 civil police forces of 
England and Wales. The term 'the police' is used in preference to that of 'the police 
forces' in the following sections. Where distinctions are to be drawn between different 
police services this will be made clear by use of the term 'the force(s). 
The history of the police is relatively long although somewhat contested. Whilst the 
origins and development of the police have been the subject of debate, it is agreed that 
the entity can trace its origins to earlier times. It is generally accepted that the modern 
entity may be taken to have come into existence with the 1829 Act with its roots in far 
earlier methods of policing. Debate as to how far back in history these roots may be 
traced was not the concern of this study and only passing reference will be made to it. 
Despite calls for reform of the police and operation of the criminal law, attempts in 1785 
to introduce a professional police force proved abortive. This has been viewed as being 
due to the distrust of the contemporary society for a police force with close links to 
central government, such as operated in France and Prussia, and to the opinion of the 
political elite, with their preference for the parish constabulary system of policing that had 
successfully protected their interests from the break down of the feudal system 
(Alderson and Sead 1973 p 28). The popular view was recorded as being opposed to 
the existence of a quasi military police force owing to the notions of community self 
policing that had its roots in feudalism and distrust of the use of the military, except in 
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times of outright war or severe civil strife. However both views were to change, due in 
large measure to brief dis ruption of the social order by the Peterloo Massacres of 1819. 
The broad masses of the population were revolted by the harshness of the authorities' 
response to the protest, whilst wealthy landowners were frightened by the spectre of 
continuing insurrection and attacks on their position. Previously the wealthy had been 
secure in their social position within rural areas, to the extent that protection from any 
form of crime other than petty theft or poaching had been unnecessary. This they had 
largely controlled in ways based on the feudal origins of their status. Protection of the 
land owning classes' property and allied rights was achieved largely through rural 
workers' and labourers' ties to the land, owned by the wealthy to whom the workers 
owed allegiance. The Industrial Revolution broke this system down and laid the basis 
for the ruling elite to consider alternative means of protection of their self-interest. 
These factors explain how, in 1829, the establishment of a permanent police force was 
given grudging social acceptance. Success was achieved, but only with considerable 
jimitations, in the form of the Metropolitan Police Act. The considerable opposition of the 
wealthy to the introduction of the police led to limitation of the operation of the police 
from the City of London; the 1829 Act specifically excluded its application to the City. 
The Act established a paid force of men with the common law powers of constables. 
They were to be responsible only for controlling an area termed the Metropolitan Police 
District. The first professional police force dealt with an area of an approximate radius of 
seven miles from the centre of London. The force, founded by Rowan and Mayne, was 
under the direct control of two commissioners, and under the overall authority of the 
Home Secretary. The definition of the role and function of the present day police as 
detailed by Pike (1985), as, 
The primary object of an efficient police is the prevention of crime; the next that 
of detection and punishment of the offender if crime is committed. To these ends 
all the efforts of the police must be directed. The protection of life and property; 
the preservation of public tranquillity, and the absence of crime, will alone prove 
whether those efforts have been successful, and whether the objects for which 
the Police were appointed have been obtained. (Pike 1985 pl 1), 
may be traced back to the Rowan and Mayne prototype. 
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Rowan and Mayne's force was gradually extended to wider geographic areas. The early 
years of this new police were uneasy, as opposition to the force came from all social 
classes. However within five years this had begun to lessen and the force to gain a 
measure of social acceptance. As the Metropolitan police assumed responsibility for the 
policing of the entire London area, save for the City, the Bow Street Runners and other 
forms of the old police were incorporated into the one new force. The justices' 
dominance over policing in the London and Metropolitan area was ended by the City 
being forced to adopt the Metropolitan police model. 
During this period of development, the role of detection came to be separated by the 
new police from their other roles and functions. This development may be viewed as 
giving concrete form to what has been termed the 'inherent tension' in police work, that 
the police established for the protection of the people are required to closely monitor, 
and also view with suspicion, those they serve (Baldwin and Kinsey 1982 p 7). 
Establishment of an investigative arm of the new police had been delayed for some 
years after establishment of the force itself. This was due to fears surrounding both the 
force itself, and the nature of plain-clothes work. In the public mind investigation by non- 
uniformed officers was closely linked with the actions of the agent provocateur, the 1833 
'Popay Affair aggravating resistance to what was perceived by many sectors of the 
contemporary society to be the invasive role of the police in private life. Thus, despite 
the wishes of the founders and subsequent Commissioners of Police, the development 
of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was slow. In 1942 the Metropolitan plain- 
clothes detection group comprised six detectives with the media of the day leading 
editorial campaigns against its increase. Over the next twenty years, an increase of only 
ten officers to this group occurred. It was nearly forty years from the establishment of 
the new police before there was sufficient public support for the establishment of a 
separate CID section. Thereafter this section increased rapidly. Provincial forces 
adopted the similar formal division between preventative and investigative functions of 
the police and the beginnings of the split between uniform and CID in both role and 
status had been initiated. Examination of literature, from Talking Blues (Graaf 1990) and 
Police Review to academic studies of the police, reveals this to be a division that still 
exists and operates strongly. 
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4, 
The spread of the Metropolitan police model from the London throughout England and 
the establishment of simi lar police forces were achieved in many areas with far less 
opposition than in London. Frequently members of the old forms of police in the watch 
and the local systems were simply sworn into the 'new police' (Emsley 1983), thereby 
limiting opposition to the introduction of professional police forces. 
The operation of these forces was not to remain unaltered. Controversy would attach to 
various police forces and manners of policing. A historical analysis of this topic is 
beyond the scope of this work. Similarly, controversy that has attached to some modern 
English police forces will not be examined in any detail. The aspect of the development 
of the police that is examined is the development of investigation powers and the allied 
growth of specialist investigative squads. 
Police powers of investiqation 
The primary task of the English police forces may best be termed a composite one, 
Jbeing a number of functions under the broad headings of prevention and detection of 
crime, inherited from the early model of Peel's 'New Police'. Nearly a century and a half 
after the formation of the police, the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police, found its role 
and functions largely unchanged from its origins. The Commission described the role 
and functions of the police as; 
i) maintenance of law and order, the protection of person and property 
ii) prevention of crime 
iii) detection of criminals and associated functions within the criminal justice 
system 
iv) in England and Wales, the decision to bring prosecutions 
v) the conduct of prosecutions in many minor cases 
vi) control of traffic and advising local government on matters of traffic control 
vii) certain duties on behalf of central government (e. g. some immigration 
enquiries) 
viii) by tradition, to befriend people who need help and to cope with minor and 
major emergencies (Oliver 1987 p 8, citing the conclusion of the 1962 Royal 
Commission on the Police) 
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The following section details those police powers of investigation that operated during 
the study. 
Before January 1986, when the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 came 
into effect, the law governing police powers for the investigation of crime was 
unclear and antiquated. It had developed piecemeal since the establishment of 
professional police forces in the nineteenth century. (Bevan and Lidstone 1990 
PI) 
Throughout the history of the professional police, changes in social conditions had been 
reflected in calls for changes to the police. The twentieth century was no exception. In 
'the homogenous 1950s' (Jefferson 1990 p 24 - 32), the dominant image of the police 
was as peace keepers as opposed to law enforcers (Banton 1964). This social situation 
was to develop into the 'transitional 1960s' and the 'less homogenic 1970s and 1980s', 
with an associated movement of perceptions of the police from 'plods to pigs' (Jefferson 
1990). 
By the mid to late 20'h century considerable support existed for the view that changes to 
the criminal justice system in general, and the operation of the police in particular, were 
necessary (Walter and O'Connell 1985 p 1). Change came in the form of the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984 and the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, 
following the Phillips' Commission examination of the investigative and prosecution 
stages within the English criminal justice system. 
PACE details the larger portion of powers, duties and responsibilities of the police in 
respect of the investigation of general crime. Whilst other statutes have conferred a 
variety of powers and duties upon the police in respect of specific topics, PACE and the 
allied Codes of Practice have had the broadest scope and greatest direct effect upon the 
conduct of investigations of crime. The provisions of PACE that are of the greatest 
relevance to this work are those in relation to the arrest and questioning of suspects, the 
searching of premises and seizure of documents, records and other materials. Section 
24 governs police powers of arrest, providing arrest without a warrant may occur where 
police officers have reasonable grounds for suspecting that an arrestable offence has 
been committed. 
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An arrestable offence is defined by the Act as being either an offence for which the 
penalty is fixed by law, or all offences (including those under the common law) for which 
a person over the age of twenty one may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of five 
years, or those offences specifically listed in the Act; these include offences under the 
Custom and Excise Acts, and several other Acts (the Official Secrets Acts 1911 and 
1920, Sexual Offences Act 1956, the Theft Act 1968 and the Public Bodies Corrupt 
Practices Act 1889) that do not have application to this study. Case law as to what 
constitutes reasonable grounds and suspicion (Castorina v Chief Constable of Surrey 
(1988) 138 New U 180) is settled and will not be examined in this study. 
Questioning, or interviewing, of suspects is governed by Ss 76 -78 of PACE. These 
sections provide that where an officer has grounds to suspect that an offence has been 
committed and wishes to question a suspect with a view to prosecuting, that suspect 
must be cautioned. Further provision is made for the subsequent questioning to be 
recorded, either in writing or in taped form. The intention of these provisions was to 
guard the suspects' right of silence. This was modified by section 34 of the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994. This provided for inferences to be drawn by a court 
from a suspect's failure to mention, when questioned under caution, any fact 
subsequently relied upon by that suspect in his defence. 
Police powers of entrv search and seizure 
Police powers of lawful entry, search and seizure take two forms. These are with or 
without a warrant. Part 11 of PACE, as read with Code of Practice B, defines the powers 
of the police in respect of entry, search and seizure. The police have additional powers 
of search in terms of Part I of the Act and Code of Practice A. These are not of 
relevance to the present study as they relate to the stopping and searching of persons 
and vehicles for stolen or prohibited goods. Part 11 powers relate to entry and search of 
premises, defined as being 'any place', either public or private, movable (including 
vehicles) or immovable. The general powers of entry arise in terms of a warrant, the 
conducting of an arrest and in relation to breaches of the peace and following the 
obtaining of the occupiers consent. Whilst Leach v Money (1765) 19 State Tr 1001 and 
Entick v Carrington (1765) 19 State Tr 1029 are authority for the proposition that any 
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unlawful entry into premises is a trespass, the wide powers conferred under Part 11 
protect the majority of police entry and searches of premises from civil action. 
Prior to PACE the police did not have any general powers to enter premises and search 
for evidence. Warrants had to be obtained to search for evidence of specific offences 
and for certain items. PACE provided that the police could apply for a warrant to search 
premises, including those of a person not implicated in the commission of the offence, 
for evidence of the commission of that offence. Warrants of this nature limit an 
individual's exercise of their rights and were viewed as requiring a high degree of 
regulation. This was provided by the requirements that such warrants be issued only in 
respect of searches in respect of 'grave offences' and that they be issued by a circuit 
judge. PACE has ensured that the police have those powers that will enable them to 
obtain such confidential materials as provide 'relevant evidence' of a serious arrestable 
offence by adding to the common law and pre-existing statutory powers of search and 
seizure. In this manner there is potential for overlapping of the warrants for which the 
police may apply in order to conduct searches. For example in certain instances the 
police could apply for the necessary warrant in terms of either s8 (Art 10) of PACE and 
PACE Order, or, s26 (1) of the Theft Act 1968. The determining factor as to which form 
of warrant is requested will be whether the material sought is evidence of the offence, if 
so the provisions of PACE will be utilised. 
If the materials sought are confidential, either in the possession of the suspect or a third 
party who is not a suspect, s14 (1)(a)(Art 16(l)(a)) or s9-14 and Sch. 1 will apply. In the 
latter instance these provisions can only be applied where the offence is a serious 
arrestable one. Searches for non-confidential material as evidence of a serious 
arrestable offence may be issued by a magistrate. 
Following the introduction of the Human Rights Act 1998, public funding was granted to 
a number of challenges to PACE powers. These included a challenge of the issue of a 
search warrant, the grounds of challenge being that the issue of search warrants is 
contrary to Article 8 of the Human Rights Act, Rv Sheffield Magistrates, ex parte C 
(2002). In Bv Chief Constable South Yorkshire Police (2002) the challenge was that 
section 1 PACE powers of stop and search were incompatible with Article 8. In both 
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cases, the courts have taken a robust view as to whether the Human Rights Act is 
engaged 
In this context, it may be anticipated that, as with all other offences, police officers 
investigating fraud may continue to lawfully enter and search premises and seize items 
without a warrant, with the consent of the suspect or occupier of premises. Code B 
section 4 governs the conduct of such searches and seizures and ensures that the 
persons concerned are advised of the purpose of the search and that they are informed 
that there is no compulsion to consent. These provisions apply to police investigation of 
serious fraud as they do to all other offences. 
At the commencement of the study considerable differences existed between the 
investigative powers of the police, SFO and DTI. Neither the SFO nor DTI required 
warrants to conduct searches and seize materials as evidence of the commission of an 
offence and could use material, usually interviews, obtained under compulsion. 
However in 1996 the European Court of Human Rights, in the case of Saunders v UK 23 
EHRR 313 found that Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to 
a fair trial) had been violated by use of transcripts of interviews conducted by the DTL 
The basis for this lay in the existence of a legal requirement, or compulsion, on the part 
of any suspect to answer the DTI's questions. 
This decision resulted in considerable changes to the operation of the SFO and DTI, 
which were observed when conducting fieldwork in the DTI and are detailed in chapter 6. 
Following the EHRR decision the operation of the SFO and DTI altered -to mirror that of 
the police, with PACE being the legislation governing investigation by all agencies. 
However, the DTI investigators not having PACE powers of arrest, search or seizure, 
their operation altered dramatically following the Saunders judgement. 
As litigants and courts become increasing "rights aware", additional case law has placed 
further constraints on the operation of all investigative agencies in relation to the seizure 
and retention of exhibits. This is particularly apparent in the investigation and 
prosecution of fraud, see Rv (1) Chesterfield Justices (2) Chief Constable of Derbyshire, 
ex parte Bramley (2000). More so than in any other offences, fraud investigations 
routinely involve the search of offices with subsequent seizures of large amounts of 
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documentation, computer equipment and such office contents as investigators believed 
might be relevant to their investigations. 
Under PACE, police officers acting either with or without a warrant had, in practice, 
taken all material they thought might be relevant to their investigations. Given s8 PACE 
requiring only that the officer should believe that material is likely to be of substantial 
value to the investigation of the offence, that this situation should have developed is 
understandable. 
Rv Chesterfield Justices ex parte Bramley (2000) 2 WLR 409 altered practices. This 
held that possession of a warrant did not authorise police officers, and by extension any 
other investigators, to seize all material found on the premises named in the warrant for 
the purposes of determining, at another location, what is and is not relevant to their 
investigations. Following this case, officers are required to "sift" the material at the 
premises and seize only that deemed relevant to the case. Similarly retention by the 
police and other investigative agencies of exhibits for extended periods of time is no 
longer tolerated by the courts. The expectation is that the contents of computers will be 
electronically copied and the equipment seized returned at the earliest opportunity. 
In 1996 the Criminal Procedures and Investigations Act made it a statutory requirement 
that prosecutors should make full disclosure to the suspects. Whilst the duty is that of 
the prosecutor, the statutory responsibility of the police to assist is emphasised in 
general works (Card and Ward 1996 p 59) and police training materials (Hutton and 
Johnston 2002 para 14.2.1. ). Both these works draw attention to the possibility of 
failure to make disclosure resulting in the collapse of any subsequent trial. 
In Rv Customs and Excise, ex parte Popely and Harris (1999) the courts approved a 
system devised by Customs and Excise of applying to the Attorney-General to nominate 
a member of the Bar to sift through the documents seized from a solicitor's office, where 
some but not all might be subject to legal professional privilege, before a decision was 
made as to which of them should be retained. 
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In light of these developments the Court of Appeal's decision in the matter of Attorney - 
General's reference (No 7 of 2000) may be seen as drawing a fine line between the right 
not to incriminate oneself by remaining silent, following the 1996 Saunders judgement, 
and the obligation to provide evidence of criminality, by differentiating between 
statements and actions. 
Notwithstanding this last mentioned judgement, during the course of the study the nature 
and exercise of police powers, particularly in relation to investigations of fraud, changed 
significantly. As may be expected, these changes within the operation of the police 
were mirrored by changes in the nature and operation of the Crown Prosecution Service 
(CPS), being the criminal justice agency with which the police may be expected to have 
most contact in the investigation and prosecution of crime. 
Before examining the changes in the CPS, the following section is an overview of the 
development of prosecution within the criminal justice system. 
Criminal prosecution: the police and Crown Prosecution Service 
The introduction to the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure study of the 
prosecution system is introduced by the statement that, 
The criminal justice system in England and Wales is unusual in that, in the great 
majority of cases, the responsibility for both the investigation and prosecution of 
criminal offences lies with the police (The Royal Commission on Criminal 
Procedure 1980 p 4) 
This was the case until 1985 and the promulgation of the Prosecution of Offences Act. 
This Act established a new criminal justice agency, the Crown Prosecution Service. This 
body was to be responsible for the instituting and conduct of all criminal proceedings 
deemed appropriate. It was not until October 1988 that the CPS came into full 
operation. Prior to this, the prosecution of suspected criminal conduct in England and 
Wales remained the responsibility and task of the individual police forces. The Royal 
Commission described this situation as, 
... the present arrangements for the prosecution of criminal offences in England 
and Wales defy simple and unqualified description (para 6.1). 
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Over time thirty two police forces had come to be assisted in their prosecutorial role by 
bodies known as the prosecuting solicitors' departments. These departments were 
staffed by lawyers who advised on and prosecuted police investigation cases. Private 
legal practices performed a similar role for those forces that did not have this 
arrangement. Prosecuting solicitors departments were without statutory basis and were 
not subject to any national authority. As such they operated in accordance with local 
requirements. This allowed for great variation in operational practices throughout 
England. The Prosecuting Solicitors' Society existed, but even this was unable to 
describe the prosecution systems operating to the 1980 Royal Commission. Despite the 
recommendation of the 1962 Royal Commission, control of the prosecution system had, 
for a number of years, remained in the control of the local governing bodies. 
Use of the prosecuting solicitors did not remove from the police control of the conduct of 
criminal prosecutions, nor the decision whether to prosecute (Mansfield and Parry 1987 
p 3). In some of the forces with prosecuting solicitors, police officers continued to 
prosecute some matters and prosecuting solicitors prosecuted others; the latter also 
providing advice to the police. Local variations in practices and operation prevented the 
development of a single, uniform system of prosecution. Those forces that utilised the 
services of private legal firms retained a high degree of control over the decision whether 
or not to prosecute. This may have been as a result of a solicitor/client relationship 
existing, with firms being unwilling to advise against prosecution or to give unpalatable 
advice to their instructing forces, due to concerns of possible loss of that client. Whilst it 
may have been true that some solicitors were prepared to advise the police against 
prosecuting, above all else, the police were free to reject advice, 
... the police always had the last word: if they instructed their solicitors to go 
ahead with a prosecution those instructions had to be obeyed. (Rozenberg 1987 
p80) 
This system of police operation was to be subjected to extensive change. "Unwritten 
rules' of police conduct within the criminal justice system (Devlin 1960 p 112-114) were 
replaced by precise Codes of Practice and legislation. Prosecution was taken over by a 
body established, and operating under, specific legislation and Codes of Practice. The 
enabling legislation and Codes specifying the criteria for prosecution decision making, 
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variation in prosecuting decisions may be expected to have lessened. However, due to 
the guidance as to what constitutes 'the public interest' it may be suggested that, in at 
least one of the criteria applied by CPS prosecutors, there remained the possibility of a 
degree of variation. 
The 1960s to 1980s saw a rise in public concern as to the general operation of the police 
and with this particular situation. Public expectations and the situational context of 
policing were in the process of changing, with new styles of policing being introduced 
(Joint Consultative Committee 1994). Technology and the new'science'of management 
were applied to the police. Introduction of such systems as unit beat policing and rapid 
response did not completely answer concerns as to the state of the police. The Phillips 
Royal Commission began its examination of the criminal justice system, the role and 
functions of the police and prosecution system in the aftermath of the Miners' Strike. 
This was a time of concern about certain police forces' decisions to prosecute for public 
order offences following the disturbances that had occurred during the strikes. 
The Commission's findings demonstrate how far perception of the prosecution system 
had altered since Devlin's comments. It found that an unacceptably high number of 
acquittals were occurring and that some of these could have been prevented. In its 
recommendations for improvements a distinct variation in approach can be ascertained 
from that of Devlin. The latter writes simply (and very briefly) of conviction of the 
innocent man. He makes no comment upon, or criticism of, the decision of the police to 
prosecute such persons. More importantly he does not deal with the acquittal of a rising 
number of what Rozenberg terms the'hopeless cases'. 
It was the number of these cases that caused the Royal Commission to examine 
alternative prosecution systems. The Commission examined an office that operated 
alongside the police, that of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) a post dating back 
to 1879. The Attorney General had, and retains, a degree of authority over the DPP's 
office. This is due to his powers of 'superintendence' over the function of the DPP in 
respect of the decision to prosecute or not any criminal matter falling within his remit. 
However the DPPs role was that of the specialist, being to prosecute difficult or 
important matters, together with sensitive matters, those referred in terms of s 49 of the 
Police Act involving complaints of criminal conduct on the part of a police officer. 
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The Commission called attention to the differing standards that operated between the 
police and the DPP in respect of the decision whether to prosecute. The DPP operated 
in accordance with what Rozenberg describes as a 'fifty per cent' rule, a term that is 
popular but may be misleading in the impression it creates. The preferable term is the 
more frequently used, 'reasonable prospects of conviction' test. This equated to a 
determination of the prospects of success of trial of any matter. This determination was 
based upon two separate enquiries. The first was the evidential merits of the case, and 
whether sufficient evidence is available to result in a conviction. The second is that it is 
in the public interest that the matter be tried. In this manner not only did there have to 
be more than a prima facie case. In addition a policy decision had to be made as to the 
merits of prosecuting each particular case. 
The police decision to prosecute was not based on these two enquiries. In order for a 
police prosecution to proceed to trial it was sufficient for there to be a prima facie case 
established. The Commission noted that the police assessment as to whether such a 
case had been made out was liable to be influenced by the fact that the investigators 
made this decision. It was felt that these officers were too close to the case to make an 
impartial decision as to its merits. 
A police officer who carries out an investigation, inevitably and properly, forms a 
view as to the guilt of the suspect. Having done so, without any kind of improper 
motive, he may be inclined to shut his mind to other evidence telling against the 
guilt of the suspect or to overestimate the strength of the evidence that he has 
assembled. (The Phillips Commission quoted at p 83 Rozenberg 1987) 
The Commission's view was that this could be avoided by use of an independent 'filter, 
in the form of a public prosecutor responsible for assessing the evidential merits of 
matters investigated by the police. At this point a brief analysis of the office of public 
prosecutor, as examined by the Commission, may usefully be made. 
The office of public prosecuto 
It has been suggested that, regardless of differences in legal systems and geographic 
area of operation, there are certain common features of the office of prosecutor. These 
include the legal training requirements of the office, and that prosecutors are 'almost 
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invariably' civil servants, who enjoy a relatively high status within the criminal justice 
system (Moody and Tombs 1982) 
This uniformity of position is not matched by a similar uniformity of role or function, 
In the criminal justice industry the domains of the component organisations 
appear at first glance to be clearly defined and well established. Police do the 
policing; the prosecutors do the prosecuting; and the judges do the judging. But 
appearances can be deceptive. This image represents only the formal division of 
labour, the textbook description of how the system works. (McDonald 1979 p16 - 
17) 
Most examinations of the office of the prosecutor reveal the tensions existing between 
the role and the functions of prosecutors. The role of prosecutors initially appears self 
evident, to prosecute criminal matters on the public's behalf. This seemingly 
straightforward role is complicated by a number of factors, including that, in almost all 
Western jurisdictions, there is no requirement that all matters reported to the police 
should develop into criminal prosecutions. 
Therefore there is an issue as to which agency exercises responsibility for the decision 
not to prosecute; the one that investigates or the one that prosecutes. The initial 
decision may lie with the police, due to several factors including that not all events 
reported to the police fall within the scope of the criminal law. Of those that are deemed 
by the police to fall within the criminal law, some may be filtered out, and so are not 
investigated. The police may take a decision that a matter falls within the responsibility 
of another agency, or that local resources are inadequate to take on investigation of any 
matter. 
The prosecutor may play a part in these decisions and the decision, either directly or 
indirectly, in respect of what offence to charge. Even where the decision to charge lies 
solely with the police, at some stage the prosecutor will exercise the discretion to 
proceed with criminal proceedings, or to decline to prosecute any matter referred by the 
police. At this stage the prosecutor fulfils a reviewing role, assessing the adequacy for 
judicial purposes of the police investigations. 
41 
Other roles, such as court administrator, lobbyist and social worker may also be the 
province of the prosecutor. Using the notion of core and peripheral roles as is done by 
McDonald (1979), following Bittner's analysis (1975) of the police role, these roles may 
be viewed as less important than others. It is for this reason that they are referred to as 
being secondary, rather than primary, roles. The roles of exercising the decision to 
charge and of reviewer of fact and evidential quality, being core roles, fall within different 
categories as exercise of these tasks forms a major component of the work of all 
prosecutors regardless of jurisdiction. 
The issue remains as to what is the core role of the prosecutor. It is suggested that no 
single, accurate answer can be given and that the office of prosecutor cannot be treated 
a single, universally occurring entity. No single role stands on its own or is fulfilled by 
all prosecutors in a similar manner. Certainly prosecution of criminal cases will form one 
of the several core roles of all prosecutors. However, the stages of criminal proceedings 
at which this role originatesl and the manner in which that role is discharged is subject 
Ao great diversity. Given the extent of variation between different jurisdictions and the 
local operating practices of prosecutors it is suggested that ail that can validly be 
proposed is that prosecution is one of the core roles of the prosecutor. 
The functions that may be performed in addition to other core, or peripheral, roles are 
similarly numerous, 
The variety of things which one can find prosecutors doing in at least some 
jurisdictions is amazing. (Rozenberg 1987) 
The office of the Procurator Fiscal in Scotland, is a good example of this diversity. It is 
separate from the police, made up of lawyers who exercise the final decision as to 
whether to prosecute a criminal matter. However the procurator exert considerable 
impact upon the evidential quality of investigation and therefore the evidence that was 
placed before the courts. This is a result of their reviewing of the legal adequacy of 
police investigations. 
What constitutes 'criminal proceedings' will not necessarily be the same throughout a number of jurisdictions. In certain 
areas it is taken to be those matters brought before the courts, and would, therefore, not include the charging of a 
suspect, whilst in others it may be taken to be those matters wherein the rules of the criminal law have been invoked. In 
the latter instance police or prosecutor charging of suspects would form part of the criminal proceedings 
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An alternative view of the procurators suggests that they are not fully independent of the 
police, but rely heavily upon police decision-making in relation to the largest portion of 
their work. This view suggests that most of the procurators' work is the routine, formal 
processing through the courts of material supplied to them by the police and that it is 
only in an exceptional case that the procurators exercise any real review function and 
decline to prosecute. (Moody and Tombs 1982 p 140) This view accepts that 
procurators are to a large degree dependent on what the police choose to refer to them 
and that there can exist a gulf between the official position and the day to day 
practicalities of the operation of prosecutors' offices. Moody and Tombs' analysis may 
be seen to follow the predominantly American and Canadian school of opinion in respect 
of the role and function of prosecutors. 
Such analysis, whilst not frequently referred to in descriptions of the English justice 
system, has had its supporters. Prior to the coming into operation of the CPS, the 
problems of strict implementation of a division between the investigative and prosecution 
roles, and the extent to which latter was dependent upon the former, had been 
recognised. Writing in 1984, Edwards noted that; 
What distinguished the Poulsen trials was the frank recognition that, as a matter 
of everyday practice in the English administration of justice, it is often extremely 
difficult to abide by a strict demarcation of functions. In theory, the investigative 
strategy and decision making are said to be wholly within the police domain, 
whilst the subsequent decisions as to prosecution, if made by the Director of 
Public Prosecutions or Attorney General, are said to be in an atmosphere of 
insulation and objectivity. After studying the system in place in other 
countries ... the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in 1981 concluded that 
'the two roles overlap and intertwine. This is because the decision to prosecute 
is not a single intellectual act of a single person but it is made up of a series of 
decisions of a widely different kind made by many people at various stages in the 
process. (Edwards 1984 p 83) 
Since its inception, the operation of the CPS and the joint operation of, the CPS and 
police have been the subject of considerable critical examination. This has been in the 
form of both academic studies and government directed reviews, which are examined in 
the following section. 
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The Crown Prosecution Service and its powers 
The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 has been referred to as the completion of the 
implementation of the Phillips Commission recommendations for the improvement of the 
investigative and prosecution stages of the English criminal justice system (Blackstones' 
Criminal Practice 1993 p 930). 
Whilst the CPS has no powers of investigation, the existence within it of a section that 
has responsibility for supervising the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud must 
be examined. This section is known as the Fraud Investigation Group (FIG). The 
incorporation of this group, from the Metropolitan police, into plans for the establishment 
of the CPS, was a development of the pre-1 985 system of ad hoc task forces of lawyers 
and police officers to deal with individual allegations of fraud. It has been suggested that 
the formalisation of this system was not a major step in the investigation and prosecution 
of fraud, the group not having a fixed permanent staff, but fluctuating staff levels, with 
police officers being seconded to the group and the CPS staff moving between sections 
within the CPS (Levi 1987 p 177). It is suggested that in this manner a continuity of 
approach is made more difficult and has ensured that the CPS does not develop as an 
investigative agency to any extent. This approach differs from that of another 
governmental agency, the DTI; the policy and operation of which will also be examined 
in this study. 
Reference within the DTI booklet on its operation (Department of Trade and Industry 
Investigations - how they work DTI/Pub/1227/5K/2/94) to the CPS as one of the 'other 
investigatory bodies' with which it works, may be criticised as being not strictly accurate, 
if a strict interpretation of the operation of the CPS is applied. Such an approach would 
deny that the Fraud Investigation Group or any other part of the CPS plays an 
investigative role. The Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 may be taken as authority for 
the suggestion that CPS staff may advise and assist the police officers, review police 
files and prosecute criminal investigations that satisfy the tests detailed in the Code for 
Crown Prosecutors of evidential sufficiency and that a prosecution is in the public 
interest. 
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Examination of the official CPS documents (Crown Prosecution Service Annual Report 
1994 - 95 HMSO London 27 June 1995) reveals that the organisation uses the phrase 
'fraud divisions' as opposed to FIG to refer to those sections dealing with fraud matters. 
In these documents it is made clear that the prosecutors within these divisions are not 
involved in the investigation of allegations, but are to work closely with the police, and 
other agencies dealing with the investigation and prosecution of fraud, in providing an 
independent review of the investigative work of those agencies. 
During the course of the study, the Glidewell Report, on the Crown Prosecution Service 
and the Auld Report, on the criminal justice system were published. Whilst both of these 
recommend closer working links between the CPS and investigative agencies, primarily 
the police, neither should be viewed as extending the remit of the CPS to include direct 
involvement in investigative functions. Both suggest improvement in the administrative 
functions of agencies within the criminal justice system, focussing on speed and quality 
of response to and between agencies. The effect of these Reports, together with policy 
statements of the CPS, it is to suggest that the CPS does not contain any section that 
can be said to have a primary investigative role. 
In chapter 5 examination is made of the role and primary functions of a specialist unit 
within CPS that deals with fraud. Examination of. its everyday practices are made to 
establish the extent to which 'a strict demarcation of functions' is applied and thereafter 
to assess the primacy of the various functions and roles of Fraud Investigation Group 
prosecutors. 
Examination of the annual reports and other official publications of a number of 
government agencies demonstrate that this Group is not the only criminal prosecution 
authority within England dealing with fraud. The DTI, SFO and Department of Customs 
and Excise also exercise certain criminal prosecution powers in relation to complaints of 
fraud. These bodies may institute proceedings only in respect of those complaints of 
fraud falling within their legislative mandate, whilst the CPS may conduct criminal 
proceedings in respect of all offences (the only reservation being in relation to 'specified 
offences' in terms of s2 (a), a category that is very rarely used. ) 
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Of all prosecution agencies within the criminal justice system, the CPS has the broadest 
statutory remit in respect of criminal offences, with responsibility to "take over conduct of 
all criminal proceedings instituted on behalf of a police force" in England and Wales, s3 
Prosecution of Offences Act 1985. The CPS' exercise of its powers and duties has 
been subject to considerable criticism. Complaints of understaffing and lack of expertise 
dogged the early stages of its operation. Increases in staffing numbers have not 
removed the general complaint that the service has not dealt effectively with crime. 
In the 1990s, due to concerns about the organisation and efficiency of the CPS, the 
Government commissioned a Review of the CPS chaired by Sir lain Glidewell. His 
Report, published in June 1998, recommended closer working between CPS lawyers 
and the police, for example in "Criminal Justice Units" or "CJUs". 
It was suggested that a CPS lawyer would head these units with mainly CPS staff and 
that the units would need to be able to call on the police to take action in obtaining more 
evidence. For this reason it was proposed that a senior police officer would need to be 
part of each unit. The Report argued for "co-location" of CPS and police staff, so that 
CJUs would be housed in or near the relevant police station (Glidewell 1998 Summary 
para 29). Towards the end of the course of the study, a number of these units came into 
operation. 
The Report also recommended the re-establishment of small groups of Special 
Casework Lawyers who would be available to provide early advice to the police 
(Glidewell 1998 Chapter 9, paragraphs 32 and 33). On the Law Commission's website 
it is suggested that, 
These examples demonstrate a pragmatic approach to the Philips principle, 
promoting efficiency without compromising the independence of the lawyer when 
taking decisions whether or not to prosecute an alleged offender or whether or 
not to discontinue a prosecution already up and running. 
Throughout 2000 and 2001 this Recommendation was put into operation in police forces 
and CPS Areas across England and Wales. However, unlike other offences, in the force 
studied fraud remained subject to the traditional division between police and CPS. 
Processing of communications and transmission of material in respect of Commercial 
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Branch matters did not make use of CJUs nor were specialist lawyers locally available to 
provide advice on major fraud investigations. 
Whilst too recently introduced to have been formally reviewed, this study found that, 
based on anecdotal evidence, neither co-location nor the re-introduction of Special 
Casework Lawyers had impacted upon the investigation and prosecution of serious 
fraud. In relation to other offences the distinction between the investigators and 
prosecutors was riot as distinct as suggested by the Law Commission. Particularly in 
relation to minor offences, it was anecdotally reported that CPS lawyers would direct or 
instruct officers to caution as opposed to charging a suspect. Not all police officers 
accept that the CPS has power to direct or instruct in this manner, arguing that the 
decision to caution is one that lies with the police and the police alone. 
Some resolution to this and other concerns as to the operation of the CPS; police and 
broad criminal justice system may come from the government's response to the Auld 
Report. 
Published in October 2001, the Report has been described on the Home Office website 
as, 
the most extensive review of the criminal. courts system for 30 years 
and, 
The Government acknowledges the review as an important contribution towards 
establishing modern, efficient criminal courts, that have fewer delays, are in 
touch with the communities they serve and respond to the needs of their users. It 
sits alongside the current review of sentencing and police reform to provide a 
criminal justice system that is respected, efficient and seen to deliver. (Home 
Office 2001) 
The issue of reform of the police and the courts remains live and contentious. In 
February 2002 police officers overwhelmingly rejected a ballot that linked reform of 
police with pay regulations. In the same month, the collapse of two high profile criminal 
trials, one on the grounds of inadmissably obtained evidence and allied non-disclosure 
by CPS, the other on the grounds that police inducements offered to a witness made her 
evidence "wholly unreliable", ensured that the issue of the relationship between the 
police and CPS retained a high public profile. 
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Debate on the overall state of the criminal justice system became increasingly public as 
opposed to political following the comments of the Commissioner of the Metropolitan 
Police, Sir Jon Stevens and the Head of the Bar Council, David Bean QC, in March 
2002. In this environment relatively little comment has been made on the Auld Report's 
recommendations as they could affect the prosecution of fraud. 
It is recommended that procedures for preparation for trial alter significantly, including a 
change in the respective roles of the police and the prosecuting authorities as to 
determination of charge. In the majority of cases the Crown Prosecution Service, not the 
police, would decide whether and what offence to charge. The CPS would have 
increased responsibility in relation to discharging the duties of disclosure. Most 
importantly it was recommended that serious fraud should be tried by a judge sitting 
alone or with lay members drawn from a panel, instead of a jury. 
The government had, prior to the Auld Report, examined the issue of serious fraud in the 
creation of the Serious Fraud office. 
The Serious Fraud Office 
The SFO was brought into existence by the Criminal Justice Act 1987, following on from 
the Roskill Commission into the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud. It was 
something of an anomaly, due to its operation being in direct contrast to the 
recommendations of the Phillips Commission, that the investigative and prosecution 
functions should not vest in one organisation. The CPS had been created to take over 
the prosecution role of the police, and police investigative powers re-structured. 
However within two years of these occurrences the Roskill Commission reported that, 
The public no longer believes that the legal system of England and Wales is 
capable of bringing the perpetrators of serious frauds expeditiously and 
effectively to book. The overwhelming weight of evidence laid before us 
suggests that the public is right. (Lord Roskill 1986) 
Whilst not all of the recommendations of the Roskill Commission were accepted, the 
suggestion that the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud matters should be the 
responsibility of a single body, comprising lawyers, accountants and police officers was 
accepted. The SFO owes its creation to the acceptance of the government that serious 
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fraud was not being effectively dealt with by the revised criminal justice system and that 
the merging of powers of investigation and prosecution in one body was justified. 
Response to concerns that this ran in direct conflict with the Phillips Commission's 
recommendations was based upon the government's acceptance that serious fraud was 
an offence of such a specific and complex nature that an exception to the general rules 
was warranted. Precedent for this approach lay in the adoption of far eastern fraud 
offices operation, and in the operation of the pre 1985 style Fraud Investigation Group of 
the Metropolitan police. There was precedent for adopting far eastern methods of 
policing, the public order tactics and equipment of the English police having been 
updated in the 1980s based on Hong Kong policing methods (Jefferson 1990). 
The view that economic crime was different to other forms of criminal behaviour and that 
it required a different investigation approach was not new. Similar suggestions had been 
made by the 1878 Royal Commission headed by Lord Penzance (Sarker 1995). What 
was new was the powers that were given to the department tasked with dealing with 
serious fraud. 
SFO powers of investigation and prosecution 
The Criminal Justice Act 1987 details the powers of the SFO, section 2 relating to its 
investigatory powers. These were modelled upon those powers conferred by the 
Companies Act 1985 and the Financial Services Act 1986 upon the DTI inspectors, but 
are more extensive. The mandate of the SFO is to investigate any suspected offence 
that appears to the Director on reasonable grounds to involve serious or complex fraud 
(sl (3). What constitutes serious or complex fraud is not defined, thereby allowing the 
SFO considerable latitude in determining what matters to accept, as definition of the 
scope of its operation must rest with itself. The Director's investigative powers can be 
applied 'for the purpose of investigating the affairs, or any aspect of the affairs, of any 
person' (emphasis added), there appearing good reason to do so' (s2 (1). Furthermore 
these powers can be assigned by the Director to any competent investigator who is not a 
member of the SFO, in addition being exercised by authorised members of the SFO. 
The flexibility of the Office's terms of reference has been further demonstrated by the 
lowering of the criteria of acceptance from matters with prejudice of or in excess of 
P-5,000,000 to those involving E 1,000,000 (The Times 2 May 1995). 
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The distinction between the investigative powers of the SFO and of the police is 
demonstrated by examination of s2 (2) and (3). Unlike the police, SFO investigators are 
not required to caution their suspect and could compel the answering of questions by 
utilising the power to bring a separate criminal charge against any person who refuses to 
answer. Written notice is served upon a suspect (termed 'a person under investigation' 
by the Act) calling upon them to appear at a specified time and place to answer 
questions or to produce specified documents. Such notification contains the warning 
that 
failure without reasonable excuse to comply with these requirements is a criminal 
offence (Frommel 1996 p 227). 
It was this removal of the suspect's right of silence, with the proviso that reasonable 
excuse will deter criminal liability (that carries with it the prospect of imposition on 
summary conviction, of imprisonment of up to six months or the imposition of a fine, or 
both), that has provided a large portion of the controversy surrounding the operation of 
the SFO. 
The House of Lords ruling in Rv Director of Serious Fraud Office, ex parte Smith (1993) 
AC I (HL) ensured that this partial removal of the right of silence was lawful not only at 
the suspect interview stage of proceedings, but also after the person under investigation 
has been charged. However, following the EHRR case of Saunders v UK and 
subsequent domestic case law, the impact of Smith is not as great as it may first appear. 
During the time between the Smith and Saunders decisions examination of the powers 
of both the SFO and DTI continued, focussing on the issue of compulsion. In some 
ways the powers of the DTI inspectors were more draconian than those of the SFO, yet 
the SFO has received far greater media criticism than had the DTI. Part of the 
controversy over the SFO centred upon its power to compel the answering of its queries 
on pain of separate criminal action, often referred to as s2 powers. Argument centred on 
the fact that neither the police, Inland Revenue nor Customs, all of which investigate 
fraud, had similar powers. 
One response to this criticism was that s2 powers be extended to the police. The 1993 
Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, chaired by Lord Runciman, recommended the 
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removal of the prohibition of s 2(11) against assignment of powers of investigation, 
including that to compel the answering of questions, in respect of police officers working 
as part of the SFO (Royal Commission on Criminal Justice 1993 p 23). This 
recommendation was not accepted. 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and its incorporation into 
domestic legislation in the Human Rights Act 1998 having been used as the basis of a 
successful challenge to the SFO and DTI inroads on suspects' right to silence, together 
with judgement in Saunders v UK 23 EHRR 313, previous concerns as to compulsion 
largely declined. Saunders may be viewed as having had considerable effect upon fraud 
investigations, effectively removing the rights of both the DTI and SFO to compel 
response to questioning. 
Prior to this change, criticism of the high cost of the SFO and its apparent lack of 
success predominated. The media and public response to the Office has been 
described as being a 'barrage of criticism' (Sarker 1995 p 59). The 1993-4 Annual 
Report of the SFO statement of a 80% conviction rate did not reach the public in the 
same manner as did reports that 'SFO investigation cost Hamilton his job' (Webster The 
Times 27 October 1994). Similarly reports that the SFO dropped its case against Nadir 
after two years of work, with investigation costs in excess of E 3,000,000 (Mackay and 
Elliot The Times 1 October 1993), together with the failure of its E 19,000,000 trial of 
George Walker (Ashw orth The Times 25 October 1994) attracted greater attention than 
its successes. Reports were published as to the likelihood of the SFO being disbanded, 
by amalgamation into the CPS and extending section 2 powers to this combined group 
(Gibb The Times 1 and 13 July 1994). These reports followed the recommendations of 
the Working Group set up to examine the criminal justice systems response to fraud 
(Review of the Handling of Serious Fraud HMSO March 1994). The suggestions were 
not accepted, and on 1 April 1995 it was reported that, 
The Serious Fraud Office was given a ringing endorsement by the Government 
yesterday when the Attorney General announced that it would not be abolished 
but would have an expanded role to tackle more cases. (Gibb 1 April 1995) 
This report substantiates comments published earlier in the year that, 
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In all the recent media criticism of the SFO it is interesting to note that none 
deride the concept of a separate body of lawyers, accountants and police to 
investigate and prosecute serious fraud. (Sarker 1995 p60). 
It was in this report that, for the first time, the successes of the SFO were mentioned. 
This provided a setting for the reporting of the recommendations that the SFO should 
extend the scope of its operation by lowering the amount of prejudice to a sum of 
F-1,000,000 or more to serve as one of the criteria for acceptance of cases. This view 
was accepted and in May 1995 police forces around England and Wales were advised 
by the SFO of its 'new criteria' that included the amount at risk being at least E1,000,000 
(SFO 12 May 1995). Even with this extension a number of cases of serious fraud could 
remain investigated by the police. This is due not only to the 'at risk' criteria, but to the 
somewhat vaguely defined 'key criterion. The phrasing of this test is reminiscent of the 
wording of the Act, in that it too gives great flexibility to the SFO. This is a result of 
leaving definition of operational limits with the operating body; the key criterion being; 
... the suspected fraud is such that the 
direction of the investigation should be in 
the hands of those responsible for the prosecution. 
In the light of this document and the Davie Report (1994) there were clear indications 
that the SFO would continue to operate in the manner in which it has since its 
establishment. However, it is suggested that the response to the Auld Report into the 
criminal justice system and in particular serious fraud may yet alter the function of the 
SFO, if not its very existence. 
The Department of Trade and Indust 
The Department of Trade and Industry is a multi-function agency with tasks ranging from 
the field of insolvency, through licensing, to the inspection of company affairs. Many of 
its tasks do not fall within the ambit of this study. These are not examined in this 
section, which concentrates upon the DTI's work in relation to the investigation of fraud. 
DTI 12owers of investigation 
DTI investigative powers are conferred by provisions of the Companies Act 1985 and 
1989. Part XIV of the 1985 Act, dealing with the investigations of companies and their 
affairs, the power to question persons and request and seize documents, are relevant, 
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as is Part III of the 1989 Act. The provisions of the latter extend the application of part 
XIV of the 1985 Act. Accordingly the provisions of both Acts need to be examined. In 
addition sections 94,102 to 106 and 177 of the Financial Services Act 1986 are relevant 
to the operation of DTI investigations and inspectors. The DTI's publication on its 
investigations details the most frequently applied of these sections, and notes that the 
1985 Act is referred to as amended by the relevant sections of the 1989 Act. 
Re Pergamon Press (1970) 3 AH ER 535 impacted significantly upon future DTI 
inspections. The judgement recognises that there are no formal procedures for such 
inspections and that these inspections are subject to no rules other than that they should 
be fair. Pre- 1998 Human Rights Act examination of the investigative powers of the DTI 
inspectors suggested these powers were not only extremely broad but also operated so 
as to exclude certain basic principles of the common law. These included the right of 
silence or self incrimination (nemo tenetur so ipsum accusare) and to be advised of the 
charge and permitted to make response to such charge (Sarker 1994 VoI15 NolO p 
310). 
Following the Saunders judgement and coming into effect of the Human Rights Act, the 
more draconian operation of the DTI was radically overhauled so as to avoid both 
declarations of incompatibility and allied failure of prosecutions. As may be seen from R 
v Everson CA [2001 ] EWCCA Crim 896 and Attorney General's Reference No 7 of 2000, 
the right not to incriminate oneself does not apply to compulsory provision of one's 
business documents or to fail to mention in questioning under caution facts subsequently 
relied on in trial. 
Accordingly, the s 431 of the 1985 Act discretion conferred upon the Secretary of State 
to initiate an investigation into the affairs of a company upon the application of members 
of the company, or the company itself by appointing inspectors who are to produce a 
report upon their investigations, remains. Similarly remaining is s432 provision of 
comparable powers in circumstances where investigation is not requested, but 
circumstances suggest a company is being conducted with intent to defraud, or 
otherwise prejudice, its creditors or members; or where a company is, or may be, 
operating for fraudulent or unlawful purposes. In addition an investigation may be 
initiated where the members of the company have not been supplied with information 
about its affairs that they might reasonably expect. 
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All these sections relate to circumstances in which there is some indication of actual or 
potential prejudice to the company or its members, generally through misrepresentation 
or fraudulent non-disclosure. The scope of the powers conferred under these sections 
lies in the removal of the right of silence and in that the evidence obtained under 
compulsion is admissible as evidence in legal proceedings in respect of the matter under 
investigation. Failure to answer queries or provide any information requested in respect 
of an investigation conducted in terms of sections 431 and 432 is, in terms of s. 436, to 
create liability for separate proceedings to be brought on a charge of contempt. The 
inspectors' powers of questioning in the course of an investigation were extended by s. 
56 of the 1989 Act. Prior to this the inspectors were entitled to question and require 
production of any documents for those who were or had been officers of the company. 
Now DTI inspectors may lawfully exercise these powers in relation to any person who 'is 
or may be in possession of information relating to a matter which they believe to be 
relevant to the investigation'. Their powers were also increased by use of the word 
'documents' as opposed to 'books and papers'. The former is broader than the latter as 
it incorporates all forms of recorded information, including computer disks, tapes etc., 
anything that may produce a legible copy of the information contained within it. 
Prior to 1999 s 57 of the 1989 Act provided a link between the work of the DTI and SFO. 
This section empowers the Secretary of State to terminate a DTI investigation where the 
commission of a criminal offence is revealed, and to refer the matter to the appropriate 
prosecuting authority. The effect of this section has been described as providing, 
... a temptation for the SFO to 'circumvent' the prohibition contained in s 2(8) [of 
the Criminal Justice Act] and use in the prosecution for fraud the evidence 
obtained by DTI inspectors appointed under the Companies Act. (Frommel 1996 
p 229) 
Following the 1993 European Court of Human Rights judgement in Funke v France, that 
use of evidence obtained under compulsion in criminal proceedings is in breach of 
Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Saunders v UK, the 
likelihood of this being realised may be viewed as having decreased significantly. 
Following Rv Lyons and others it is suggested it is removed entirely, save in relation to 
documentation provided under compulsion. 
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S 435 of the 1985 Act, dealing with the production of bank account records is not 
contentious and need not be examined in detail. Neither do those following provisions 
relating to the inspectors reports, the powers to bring civil suits on a company's behalf 
and those relating to the costs of an investigation. S 441 is of considerable importance 
in that it provides that the report of an inspector is admissible in evidence in legal 
proceedings as conclusive proof of the inspector's opinion. In this way the rules in 
relation to opinion evidence may have been extended. Whether this is so will depend 
upon the weight that a court will attach to the opinion. It may be the case that, as with 
medical evidence, the report may be considered as expert evidence. If this were the 
case it would have considerable procedural consequences. This is due to the fact that 
such evidence may be admissible upon its mere production and carries considerable 
weight in the court's determination of a matter. 
Ss 442 and following relate to the other powers of investigation of company affairs that 
are available to the IDTI. S 442 is the broadest of these since it provides for the 
Secretary of State to appoint inspectors and initiate an investigation into the true 
ownership of a company, either upon application of members of that company or upon 
an independent basis. The investigative powers applicable in these investigations are 
the same as those that apply in the previously mentioned investigation. The report that 
will be produced as a result of such investigations will be published. Given the effect of 
the publication of these DTI reports (Levi 1993 p 159) and the investigative powers that 
may be applied, use of this section is of considerable importance. In addition it may be 
noted that it has the potential for substantial political importance. 
The same is true of use of the powers conferred under s. 444. This section again confers 
considerable discretionary powers upon the Secretary of State to initiate investigations 
into the ownership of shares. In terms of s445, the Secretary of State may impose 
restrictions upon dealings in such shares if there is any difficulty in obtaining the required 
information. These powers are moderatea by the findings of such investigations not 
being published, but remaining confidential. As such the importance of these forms of 
investigation is difficult to determine. 
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The bulk of the investigatory work of the DTI has been reported as being carried out 
under s. 447 of the Companies Act 1985 (The Company Lawye 1990 p202), which 
authorises the inspectors to order the production of books and papers. 
The operation of the DTI has been criticised in a manner similar to that in respect of the 
CPS and SFO, yet there have been virtually no calls for the abolition of this department 
as there have in relation to other agencies. Rather the suggestion has been that the 
department remains in existence but improve its inspections/investigations. Even other 
branches of the government, such as the Trade and Industry Committee in the Third 
Report, that provided the basis for the White Paper on Company Investigations, have 
noted that the DTI does not enjoy a good reputation. In editorial comment it was noted 
that, 
Over the years this journal has rarely discovered an opportunity to praise the 
Department of Trade and Industry. (Long 1990 p 126) 
The national media has echoed this view, with The Times publishing comments that the 
reports of DTI inspections were "worthy but worthless" (Wilkins Business Letters 21 
October 1994). The newspaper's own correspondents reported that, 
The wheels of justice grind slowly, but they move at chariot speed compared with 
the progress of some DTI investigations. (Campbell City Diary, Business Section 
9 February 1994) 
In the same month as this report, the DTI came under further attack for its perceived 
failure to deal effectively with company directors and company auditors who failed to 
comply with the accounting requirements of the Companies Acts. Calls were made for 
increased resources to be allocated to the DTI investigations, to remedy the situation 
where, in 1993, of the 6,710 companies that were criticised for 'unfit conduct', the DTI 
proceeded against only 322 (Burrell Business Section 13 February 1994) 
It has been suggested that the appointment as inspectors of persons who are not 
permanent DTI staff members has hindered the development of DTI investigative skills 
and that a preferable situation would be to base the conduct of DTI investigation on the 
operation of the police. In this manner, it is suggested the DTI would build up a group of 
trained investigators, similar to the CID of the police. These groups could call upon 
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outside sources for assistance where required. Whilst there may be merit in these 
suggestions, the findings and recommendations of the Roskill Committee (1986) should 
be considered. The Committee found that the police, amongst other agencies, were not 
dealing successfully with fraud. This being so there would appear to be reason not to 
base the operation of another investigative agency upon that of the police. 
Whilst the fraud investigations sections of the DTI have not faced public criticism in the 
same way as have the SFO and CPS, the scope and extent of their investigation powers 
have significantly altered following firstly European and then domestic examination in 
light of the ECHR and Human Rights Act 1998. Notwithstanding the (2001) Auld Report 
there is no indication that the criminal investigative arms of the DTI will be abolished. As 
did the Saunders and related cases, it may be expected that judgements such as Rv 
Customs and Excise, ex parte Popely and Harris (1999) will impact upon the operation 
of the DTL 
The Department of Customs and Excise 
As with the DTI, the Department of Customs and Excise ("Customs"), has a very broad 
mandate. It has a variety of tasks, the most relevant for this study being the collection of 
Inland Revenue in the form of VAT and Excise duties. In this aspect of its operation, 
Customs differs from the police, CPS and SFO in the manner in which it performs its 
tasks and the extent of its powers. Whilst, in certain respects the powers of Customs are 
broader than those of the DTI and SFO, it has been noted that, 
Although 
... revenue collectors have power to initiate criminal prosecution for 
evasion it is clear that it would be impossible to prosecute all those who fail to 
honour their legal obligations. Enforcement powers, therefore, must be geared to 
discouraging evasion by making evasion an unattractive option and by promoting 
voluntary compliance. (Rowan-Robinson Watchman and Barker 1990 p151) 
Unlike the previously discussed agencies, this department rarely has been criticised in 
relation to its methods of fraud investigation and prosecution. Its function in relation to 
the collection of Value Added Tax (VAT) commenced with the coming into effect of the 
1972 Finance Act. This Act created the concept of VAT and made Customs responsible 
for its collection and ancillary manners. 
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Customs' powers of investiqation 
Customs investigation powers are provided by the provisions of the 1972 and 1985 
Finance Acts. Section 12 of the 1985 Act amended s39 of the 1972 (principal) Act that 
dealt with offences and penalties, in accordance with the recommendations of the Keith 
Commission on the enforcement powers of Revenue Departments. These sections 
detail what constitutes 'fraudulent evasion of tax'. This offence includes intentional or 
reckless making of false statements of material fact in relation to information required by 
the Act, the making and production of a false document relating to the payment of VAT 
and claiming of repayments to which the claimant is not entitled. The increased penalty 
in respect of fraudulent evasion of tax makes this offence an arrestable one under s. 2 of 
the Criminal Law Act 1967. Both police and Customs officers have, therefore, the power 
of arrest where reasonable grounds exist for suspecting the offence to have been 
committed. The exercise of this power is to be in accordance with the principles and 
code of practice previously examined. Search warrants may be applied for by Customs 
officials in situations in which there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a fraud 
offence that appears to be of a serious nature has been, or is about to be, committed. 
The powers of entry and inspection held by Customs are broader than those of any other 
agency. S. 37 (1) provides that officials may 'at any reasonable time enter premises 
used in connection with the carrying on of a business' for the purposes of exercising any 
of their tax functions. S. 37 (2) permits entry into premises that are reasonably believed 
to be used in connection with the supply of goods under taxable supplies and the 
inspection of such goods. These powers are not subject to the review of a court in that 
application for a warrant does not have to made. It has been noted that these powers 
are generally exercised with restraint (Levi 1993 p 165) which may go towards 
explaining why there is less controversy over these powers than over the s. 2 powers of 
the SFO or the DTI powers of gathering evidence. 
A warrant is required for a search to be conducted and seizure of any documents. 
Restraint similar to that exercised in relation to entry and inspection is seen to operate in 
application for such warrants. Applications are infrequently made and the results of 
authorised searches are overwhelmingly successful, with evidence of fraud being 
obtained in the vast majority of cases. 
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Other aqencies that deal with fraud 
A response to fraud is also provided by any of a number of civil justice agencies that co- 
exist and may co-operate with criminal justice agencies. At the commencement of the 
study the foremost civil agency was the Securities and Investments Board. 
The Securities and Investments Board (SIB) 
The origins of SIB lie in the Financial Services Act 1986. The Act provided for the 
creation of a private sector body with the status of a private company to which the 
Secretary of State would delegate the power to act as a designated agency, responsible 
for the regulation of investment business. The development of investment business had 
not been matched by development of regulatory legislation. The Financial Services Act 
was an attempt to remedy this situation. This process was continued by the Companies 
Act 1989. Prior to these Acts the operation of the investment business was regulated by 
the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act. When Professor Gower was appointed to 
examine the situation it was thought that the Government did not intend to make any 
meaningful improvement to the operation of the investment business. However a 
number of financial scandals, and the public concern that accompanied them, altered 
this situation. 
At the same time the Government viewed with increasing favour a system of self 
regulation within a statutory framework. This was seen as providing a greater flexibility 
in the making and enforcing of rules and providing a greater distance between the 
government and the regulators, than would be the case with a government body. These 
claims were viewed with some suspicion at the time, and it suggested by one 
commentator that the real basis of the governmenfs approval of the system lay in its 
desire to lessen government intervention and hand responsibility to the private sector 
(Page 1987 p 302). 
Suspicion as to the increased efficacy of this system has proved to be well founded, a 
'practitioner based, statute backed'system of self-regulatory having been shown to have 
failed in its task on a number of occasions. The media reporting of this has seen it as 
due to the closeness of the regulators to the regulated, a number of the latter being 
unwilling to regulate their business conduct to the extent required by the regulator. 
(Ham 29 Jan 1995) 
59 
Concerns continued as to the effectiveness of self-regulation throughout the latter half of 
the 1990s. Overhaul of the financial regulation system as operated under the SIB was 
completed on 14 June 2000 when the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 received 
Royal Assent. The Act provides a framework within which a single regulator for the 
financial services industry, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) operates. The FSA 
has a full range of statutory powers. These operate in conjunction with the Financial 
Services and Markets Tribunal, the role of which is to regulate the conduct of financial 
services. Following the Act a single ombudsman for the financial services industry was 
created, together with compensation schemes to provide further protection for 
consumers. 
In addition to the FSA's statutory powers to authorise, regulate, investigate and 
discipline authorised persons and to regulate collective investment schemes, the 2000 
Act provides that certain actions constitute criminal offences and places responsibility 
upon the FSA to investigate and prosecute the same. The official website of the FSA 
described the Act as, 
... intended to co-ordinate and modernise financial regulatory arrangements 
which are currently established under a number of different enactments. (FSA 
2001) 
The Act provides that FSA has four statutory objectives. These are to maintain market 
confidence, promote public understanding of the financial system, secure appropriate 
consumer protection and reduce financial crime. It is in the carrying out of the latter role 
that it may be expected that the FSA will have most dealings with the other justice 
agencies described above. The explanatory notes to the Act state that, 
This provision does not by itself impose any duties on firms. The Authority is 
expected to pursue this objective in co-operation with various law enforcement 
agencies. (FSA 2001) 
At the time of the study relatively little academic analysis of the operation of the FSA had 
occurred. That this is so is suggested as being directly linked to its relatively short time 
in operation. It had not been possible to assess the accuracy of the FSA's statements, 
of direct relevance to the study that, 
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We also have various criminal prosecution powers, including powers to 
prosecute persons who engage in regulated activities without authorisation. We 
work closely with other law enforcement agencies and use regulatory, civil and 
criminal powers. (FSA 2001) 
Aqencies chosen for stud 
Extensive criticism has been made of the operation of virtually all the agencies 
discussed in this chapter. This provided considerable material with which to begin the 
study. By contrast very little criticism had been made of the legislative framework within 
which these agencies operate, Ormerod's work (1999) being a notable exception. This 
was not particularly problematic for this study, since its primary focus was not analysis of 
the legislative framework within which agencies operated, but the operation of those 
agencies. The difficulty lay in deciding which agencies to study. 
It was thought that there would be a limited value in conducting fieldwork in all of the 
agencies discussed in this chapter. Some of the agencies described have relatively 
limited dealings with fraud of the type that would fall within the definition adopted for the 
purposes of this study and detailed in chapter one. The Department of Customs and 
Excise is a prime example of this, as a significant portion of its work is concerned with 
taxes and other revenue due to the state. Investigations and prosecutions related to 
failure by individuals to pay such taxes not falling within the definition of fraud adopted 
for the study, it was decided not to examine this agency. As the study progressed, whilst 
the SIB/FSA's work could be regulatory, investigatory or prosecutorial, it was not 
comparable to that of other civil or criminal justice agencies. Unlike specialist units 
within the police of CPS, the SIB/FSA's work appeared to involve breaches of codes of 
conduct not necessarily connected to fraud on individuals. The volume of its work that 
fell within the study's definition of fraud was felt to be so limited as to make an 
examination of its operation in this respect of little value to the study. 
The same can not be said of the work of the SFO. Of the agencies described in this 
chapter, it is the SFO that, were the study to be repeated, could most usefully be 
included. The reasons for non-inclusion of the SFO focussed on the time that the study 
had taken and the need to draw an end to the data collection. Examination of the 
operation of specialist units within the police and CPS provides examples of criminal 
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justice agencies that dealt solely with the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud 
respectively and, in that function, inter-acted with the other. The DTI provides an 
example of an agency that combined not only the investigatory and prosecutorial 
functions in a single agency but also regulatory and enforcement roles. Examination of 
the SFO's operation would have provided an example of another agency that combines 
these functions and comparative analysis may have been made between the two. 
However, the duration of the study was such that this was not a viable option and, 
reluctantly, this option had to be dropped. The constraints of the study led to a decision 
to examine those agencies that had a general investigative or prosecutorial role in 
addition to dealing with fraud as defined for the purposes of the study. This rationalised 
the exclusion of the SFO, since it deals only with fraud. This enables examination of 
practitioners' roles, work and views to be made in the context of being part of the 
broader criminal justice system. As such the responses to fraud and each other of the 
various agencies chosen for this study can be set in the context of the broader criminal 
justice system. 
The definitional and time constraints were the primary reasons for limiting the main focus 
of the study to investigation and prosecution within a criminal justice context. Using the 
study's definition it may have been possible to examine the response of the civil justice 
systems to fraud. However initial indications were that agencies dealing with fraud in the 
context of the civil law would be difficult to access, for reasons of commercial 
considerations. These include the 'in-house' fraud investigation units that operate in 
most banks and insurance companies. It was thought that most financial institutions 
would be reluctant to discuss the extent of fraud within their operation, citing the need to 
maintain confidence and client confidentiality (Levi 1991). Were those considerations 
overcome, it is possible that interesting comparative analysis could be made between 
the response of civil and criminal law systems to the fact of fraud and the response to it. 
Having responsibility for the investigation of most crime, the police provided the first 
choice of investigative agency. Due to the CPS' statutory responsibility for the 
prosecution of all criminal proceedings instituted by the police, this was the second 
agency chosen to be examined. It was thought that these two agencies would provide 
results in respect of agencies in which the investigative and prosecutorial roles were 
separate. The third criminal justice agency chosen was the DTI. As with the police and 
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CPS, this agency has a specialist unit that deals with fraud. It was thought that 
examination of this unit's operation would provide a comparator with which the results 
obtained from examination of the operation of the police and CPS could be analysed. 
In the following two chapters the literature review and determination of methodology that 
preceded the fieldwork is described; thereafter the fieldwork conducted in the chosen 
agencies is detailed. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
As briefly described in the preceding chapters, the broad scope of the study 
emerged whilst working as a prosecutor in a Southern African Commonwealth 
jurisdiction, with very limited experience of the response of the English criminal 
justice system to fraud. Within many Commonwealth countries there are no formal 
systems of recording crime and crime trends as exist under the British Crime Survey 
and Home Office recording systems. In such systems the extent of the occurrence of 
any particular form of criminal activity, as well as the response of the criminal justice 
system to it, can only be approximated. Given that the extent of the problem is not 
known with any degree of reliability, it is equally difficult to assess what could 
improve the response of the criminal justice system to an offence that, if nothing else 
reported, the local media was announcing as occurring with increasing frequency. It 
was thought that the English system of recording and analysing crime would provide 
an insight into how the formal systems could respond to criminal activity better. 
This section of the study examines the first stages of the research, that began with 
examination of the concepts and terms that formed the substance of the study. This 
chapter is divided into sections. The first. examines the socio-legal development of 
the concept of "fraud" and the related notions. of "white-collar crime". The latter 
concept originated in America in 1949 in the work of Edwin Sutherland. Sutherland's 
original theory having been developed by both British and American criminologists, 
branches of current criminological thought accept as relevant the concepts of 
"corporate crime" and "business crime" despite neither being part of the letter of 
English law. 
Following examination of the literature on the legal and criminological definitions, 
examination is made of the literature on those bodies that either investigate or take 
formal action in respect of allegations of fraud. This stage of the research discusses 
in greater detail the distinction between the criminal and civil law response to fraud 
and the impracticability, for the purposes of this study, of conducting a 
comprehensive examination of all possible responses to fraud as outlined in chapter 
2. 
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It was on this basis that the decision was made to focus upon the work of the 
traditional investigation and prosecution agencies within the criminal justice system, 
together with the Department of Trade and Industry, an agency that combines these 
two functions with a regulatory approach. Accordingly the review of the literature is 
concerned primarily with British works on the establishment and operation of the 
police and Crown Prosecution Service and the roles of investigators and 
prosecutors. 
In addition to examination of the more traditional forms of response to suspected 
crime, such as those provided by the police and prosecution, it became apparent that 
other, less traditional agencies played important roles in "dealing with fraud". These 
are the agencies that are capable of exercising a regulatory function in addition to 
prosecutorial function. Accordingly examination is made of studies of the concept 
and reality of "regulation" and exercise of regulatory powers, particularly 
enforcement, together with studies into the operation of specific regulatory bodies. 
The final section of this chapter is an identification of the themes that developed as a 
result of the literature review. 
Aqencies that deal with fraud in Enqland and Southern Africa 
As detailed in the Introduction to this study, the English criminal justice system has 
an imprecise definition of 'fraud'. Examination of related literature indicates that 
academic studies have tended to focus upon the operation of specific organisations 
and how they deal with certain types of criminal activity, rather than taking fraud as 
the subject and thereafter examining different agencies that deal with its 
investigation and prosecution (Levi 1987). 
The earliest stages of the literature review revealed that the English agencies 
responsible for dealing with fraud not only investigated and prosecuted, but could 
also regulate business operations in a manner not recognised by the Southern 
African Commonwealth criminal justice systems. 
Many Southern African Commonwealth countries do not have agencies that can 
operate on both sides of the boundary of regulation of sharp business practice and 
criminality. The reason for this is that these jurisdictions do not have well established 
or any regulatory systems as part of their justice systems. In these countries, 
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Zimbabwe being one, such regulation of business activity as there is, is achieved by 
prosecution. The prosecutions that do occur are in relation to breaches of secondary 
legislation, such as control of building sites, movement and control of animals, 
control of waste etc, as a result of investigations by the police. 
In Zimbabwe police investigations into all suspected breaches of the law are 
forwarded to the public prosecutor's offices, these State lawyers prosecuting 
regulatory breaches in the same way as they do allegations of other forms of 
criminality. Those persons or businesses not prosecuted within the criminal justice 
system are not subjected to any legislative limits or examination of their personal or 
corporate operation. Working in such a system it was interesting to come into 
contact with the perspective that held the criminal justice system had a role to play in 
regulating business in a non-crime orientated manner. 
Within most jurisdictions "sharp practice" is generally understood as conduct that the 
courts can not catch under the criminal law yet the ordinary person recognises as 
unacceptable practice. An example would be a building contractor, whose cost 
cutting operation results in use of faulty machinery, which machinery is used 
resulting in the death of an employee. In a number of Southern African 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, although technically possible, it is extremely unlikely 
that the contractor would be charged with "culpable homicide" before the criminal 
court. It is almost certain that they would not be prosecuted under Health and Safety 
legislation, since there is virtually no such legislation. It is absolutely certain that they 
would not be served with a improvement notice, nor would they otherwise be 
required to improve the safety of the operations, failing which they would face 
financial penalties and possible prosecution, as no such systems exist in many 
Southern African Commonwealth countries. 
But for a death occurring, they could expect not to be prosecuted at all, despite their 
actions causing others to work in conditions that are generally considered bad and 
unacceptable. Even in those circumstances the offence charged would not be one 
of a regulatory nature but of "culpable homicide", the negligent causing of death of 
another person. In many Southern African Commonwealth jurisdictions it is almost 
impossible to prove the offence, as corporate negligence is extremely difficult to 
establish, due to breaks in the chains of communication and responsibility that are 
essential to establishing negligence. Similarly an investment manager who shares 
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their views on the prospects of various investments with their friends, to those 
friends' subsequent advantage, is not prosecuted for breach of investment 
regulations or "fraud" despite their actions increasing the cost of subsequent sales to 
the "outsider'. 
The lack of definition of the concept of fraud may in part explain this situation, as the 
term fraud covers a variety of actions, ranging from a "straight forward" obtaining 
pecuniary advantage by deception, to more involved business transactions and the 
failure to comply with Company Law requirements. Some actions are easily 
understood as "offences", based in the criminal law, whilst others are of a more civil 
law nature. This diversity of use may be seen as reflected in the different agencies 
and bodies stated as providing a response to fraud. 
In the English context, the agency that may be expected to be most easily identified 
as having some responsibility for deal with 'fraud' is that having the term 'fraud' in its 
title, the Serious Fraud Office. Certain other agencies such as the Crown 
Prosecution Service have sections that again from their titles are expected to be 
involved in the criminal justice response to fraud; the Fraud Investigation Group 
being one example. Similarly police forces have specialised Criminal Investigation 
Departments (CID) sections to detect and investigate fraud, that are often referred to 
as being "fraud squads". 
Despite these titles both the police and CPS investigate and prosecute allegations of 
fraud beyond these specialised groups. Non-specialised CID officers within each 
police area may receive allegations or complaints of fraud; so too may uniformed 
officers. As with all allegations of criminal behaviour, the more complex the 
allegations or more serious the crime (in either the impact upon the individual victim 
or the number of victims), the more likely those allegations are to be investigated and 
then prosecuted by a specialist investigator or prosecutor. This is as true of fraud as 
it is of assault. 
It is increasingly common for the various departments within UK government 
agencies to be made known to the public and their operation publicised. In recent 
years this has been particularly true of those departments established to counter 
fraud. A well publicised example is provided by the Benefits Agency that publishes a 
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"hotline" number to which confidential reports of fraud can be made in respect of 
claims for income support and other allowances. 
Units within the Inland Revenue sections of the Department of Trade and Industry 
have conducted similar campaigns in the past. Due to these, the TV or radio owning 
population of the British public may be expected to think that the Inland Revenue has 
fraud investigation and prosecution units at work, without necessarily knowing how 
these "deal with fraud". Equally well publicised have been operations conducted by 
Customs and Excise into counterfeiting and the fraud on the public and the genuine 
manufacturers in the sale of such goods. 
The phrase "dealing with fraud" also has a non-criminal justice sense. Again the 
influence of television is such that a large proportion of the public is likely to 
recognise non-governmental or non-organisational bodies such as "Watchdog", or 
"The Cook Report" and similar as also dealing with fraud in the sense of making it 
more difficult for "scams" to be perpetrated on the public. 
Less well known to most of the UK public are the regulatory functions of professional 
bodies in relation to allegations of fraud made against members of those bodies. 
Most professional bodies operate regulatory processes under the civil law to monitor 
their members' operation and where internal governing codes of practice have been 
infringed, investigate and discipline those alleged to have breached the 
organisation's rules. Increasingly fraud alleged to have been committed by 
professionals such as doctors and lawyers is being reported in the media. This may 
influence the public perception of "dealing with fraud". However reports of criminal 
investigation or prosecution of fraudulent activity remain the primary influence on the 
public perception of "dealing with fraud". 
Ordinary experience is that a large number of governmental agencies and 
commercial organisations "deal with fraud" and that there is also considerable 
diversity in the manner in which they act. The response to allegations of fraud in its 
numerous forms may use the civil law remedies available in respect of breaches of 
contract and material mis-representations, employment law in respect of fraudulent 
underpayment or unacceptable working conditions to internal discipline measures 
based upon an agreed code of conduct within a particular profession. It was 
expected that if this response to fraud was examined there would be little uniformity 
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of approach and response, due not only to the diverse composition of the bodies 
responding but also to the branch of the law within which they were basing their 
action. Those agencies working within the criminal justice system were thought to 
be fundamentally different to bodies working in the civil law and, as such, greater 
degrees of comparison would be possible as the response to allegations of fraud by 
one agency would be based within the same legal framework as that of a completely 
different agency within the criminal justice sysiem. Within the criminal justice system 
comparisons of response would be possible, as all the agencies would be using the 
same legal framework as the basis of their decision making. 
In addition within the criminal justice system, agencies use the same legal framework 
as each other in their sometimes inter-related roles in responding to allegations of 
fraud. Not only do all criminal justice agencies use the same standard of proof as 
each other, the manner in which one agency classifies allegations accords with that 
of other agencies. It was thought that there would, therefore, be a common basis to 
the operation of these agencies and therefore any differences in operation would be 
the more interesting than those that many occur within the civil law. 
In addition "investigation" and "prosecution" are the most widely known responses to 
allegations of wrongdoing. The most well known examples of this type of response 
are found in the operation of the police as investigator and the CPS as prosecutor. It 
was therefore decided that the study would begin with examination of the police and 
CPS response of fraud. The two agencies are related in that the task of the one is 
dependent upon the operation of the other. Although the immediate impact of a 
police investigation may be considerable, the long tem impact is less so. Officers 
can arrest, seize assets and items considered to be evidence of a crime, and 
investigate complaints. In these actions are the short term effect of their operation. 
The long term effect lies in their investigations being prosecuted before a court and a 
finding of guilt or innocence of the charges recorded. No matter how great the 
immediate impact of loss of liberty through arrest may be; it is generally well known 
that detention will usually only last 24 hours. Without the operation of the 
prosecution the matter would end there. By the operation of the CPS there is the 
opportunity for the matter to be placed before the courts. 
It was felt that there would not be much to gain from a simple examination of several 
criminal justice agencies all of which carried out one or other function, investigation 
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or prosecution, and their co-operation with their counterpart agency. Due to the 
similarities of the functions it was thought that very little of interest would be revealed 
by, for example, the -investigative role of the police; the Benefits Agency and 
Department of Health in respect of allegations of fraud, and comparing these than 
there would be from examining an agency that combined the investigation and 
prosecution functions. This would permit analysis of the single function and also 
comparison of that function between the two types of agency within the same legal 
framework. 
For this reason it was decided to examine the operation of the police, as being the 
popularly understood agency responsible for investigation; that of the CPS, again 
popularly accepted as having primary responsibility for fulfilling the prosecution 
function within the criminal justice system and the Department of Trade and Industry 
as an agency that works both together with the police and CPS but also carries out 
the investigative and prosecution role within one agency. 
Before the data collection could begin it was necessary to establish the meaning of 
the common terminology to ensure not only the respondents shared an 
understanding of the questions being asked but also that their response would be 
properly understood. Due to the imprecise legal definition of the term "fraud" and this 
being the central area of examination of the study it was clear that examination 
would have to be made of prior studies into "fraud" so as to determine what was 
examined and the conclusions reached. 
The criminoloqical definitions 
Writing in the American context, Calder (1994) notes that the US Government's 
withholding of files relating to Al Capone led to a "state sanctioned criminology' 
about organised crime. He suggests that by restricting information from serious, 
independent analysis, state agencies are able to present the "facts" in a manner that 
supports their assessment of the threat to social order. In addition, and of political 
importance, the state is able to support its allocation of resources to responding to 
the problem, the latter being defined by it. 
A somewhat similar problem exists in relation to analysis of the British criminological 
studies of fraud, in that the official recording system does not encompass "fraud" or 
require agencies to respond to it in any particular manner. "Fraud" may be reported 
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but will be recorded as various offences. As such it is difficult to make statistical 
analysis of the extent of occurrence of fraud or compare its treatment between and 
amongst different agencies. However studies have been made both of the state of 
the legal system and the response of some agencies, notably the police, in relation 
to allegations of fraud. 
Examination was made of previous studies of fraud (Finn and Hoffman 1976) and of 
those of other agencies that carried out fraud investigation functions (Rider 1979), 
most of which bodies operated within the same English justice system. These works 
confirm the conclusions drawn from the earliest stages of the literature review, that 
there is no single agreed definition of "fraud" or other similar terms and that various 
agencies could and did use the terms differently. 
Despite this, a common theme to the literature is the importance of this type of 
activity, with authors of varying perspectives, from the commercial (Saker 1994, 
1995) to the more legalistic (JUSTICE 1985) focusing upon the effects of fraud at 
national and international levels. 
The introductory sentence to the 1985 JUSTICE study reads, 
The prevention of fraud needs to be treated as a matter of high priority, both 
nationally and internationally. (pl) 
However the difficulty in implementing this sentiment is apparent within six sentences 
of the same work, 
The essence of fraud is deception, the use of a false representation to obtain 
an unjust advantage, or to injure the rights or interests of another. It follows 
that fraud may be an element in any offence from rape to avoiding taxation. 
(emphasis added) 
This definition is so wide as to be almost meaningless in the context of an analysis of 
the legal status and implications of the term. However the JUSTICE definition is of 
assistance in that it emphases of the breadth of the subject matter. JUSTICE's 
stud- details the national response of police forces to reports of fraudulent activity 
agai st companies. It concludes that there is a pressing need for improving the 
curr nt practices and suggests a simplified approach be adopted with the creation of 
a sr cific offence in order to protect both the broader economy and the company. 
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Some fifteen years later the problem of definition, implicit in the call by JUSTICE for 
more effective investigation and prosecution processes, was the explicit basis of 
David Ormerod's criticism of the 1998 Law Commission's approach to whether the 
English criminal law would be improved by creation of a general statutory offence of 
fraud; 
If the Commission has not defined its general offence of fraud, how can it 
properly analyse the positive and negative implications of any such offence? 
(Omerod 1999) 
Ormerod's work examines the mandate of the Law Commission, its Report and that 
Report's perceived shortcomings. His stance is that the 1998 Law Commission was 
given considerable latitude and could have significantly influenced the development 
of English law. However it has failed to do so, due to the fundamental fault of not 
proposing a legally acceptable definition of fraud as a specific offence under the 
criminal law. 
These two studies may be taken as representing and, by comparison with each 
other, revealing the unchanged nature of one of the primary issues in the 
examination of the investigation and prosecution of fraud; the lack of definition in a 
context of consistent concern for a type of criminal activity. 
In the absence of an offence of fraud it is tempting to develop other terminology that 
can be meaningfully used in criminal proceedings without suffering from the 
broadness of the description provided by JUSTICE. To effectively use the term, that 
group has to state, 
In this report we are concerned with fraud in its commercial aspect. It can 
range from fraudulent trading by a single person to an international criminal 
gang using the most sophisticated methods ... But it must be remembered that 
at the core of the offence there must be dishonesty, and in this country that 
word bears its ordinary everyday meaning. (JUSTICE 1985) 
Other term., such as "white collar crime", "economic crime" have been suggested as 
replacing f iud. All share with the term "fraud" the absence of legal meaning. In 
addition e,, h has its own particular issues. Geis notes that, 
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... as a classification category, "economic crime" proves not notably 
enlightening, since virtually all property crimes, and many crimes against the 
person, are committed to achieve economic ends. (Geis 1984 p139) 
L. H. Leigh assumes "fraud" to have a more precise definition than other terms, 
(This book is specifically concerned with) fraud, rather than white-collar crime 
or economic crime. Those are concepts which cannot be defined with 
precision, nor can the notion of business crime (Conklin, 1977), Most 
definitions are unsatisfactory because agreed unifying elements are hard to 
find. (Leigh 1982 p 7) 
within the above definition it is difficult to establish upon what this assumption is 
based. 
"White-collar crime" 
As description of criminal activities, "white collar crime" suffers from the implication 
that it relates not to the action but the social status of perpetrator of the offence. 
Sutherland (1949) introduced the use of the term, defining it as, 
... a crime committed by a person of respectability and high social status in 
the course of his occupation. (Sutherland 1949 p 9) 
Using this definition Sutherland examines a number of differing types of behaviour 
carried out in the course of legitimate occupations, including some that were not 
criminal, such as the administrative offences regulating business such as those by 
laws that prohibit the emission of waste from premises into rivers. 
Since Sutherland's introduction of the term, its definition and use have been criticised 
and developed. When considering this criticism it is important that the context, of 
time and social conditions of those times, be borne in mind. Sutherland wrote at a 
time in which "crimin- ity" was generally regarded as perpetrated by members of the 
lower social classe., The types of behaviour engaged upon by developers and 
industrialists that le to harm to the environment or community was not viewed as 
being in the san- category of wrong doing. Frequently their financial status 
protected such people from the operation of the civil law, let alone the criminal law. 
To establish the context of Sutherland's definition it should be remembered that, at 
the time of his supplying this definition, the legal system of the United Kingdom was 
still 10 years away from the introduction of judicial review and legal challenges to 
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administrative decision making. Prior to 'the introduction of the concepts of 
"legitimate expectation", the need for a demonstrable rational basis to administrative 
decisions and the consequence of judicial review, large corporations and 
government agencies operated unchallenged and unchallengeable. 
In the present political and social climate it is less ground breaking, or difficult, to 
challenge institutions and those in positions of power. The concept of corporate 
responsibility or liability for organisational wrong-doing is now part of established 
social and polit ical culture. The current government has accepted the desirability of 
establishing Commissions to examine the potential for an offence of corporate 
manslaughter. Were this to occur, one of the last refuges from criminal sanction for 
companies that may act negligently, causing deaths as a result of their actions or 
inaction, would be removed. 
Some of those who seek to apply Sutherland's definition of "white collar crime" to the 
present day have developed various sub-categories of behaviour such as ""economic 
crime" and "business crime" to avoid the imprecise nature of Sutherland's definition. 
Still further classification of the term "business* crime" may occur, dividing the topic 
into employee crime against the corporate employer; insurance fraud by companies 
on their insurance providers, tax evasion by companies and Health and Safety at 
work infringements (Clarke and Wheeler 1990). 
Some criminologists still see a use for the term "white collar crime" as defined by 
Sutherland, despite its absence from any legislation. One of these is Croall (1992) 
who uses Sutherland's definition, whilst accepting that its definition is both disputed 
(Croall 1992 p165) and controversial (p19) as a means of evaluating crime statistics 
and the approach of the criminal justice systerr including investigators, prosecutors 
and courts, to such "crimes". She examines - ie factors that affect the reporting of 
and subsequent dealings with allegations of v Re collar crime, noting that a number 
of factors interact in respect of both reporting -nd subsequent action. 
Croall notes that the impact of white collar crime upon victims may be economic or 
physical and that, particularly in respect of financial loss, such as over-charging for 
goods or selling less than the stated weight of an item, the victim may simply take 
their custom elsewhere. Even if the consumer is so annoyed as to complain, that 
complaint may be made to the shop manager who may be expected to ensure that 
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the report will go no further. In this way businesses can repeatedly engage in the 
actions complained of, without the legal process becoming involved. Croall notes 
that, in dealing with specific types of white-collar crime, there are differences in 
approach within different units of the same department. In particular she found this 
applied to the work of Environmental Health Officers, as noted previously by Hutter 
(1988) (Croall 1992 p83). 
Both Hutter and Croall note that different approaches to similar actions may be 
considered in relation to other types of offences and prosecuting agencies. Croall's 
emphasis upon the inclusive nature of Sutherland's definition making the term 
somewhat too broad to use without clarification when dealing with a specific type of 
fraud. That other criminologists use the term in a more restricted manner and its not 
being recognised by either the civil or criminal law, may be viewed as makes the 
term white collar crime, inappropriate when seeking to evaluate the criminal law 
response to specific types of criminal behaviour. However the debate over definition 
and utility of the term continues. 
Writing in 1999, Slapper and Tombs examine Sutherland's work and criticism of it in 
their examination of alternative definitions of the concept of calling the wealthy and 
influencial to account by means of the law, noting the influence of discipline on the 
debate (Slapper and Tombs 1999 p 11). Essentially lawyers will use terminology that 
is established in the law and could be relied upon in courtroom submissions whilst 
criminologists use a far broader approach to different ends. Slapper and Tombs use 
Sutherland's definition as the starting point of their development of a definition of the 
concept of "corporate crime" that is, based upon Kramer (1984), 
... any act committed by corporations that is punished by the state, regardless 
of whether it is punished under administrative, civil or criminal aw ... includ(ing) 
acts that are subject to tortious litigation whatever the for al status of the 
litigant (Slapper and Tombs 1999 p 16-17) 
Accepting the difference in approaches within the disciplines of law and criminology, 
they view the latter as a means of obtaining recognition of the importance of what 
they feel to be "a key crime, law and order problem" (Slapper and Tombs 1999 p 
227) and removing, within the law, the invisibility of these crimes. 
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Whilst their views may be taken as reflecting the Left response to what for many had 
been a disappointing few years of Labour government after nearly two decades of 
Conservative government, Slapper and Tombs' work is of greater use than mere 
social commentary. It provides evaluation of predominantly British criminological 
development on this topic. In their examination of the development of Sutherland's 
definitions, citing Kramer, Box, Schrager and Short as influences upon their definition 
of "corporate crime" (Slapper and Tombs 1999 p16-19) and means by which 
corporate crime can be measured and quantified, they attempt to place upon the 
political and thereby legal agenda the issue of law breaking by "big business". 
They accept that, to date, this has not been entirely successful, although it could be 
argued that the Left perspective has been influential in the current Government's 
approach to the need for evaluation of manslaughter in the context of the operation 
of "big business". 
There remains however the essential problem with criminological terminology that is 
not reflected within the administrative, civil or criminal law. Terms such as "corporate 
crime" "economic crime" or "business crime" may well have considerable meaning for 
the criminologist or even reader of the financial pages of the newspapers, but all 
suffer from not being recognised by the British legal framework and recorded as a 
specific type of offence. 
It is for this reason that none of these terms provide the proposed research with a 
commonly understood and legally accepted alternative to "fraud". Examination of the 
agencies was to make use the term "fraud", recognising that it does have legal 
recognition, sometimes even in the agencies" titles. One of the aims of the study 
was to determine how the chosen agencies defined this term by exa lination of their 
official terms of reference and practical application of these. 
Research on "fraud" 
Examination of British legal and criminological texts reveals the degree to which 
fraud has escaped study. A notable exception to this is the research conducted by 
Professor Levi into various aspects of fraud. Levi's work ranges from crime 
prevention guidance (Levi 1987) to examination of the jury system and its application 
to the prosecution of fraud (Levi 1999) 
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In 1987 as part of the Home Office's Crime Prevention Unit's work, Levi examined 
fraud from the perspective of business, noting that the victim of an act may perceive 
that act as fraud without it failing within the criminal law. The effect of this is that 
whilst the victim may not appreciate any distinction, this fact may result in the police 
investigating some matters and not recording or investigating others by virtue of their 
being considered to be civil deceptions. The work aims to assist both the business 
community and the police, providing guidance, as to the perspectives of both groups 
and encouraging the development of fraud prevention strategies. Levi does not 
define fraud but draws a distinction between fraud against the individual and against 
businesses. 
Although this work does not particularly develop the criminology of fraud, it provides 
an insight into the response of the law and commerce to a specific type of fraud. In 
that way it develops the concept of "commercial crime" as also referring to crime 
against companies as opposed to the "white collar crime" concept of it being 
committed by companies. 
Three years later the themes identified by Levi were developed by Burrows within the 
same Home Office unit (Burrows 1991). Adopting a position similar to that of Levi, 
that of prevention being a joint police: business issue, Burrows suggests that the 
regulatory authorities, such as the DTI and Customs and Excise, actually confuse 
the issue by increasing the number of ways of recording fraud and also the number 
of records actually kept. He argues that a large volume of fraud does not get 
reported, resulting in business viewing the police as having a limited role in either 
recovering funds or preventing crime. 
Despite possible criticism of this approach as focusing upon F role (retrieval of 
losses) that does not properly fall to the police, Burrows' work iay be viewed as 
adding to the call for greater clarity within the law. The results ' this could include 
greater understanding by the police and the business community of what response 
can be made to allegations of fraud. 
The works of Levi and Burrow should be considered in light of the 1986 Fraud Trials 
Committee, chaired by Lord Roskill. This body was tasked with examination of the 
conduct of fraud trials in England and Wales, and how these, together with the 
existing law could be improved. In doing so the Committee identified some 24 types 
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of fraud. It noted the role of the police as receiving the majority of complaints and 
how the various agencies' response to investigations of serious fraud lead could lack 
co-ordination. 
Despite this analysis, the results of the Committee's Report were not to streamline 
the operation and co-operation of the various criminal justice agencies, although one 
of its recommendations, the creation of the Serious Fraud Office, was implemented 
in an effort to improve the investigation and prosecution of complex frauds. 
Nearly 15 years after this Report, Levi's analysis was of the system of fraud trials. 
Whilst noting the different organisational definitions and desired outcomes of the 
various agencies may differ, 
... the Roskill Fraud Trial Committee has come and gone, creating the Serious 
Fraud Office, but - as was not intended by Roskill or the Committee in 
general- leaving Customs & Excise, the IDTI, the Inland Revenue and the 
police/CPS to go their separate and perhaps quite divergent ways, using very 
different sets of powers and deploying very different resources to achieve (or 
not) their respective objectives of protecting revenue, re-engineering 
company law and directors duties, and punishing the guilty (Levi 1999 p54) 
his concern is to some extent similar to that of the Roskill Committee, in improving 
the conduct of fraud trials. 
Levi suggests that there are two constant features to examination of fraud; the one 
the need for simpler trials and the second the need for reform of the jury. In this 
work an offence of "fraud" is not proposed, although it will be suggested as one 
means of simplifying not only trials but also more importantly, the decision-making 
processes in the various criminal justice agencies that have responsibility for 
processing complaints of fraud. 
Subsequent examination of the police operation under the SFO regime led Lev' o 
conclude that there was a need for "tighter specification of objectives and more 
supervision than some receive " (Levi 1993 p140). 
A constant theme through the work on fraud, particularly that based upon research 
conducted by Levi, is the effect of the lack of either a substantive offence of fraud or 
a shared understanding between criminal justice agencies as to what it is that 
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constitutes fraud. It was thought that, although the agencies may have the word 
"fraud" in their title, the definition of that term used by individual investigators and 
prosecutors may be expected to play a part in their operation and interaction with 
each other. 
Whilst it was not the aim of the study to analyse the sociology of the chosen 
agencies, it was intended to assess the bureaucratic and personal factors that 
influenced the outcome of allegations being made, investigated and considered for 
prosecution. 
The lack of accepted legal definition revealed by the literature review was to 
influence the research methodology used throughout this study. This was due to the 
need to determine not only which agencies would be studied but also what aspects 
of that operation would be the focus of examination. At the commencement of the 
study it was decided that its focus would be upon how several agencies defined what 
constituted the "fraud" with which they dealt, together with examination of how the 
agencies interacted and whether there were any themes common to their operation 
and interaction. 
The literature review assists in determining what agencies would be chosen for 
examination, by revealing those most publicly engaged in providing a criminal justice 
response to fraudulent activities. The general operation of the police has been 
extensively examined, that of the Crown Prosecution Service to a lesser extent. It 
was found that most commentary upon the operation of the Department of Trade 
and Industry and the Serious Fraud Office appeared in the media more frequently 
than it did in research studies, usually in the context of commentary on specific 
cases. 
The police 
Many studies of the police are concerned with the types of behaviour or culture that 
occur within the organisation as opposed to the type of crime investigated and the 
form that investigation takes. Both Reiner and Holdaway provide considerable 
assistance to any studies of police officers or the organisation of policing, detailing 
the types of behaviour found to commonly occur in the context of police work. 
Reiner's (1985) work is based in observation of police culture whilst Holdaway's 
(1983) study is based in participant observation, whilst he was both a serving police 
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officer and research student. Both describe a masculine orientated environment 
where officers value physical activity or "action" above "desk work" and operate in a 
distinctly "macho" ways. Holdaway, in particular, notes the scorn officers have for 
what they perceive as the overly reflective analysis of their activities and the lack of 
enthusiasm officers have for any duties that involve desk bound analysis or 
reflection. 
Reiner examines the context of policing activity, detailing how the origins of present 
day UK mainland policing are based on the concept of "policing by consent" (Reiner 
1985 p6l). Under this theory, the success of the operation of the police and the 
manner in which they act is determined by society's agreement with their actions. 
That this requires a broad consensus within the dominant societal group is largely 
unexamined by Reiner, who developed this approach as being the basis of a mid 
1980s style of policing, "community policing". 
One of the fundamental tenets to this theory is the ability of every officer to decide as 
to how to deal with an incident. Each police officer has the discretion to determine 
how he or she will respond to apparent contraventions of the criminal law. They may 
respond formally, invoking the criminal law either by reporting on summons, 
cautioning or charging, or informally by offering "advice", that is entirely without legal 
basis (Kemp Norris and Fielding 1992) and has no associated power of enforcement, 
or by "turning a blind eye". 
This is recognised in law as being fundamental to the operation of all police officers 
and judicially exercise of discretion is limited only by considerations of 
reasonableness. 
In the 1980s interest in America in the "broken windows" theories (Wilson and 
Kelling`1982) started to spread to the United Kingdom. Wilson and Kelling initiated a 
theory that if minor crimes in any geographic area are ignored, the likelihood is that 
more serious crime will increase. The naming of the theory "broken windows" came 
from observations that if individuals and or gangs in an area were permitted to break 
the windows of derelict buildings, they will soon "graduate" to more harmful activities. 
It was observed that they would progress from destroying the fabric of the building to 
dealing in drugs and to using the area as a refuge for other more serious offences. 
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Underpinning this theory is the concept that, if such buildings are made secure and 
mended, a decline into more serious crime is avoidable. 
Both this theory and that claimed (predominantly by its proponents) as being its 
ideological successor, "zero tolerance" policing, may be viewed as removing a 
fundamental aspect of British policing identified by Reiner, Holdaway and various 
Home Office research studies, the discretion held by every officer as to how to deal 
with an incident. 
Whilst most articles on "zero tolerance policing" do not define the concept, analysis 
of the various examples of this theory leads to a possible definition as being, 
a method of policing in which all observed contraventions of the criminal law 
are given a police response, usually involving the immediate stopping, and 
searching and questioning of, or arrest of, the suspect. 
It removes officers" discretion to act although partially retains their discretion as to 
how to act. The intended results of application of this theory are twofold. The first is 
that the police come into direct contact with more offenders. This contract provides a 
"tough on crime" message that is intended to make people believe that if they do 
break the law they will be caught and punished and secondly, that in dealing with 
apparently minor or trivial matters, more serious crime is detected. An anecdotal 
story appeared in the British media that, as a result of a New York officer's stopping 
the driver of a car due to a minor vehicle defect, that driver was asked to open the 
boot of the car. Concealed in the boot were a number of unregistered weapons, 
leading to the driver's arrest on charges of possession of these weapons (Sunda 
Times 2000). This tale re-inforced the government's message that in dealing with a 
very minor matter, serious criminality could be detected and prevented. 
This theory of policing activity was introduced in America in the mid to late 1990s. 
Despite initial dispute as to whether the credit for this form of policing is due to 
Rudolf Giuliano, Mayor of New York City or to the then Commissioner of the New 
York City Police, William Bratton, the latter emerged as the accepted proponent of 
this style (Bratton 1996). Unlike the mainland UK context, within America there is no 
similar notion of public consent being fundamental to the operation of the police. It is 
therefore understandable that this is less of an issue in the USA than it is in England. 
81 
The adoption and adaptation of USA style "zero tolerance policing in England has 
received relatively little academic analysis. Political analysis has focussed upon its 
main proponent in England, Supt Ray Mallon. With this officer's suspension from 
duty following charges of mis-management this analysis decreased considerably. 
From such analysis as there was of this style of policing, it is suggested that it marks 
a fundamental shift away from the notion of discretionary policing. This view is 
rejected by its supporters, who claim the theory has criminological foundations in 
liberalism existing as much in the UK as in the USA (Zedner 1997) (Burke 1999) 
Support for this perception of the criminological basis for the operation of the police 
as being accurate may be found in examination of the Human Rights Act 1999. 
Within this Act not only is there is specific acceptance that some rights, such as 
freedom of expression, are qualified and not absolute, as is the right to life, and that 
amongst the factors that may qualify exercise of certain rights are the interests of 
democratic society, a concept not defined within the Act but also the introduction of 
"anti-social behaviour orders" (ASBOs). 
The Act provides that either the local authority of the police may use civil 
proceedings against those whose behaviour is possibly not criminal but "anti-social", 
a term not defined within the Act or Home Office Guidance to it. These Orders and 
the proceedings used to obtain them may be viewed as enhancing police officers" 
discretion as to how to deal with those who do no t necessarily break the criminal law, 
but are a nuisance, threatening others' "quality of life". 
The converse to this view is that the government is acting as the "nanny state", 
making further use of the police to control areas of behaviour beyond their 
established remit in much the same way as para-militarisation was beyond the 
established parameters of policing by consent. 
Burke supports "zero tolerance" policing, arguing that there is a distinction between 
the para-military policing examined by Jefferson (1990) and Lord Scarman (1981) 
and "zero tolerance" policing in that the latter is 
part of a revised form of community policing in which the police service takes 
a proactive, confident and assertive central role in seeking to confront and 
control crime but which at the same time is highly dependent on the support 
and legitimacy of the community it purports to serve. (Burke 1999 p 276) 
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His argument that "zero tolerance" is a form of community policy is based upon the 
premise that somehow the community being policed establishes an agenda for the 
police and by so doing the resulting style of police operation is "community" based 
and approved. 
Fundamentally, the targets and objectives of a proactive, confident, assertive 
policing strategy must be those identified and chosen by the community for it 
to be legitimately afforded the designation of community policing. (p281) 
Within England and Wales relatively little use has been made of "zero tolerance" or 
"selective intolerance" (Burke 1999) policing. Within the Metropolitan Police it has 
been used in specific operations. One such operation was in response to critical 
commentary about lack of police response to low level crime at the 2000 Notting Hill 
carnival (Channel 4, News 5 September 2000). In Cleveland Police its use did not 
appear widespread, but used mainly by a single area's CID offices, under the 
supervision of Supt Mallon. 
Notwithstanding these instances of use of this style of policing, it is suggested that 
police officers are not routinely instructed to ignore discretion and respond formally 
to all instances of law breaking. The considerable media attention to the career of 
Supt Mallon, focussing on photo-calls with the Home Secretary and Prime Minister, 
may have contributed to a popular perception of this style of policing as widespread. 
This perception disguises the fact that "zero tolerance" policing applies to direct 
involvement with the offender. The driver who is stopped for the purpose of checking 
their vehicle insurance and is found to have weapons in the back of the vehicle 
(Sunday Times 2000) typifies the type of crimes in respect of which the police are in 
direct contact with both the perpetrator and the elements of the offence. The same 
is not true of fraud, where the suspect and the offence may be quite separate, there 
is no outward manifestation of criminality and in corporate life there are no similar 
misdemeanours that necessarily foretell the development of subsequent criminality. 
That the investigation of fraud by the police fits as little in community policing as it 
does "zero tolerance" or any other style of policing, makes examination of 
discretionary exercise of legal powers relevant to this study. A further basis for 
examining the discretionary exercise of powers is that not only the police but also 
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other agencies, such as the Department of Trade and Industry, to which "zero 
tolerance" methods of operation do not apply, use it. 
Support for examination of the exercise of discretion in relation to the prosecution of 
fraud by the various chosen agencies may be found in the fact that prosecution of 
fraud is performed by several agencies, some of which have the power to act 
otherwise than by initiating criminal proceedings. It is for these reasons that studies 
of the organisational cultures of those within the agencies that investigate and 
prosecute are thought to remain relevant in the study of organisational response to 
crime. Such studies inform the examination as to the type of factors that may 
influence the decision-making processes. 
In his works on fraud investigation Levi (1993) cautioned against stereotyping police 
perceptions of fraud and its investigation, acknowledging the influence of police 
culture. He examines the investigation of fraud as being distinct from other police 
work, noting its lack of appeal to most officers as being non-action-orientated 
investigation. Examination is made of the perceptions of fraud investigation within 
British police forces and the reality of the situation. It is noted that far more officers 
deal with non-fraud (or "general" crime) than deal with fraud. A number of factors 
are suggested as contributing to and influencing this situation. Levi notes that the 
reality of fraud investigation is that it involves a high ratio of investigation time to 
number of arrests. This is contrary to the "macho" crime fighter image of police 
officers as described by Holdaway (1983) and Reiner (1985), which image is 
recognised by Levi as being one of the reasons some individuals join the police. 
Further, officers perceived this type of crime as being an area in which any 
weaknesses in their investigative abilities were more likely to be highlighted than 
would be the case in relation to investigation of other types of criminal activity. In 
addition, as the vast majority of police officers lack experience in investigating 
allegations of fraud, the "fear of the unknown" might be a further reason why police 
officers do not seek attachments to CID units responsible for investigating 
allegations of fraud. 
Perceptions of social inferiority in police officers to suspected fraudsters are cited as 
additional reasons why fraud specialisation is not seen as attractive to police officers. 
Most "City" frauds or fraudulent operation of business involve those in business, 
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whilst the more usual CID crimes are typified as being perpetrated by those of the 
same or usually lower social class than most police officers. This perceived 
imbalance in social status is described as being viewed by officers as assisting them 
in their dealings with the more usual CID work, but working to their disadvantage in 
dealing with the bank managers and business persons either suspected of being 
fraudsters or interviewed as potential witnesses as victims to fraud. 
In addition, increasing demand from the public upon what staff resources chief 
officers have, combine with a government demand for increasing numbers of arrests, 
to make fraud an area of low priority for most police forces. Those officers who are 
available for duties are most productively utilised in the investigation of the more 
usual CID type work, such as assault, more serious thefts etc., that do not entail the 
same length of investigation as do most frauds, and also do not have the same 
complexities in submission of files to the CPS, fraud files. routinely having extensive 
exhibit lists and witness statements, as well as complex transactions. 
Examination made in the course of this study as to the content of police annual 
reports within the last two decades supports Levi's analysis, with little emphasis 
being placed in such reports upon fraud investigation as an area of specialisation, as 
opposed to efforts to meet Home Office priorities, such as reducing vehicle crime. 
Most police forces' annual reports make specific reference to the types of crime 
perceived by the public as important or those prioritised by the Government. Often 
annual reports include specific reports on those branches of CID responsible for the 
investigation of domestic violence, racially motivated crime and vehicle crime. Far 
less mention is made of those units that deal with the investigation of fraud. In this 
may be read the relative unimportance of fraud investigation in comparison to the 
investigation of those crimes prioritised by the government. 
Apart from the Government's not having prioritised fraud investigation in the same 
manner as it has certain other types of criminal activity, considerations of public 
expectations of the police might also influence police perceptions of fraud 
investigation. 
Since the 1980s almost all police forces had invested considerable resources into 
examination of what service the public expected from them, most contributing to 
what was, in 1990, a ground breaking approach, publication of the Operational 
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Policing Revie (ACPO). For an institution designed to operate upon the obtaining 
information from the public, this publication was the first major examination by the 
police as to what was expected from them by the tax payer. Previous studies of 
police operation and public expectations had been made by government associated 
institutions, ranging from University research projects to the British Crime Survey 
(Home Office 1982,1984,1988,1992,1994,1996,1998,2000) 
The British Crime Survey brought attention to the considerable under-reporting of 
crime, particularly domestic abuse and racial violence and played a part in improving 
the response of police officers to allegations of this type. The BCS did not have, 
however, much impact upon fraud or its investigation. 
By the late 1990s enquiry by the police as to public wants and perceptions had 
become part of the legislative framework within which the police operate. Section 
106 of the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act put in place consultative 
committees that, although operational, did not have the same weight as the bodies 
established by the 1998 Crime and Disorder Act. By the latter Act, chief officers 
were required not only to work with the local authorities but possibly more 
importantly, to demonstrate that they had consulted with the public. A still further 
improvement upon the effectiveness of action under the Crime and Disorder Act 
upon the operation of s106 Consultative committees was the requirement that chief 
officers demonstrate the results of consultation had been incorporated into their 
annual Strategic Plans. The effectiveness of these requirements lies in the 
examination of each police forces operation by the Inspectorate of Constabulary, 
also known as the HMI or HMIC. On an annual basis all forces are subject to 
inspection by the Inspector for that area to determine how the force has operated in 
relation to the Government's policing priorities, including its plans of action produced 
in accordance with the Crime and Disorder Act. 
Within the current study examination was made of the Crime and Disorder audits 
conducted by a metropolitan police force that had agreed to the request for research 
access together with its associated Authorities. In none of the four audits was the 
investigation of fraud identified as a policing priority. Similar examination in the 
course of this study of other forces' annual reports and the British Crime Surveys 
confirmed the lack of importance that the general public attaches to the investigation 
86 
of fraud. Despite this, academic studies and media reports demonstrated that, 
whatever its priority, investigation of fraud continued to be undertaken, both by 
specialised units within police forces and other agencies. 
The literature review established that the investigation of fraud remained the subject 
of continued, if specialised, examination. This led to the decision that one of the 
initial stages of the study would be the examination of the operation of a fraud squad 
within a metropolitan police force, focusing upon what officers within that squad dealt 
with and the processes through which investigation went. This part of the study 
would include analysis of officers' perceptions of both their role and interaction with 
other criminal justice agencies. Study of the operation of the police and other 
agencies was grounded on an acceptance of the doctrine of discretionary exercise of 
official powers and duties. 
The themes of types of behaviour identified by Reiner (1985), Holdaway (1983), Levi 
(1982,1987,1991,1993) and Burke (1999) in their studies of the police would be 
applied to determine whether these operated in the chosen force. If these were 
found to operate within the chosen force, the study would seek to ascertain the 
extent of their impact upon the investigation of fraud and the investigators" exercise 
of discretion and decision making. 
This was to be followed by similar examination of the operation of other agencies 
that the literature review had identified as having the primary function of investigating 
or prosecuting fraud. The closest associated agency was revealed by the literature 
review as being the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 
Prosecution 
Discretion 
McBarnet and Whelan's (1999) description of enforcement in the context of a 
regulatory body was thought to be equally valid within the broader investigation and 
prosecution context, 
Law enforcement is a process in which many factors come into play to 
influence outcomes in individual cases. It is in the nature of law enforcement 
that there are choices to be made, strategies to follow, discretion, bargaining. 
(pl 3) 
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This required examination of the nature of the law enforcement decision making 
process, from the definition of what constitutes an offence for the purpose of an 
agency to the individual police officer or lawyer's decision as to the most appropriate 
means of dealing with a set of allegations or facts. Throughout assessment would 
be made of the different types of discretion exercised. 
In this stage of the study regard was had to the importance of legal and 
organisational context to the operation of prosecutorial and investigative bodies as 
identified by Hutter (1988) in her analysis of the operation of Environmental Health 
officers, 
Enforcement officials do not work in a vacuum, free from external influence 
and from constraint. They are constrained, to varying degrees, by the 
organisations within which they work and, in turn, these organisations are 
subject to a variety of external pressures and persuasions. The most obvious 
constraint upon the behaviour of all enforcement officials and agencies is the 
law, which at a minimum defines the activities to be controlled. However, this 
is not to argue that laws serve as being structures to which enforcement 
officials religiously adhere. Many studies have shown that the law may enter 
very little into enforcement officials' activities, particularly if they select 
informal enforcement techniques. Officials have considerable discretion to 
implement their own interpretation of an organisational mandate, which is 
itself an agency or departmental unders tanding of what the demands and 
procedures of law really are. (p 9). 
In assessing the extent of an individual investigator's and prosecutor's exercise of 
discretion at least three distinct types of decision May be examined in relation to 
fraud. One is the decision as to whether a set of facts or allegations constitutes 
"fraud" (i. e. what definition of fraud is applied). If it is decided that the 
facts/allegations are "fraud" does the matter fall within the individual's remit (i. e. does 
the agency within which they operate define the facts as fraud) and, if so, by what 
methods will the matter be pursued. 
A large body of research exists into prosecution and the role of the prosecutor, both 
within England and in other jurisdictions. That there could be a need to determine 
what is meant by "prosecution" before examining the operation of the well 
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established Crown Prosecution Service, may well appear unnecessary. However as 
Jehle notes; 
In the history of criminal law the institution of a prosecuting authority is a 
relatively new feature. It first appeared in the wake of the French revolution 
after which it, gradually, took up its position as a central institution in the legal 
systems of continental Europe. It is only in the past few decades that it has 
become established as a feature of common law systems. (Jehle 2000 p27) 
He notes, at p 28, that the "specific structures and functions differ greatly from 
country to country. However he suggests that there can be a commonly understood 
and recognised concept of "prosecution" if a "pragmatic" definition is adopted. This 
is proposed to be 
. an intermediary stage between police and court levels. The process as a 
whole usually begins with an offence being reported to the police and the 
identification, sooner or later, of a suspect. Once this has happened in almost 
all of the criminal justice systems dealt with here (Albania, Austria, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, England and Wales, Estonia, F. Y. R. 0 Macedonian, 
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldovia, 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal Romania, Russian Federation, Scotland, 
Slovenia and Turkey), a decision has to be made as to whether or not the 
case should be brought to court, that is, whether to prosecute or not. (p28) 
Jehle continues that this is not inevitably the procedure that the discovery of 
suspected criminal activity follows as; 
the police may also have the ability to end a case by imposing some kind 
of sanction. 
Although the basic definition of "prosecution " supplied by Jehle may be adopted, this 
study found it to have a weakness in its application to the police. Literature on the 
investigation of fraud identified that not all cases of suspected fraud "begins with an 
offence being reported to the police". Certain types of fraudulent activity can be 
reported to branches of the Department of Trade and Industry, or to regulatory 
groups including non-governmental bodies. 
The substance of Jehle's definition of prosecution would be applicable to fraud if it is 
widened by acceptance of the first stage of formal processing within the justice 
system. In this way the first stage, the receiving of a report of suspected fraud, 
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would include reports made, in England, to policing or investigative agencies other 
than those within the 43 Home Office police forces. It was this variation of Jehle's 
definition that was used throughout the study to obtain the most comprehensive 
analysis of the English justice system's response to fraud. 
Jehle does not make specific examination of the exercise of discretion in the 
prosecution process, but acknowledges that'this plays a part in the difference of 
output or case loads between the number of matters dealt with by the police, the 
number passed to the prosecution and the number that the prosecution places 
before the courts. 
Some years prior to Jehle's work, Ashworth (1984) had drawn attention to the 
exercise of discretion by prosecutors in England and Wales, suggesting there to be a 
need to examine the principles upon which decisions whether or not to prosecute 
were taken. The basic principle of Ashworth's argument for examination of the 
exercise of discretion by prosecutors is founded upon acceptance of the need for 
prosecutorial discretion, by which he refers exclusively to the decision whether or not 
to prosecute. 
This proposal was made prior to the coming into operation of the Prosecution of 
Offences Act and its result, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). Some fifteen 
years into the operation of the CPS it is po ssible to suggest that Ashworth's 
suggested examination can be extended to the decisions by all prosecuting 
agencies, as to the appropriate charge and other means of disposal, such as 
cautions, reprimands and warnings, based upon his approach to prosecution as 
being integral in the administration of justice and the fact that it is now recognised 
that more than one agency is directly involved in making prosecution decisions, 
specifically relating to suspected frauds (Quirke 1999 p187).. 
In suggesting that there should be detailed examination of the factors considered by 
prosecutors, Ashworth does not distinguish between types of crimes or charges, 
although discussion is made of the Scottish procurators' approaches to crimes of 
domestic violence. He notes that, on facts that would evidentially support a 
prosecution, procurators may not necessarily pursue a prosecution as they view their 
role as acting as mediator between the parties. It was this suggestion that led to 
consideration of the theme that, in the context of investigations of fraud, was 
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examined by Levi (1993); the application of considerations of perceived social class 
to the decision as to whether or not to prosecute. 
Despite the call in 1984 for greater understanding of prosecutors' exercise of 
discretion, little research is available on this point. Whilst some academic 
examination has been made of prosecution decision making within England and 
Wales (primarily in respect of offences of domestic violence and offences involving 
members of ethnic minority groups), access to much of this material is restricted. 
The same is not true of the general function and operation of the Crown Prosecution 
Service and of the comparable system in Northern Ireland. Grosman's 1969 
sociological study of Canadian prosecutors and their work culture noted the lack of 
research into the office of prosecutor. In light of Ashworth's views and the absence 
of public information upon current English prosecutorial systems, processes and 
personnel, it appears that this situation and context had changed little in the 
intervening thirty odd years. 
As such, Grosman's depiction of prosecutors provides indication of issues and 
themes that would form part of the study. The prosecutors studied by Grosman were 
described as being a relatively homogenous group of younger men, having a shared 
professional ethos, 
Although part of the legal profession, the office of prosecutor has acquired 
certain attributes of a sub-culture that sets it apart from the larger 
professional lawyer culture. The prosecutor has developed skills and 
sympathies which are part of a segmented interest group within the 
interstices of the profession as a whole. (p 66) 
Mention is made of the vicarious "enjoyment" in types of criminal activity, suggesting 
some, at least, of the research subjects enjoyed the 'seedier' side of their work. This 
suggestion may be seen as predating a similar suggestion made by Holdaway 
(1983), Reiner (1985) and Levi (1982,1987,1993) of criminal investigation as being 
a male dominated, activity based exercise. Fraud in the sense of business crime 
does not appear well suited to either view of the investigator or prosecutor and, if 
these views are accepted, it is understandable that the impetus to investigate or 
prosecute fraud is lacking. 
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The themes presented were of prosecution as being a male orientated culture in 
which the machismo of investigation could be detected and might suggest possible 
allegiances between prosecutors and investigators in the exercise of discretion in 
respect of charging, investigating and prosecuting. 
One aspect of the study would be examination as to whether the group ethos 
described by Grosman had altered within 1990s England. Examination of the legal 
profession and prosecution in particular suggested that variation might be expected. 
The legal profession was no longer the male domain examined by Grossman, with 
women playing a significant part in both professional and organisation management 
structures. During the 1990s Dame Barbara Mills held the post of Director of Public 
Prosecutions and several women now hold the post of Chief Crown Prosecutor, 
heading the CPS for specific geographic areas. 
As previously noted, the role of the prosecutor had extended beyond that of the 70s, 
with prosecution functions being part of a number of agencies' operation, including 
the DTI, Customs and Excise, Department of Health and Social Security, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries and other multi-national/European agencies. No longer do 
prosecutors deal solely with crime, as was the case at the time of Grossman's study, 
by way of prosecution or dropping the case. Annual reports of the CPS and other 
government criminal justice agencies, together with studies of those organisations 
indicate that the role of a prosecutor within the English criminal justice system now 
covers a wide range of criminal, regulatory and advisory matters. 
After a period of considerable media interest in the operation of the CPS, the 
Glidewell Report (1998) was the result of a Government sponsored examination of 
the primary criminal prosecutorial agency. Within this Report the prosecution of 
fraud, is examined from a specific perspective, of assessing and improving the 
CPS's operational effectiveness. Although examination was made of the constraints 
upon prosecutors, the aim of the Glidewell Report was not to examine or identify 
types of organisational culture or its impact upon decision making. One feature of 
the Report that was of importance for the purpose of the study is that it is the first 
"official" study of the English prosecutors that examines the review function that they 
fulfil in relation to decisions taken by the police as investigators of alleged or 
suspected criminality. The findings of the Report were that the CPS was not 
concerned with the vast majority of recorded crime (p 4) and that there had not been 
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the improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of the prosecution process that 
had been expected to result from the establishment of the CPS in 1986 (p 6). It was 
also concluded that whilst the initial tensions between the CPS and police had 
eased, they had not disappeared, with some CPS staff seeking to retain their 
independence by becoming "isolationist" (p6). It was suggested that to achieve its 
potential, the CPS would have to re-focus its efforts, away from the majority of its 
work in the magistrates courts, being relatively minor cases, to more serious crime in 
the Crown Court. Changes in the overall organisation, structure and management of 
the Service were recommended, as was the adoption of an attitude within the CPS of 
it being an integral part of the criminal justice system, not a 'new kid on the block' (p 
6-7). 
In doing so it was thought necessary to allempt to establish the sociological 
perspectives operating within the agencies, whether these differed from those 
identified some thirty years earlier and if so, to assess how the new norms impacted 
upon the choice of cases accepted, procedures used and the effect of both sets of 
choices upon the final outcome. 
A broader based examination was made of the office of prosecutor within the 1999 
examination of the entire criminal justice system within Northern Ireland. In respect 
of prosecution, the Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland 
emphasised the importance of decision making and the role that discretion plays 
within the prosecution process. 
The nature of the decision on prosecution is significant. The DPP is more 
than a reviewer of a decision to prosecute already taken by the police and 
formally takes the decision to prosecute or "directs" on cases referred to him. 
(HMSO 2000 para 4.33) 
As with the English system of prosecutions, the DPP's office is staffed by trained 
lawyers, responsible for making the decision whether to prosecute and upon what 
charges. In Northern Ireland, as in the English equivalent, the CPS, the IDPP and his 
staff do not have direct involvement in police investigations. This being described by 
the RCJNI as 
The DPP has no formal involvement in the conduct of police investigation, 
prior to summons or charge, or between the charge and submission to him of 
the police investigation file. It is however open to the police to seek the 
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advice of the DPP's staff in the course of their investigations, especially 
where it is apparent that complex issues of law or evidence are likely to be 
involved. (HMSO 2000 para 4.36) 
Unlike the English system, where the prosecutors' decisions as to whether or not to 
prosecute are stated to be based only upon the evidence provided to them by the 
police, the RCJNI found that staff of the Northern Irish DPP "consult with the police, 
victims and witnesses and to visit the scene of the crime". (HMSO 2000 para 4.37) 
It is estimated that in approximately 30% of the cases dealt with by the Northern Irish 
DPP's staff, lawyers proactively seek further information from the police. No similar 
research within the English CPS permits comparison of the two systems but does 
suggest two themes for further examination; what can constitute proactive 
involvement in police investigations by prosecutors and, in relation to fraud, to what 
extent do prosecutors become proactively involved in investigations? Within the 
RCJNI report it is stated, 
The CPS has no role in supervising investigations although it advises on legal 
issues if asked; nor can it direct that lines of enquiry be pursued. (HMSO 
para 4.84) 
As noted in the 1998 Glidewell Report, the view that the CPS can not direct an 
enquiry, may well overlook the feature that, if the CPS requests additional evidence 
from a particular line of enquiry, it can discontinue proceedings where that 
information is not obtained. Practically this may be viewed as providing the 
prosecutor with a role in the direction of investigations. It is recognised within the 
Review that in order for this system of separate responsibilities within the same 
system to operate successfully, joint management of the interface between the two 
agencies is essential. This is an operational feature emphasised in the Glidewell 
Report (1998). 
The RCJNl report examines other prosecutorial systems, focusing upon those 
operating in England and the United States of America, where it is noted, the reality 
of the concept of separateness of the prosecution and investigations functions are so 
well established that there is no debate as to combining the functions within the 
operation of the police. By contrast, the Dutch prosecutors play a role in the 
investigative process and have a key priority of co-operation with the police and local 
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authorities. Examination is also made of the Procurator Fiscal system operating in 
Scotland, where the procurators have a common law duty to investigate crime, 
strengthened by the statutory duty upon Chief Constables to comply with the lawful 
instructions of the procurators. It is only in the more serious of cases that procurators 
are described as playing a role in the investigation, however in these matters, their 
assistance is welcomed. The Review panel's examination concluded that the 
independence of the procurators appeared to them to be respected, with relations 
and co-operation between them and the police being good. 
The diversionary role of the prosecutor was also examined by the Review, this being 
the discretionary power of the prosecutor not to utilise the criminal justice system as 
a means of finalising and investigation commenced within that system. This was 
found to be valued as a considerable tool available to both the Scots procurators and 
the Dutch prosecutors. 
The Review makes examination of the requirement that prosecutors communicate 
the reasoning behind their decision making and the reluctance on the part of English 
prosecutors to do so, save in very general terms. The Review suggests this feature 
plays an important part in generating public confidence in the office (HMSO para 
4.111- 4.116). 
The Northern Irish examination of the role of the prosecutor noted the possibility of 
that role playing a diversionary function within the criminal justice system. The 
concept of a branch of the criminal justice system acting in a diversionary manner is 
common to the operation of many Commonwealth jurisdictions. Prosecutors are not 
expected or encouraged to make decisions that fall beyond the clear dichotomy of 
prosecute/decline to prosecute. Either they are prosecuted before the courts or they 
escape criminal proceedings entirely and without any other action being formally 
taken in relation to their conduct that formed the substance of, usually a police, 
investigation. 
This being so and at the beginning of the study it having been realised that a 
diversionary function existed within the English criminal justice system, it was 
decided to examine the regulatory function, both in relation to their operating as 
prosecutors and also as diversionary from the criminal justice system. 
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Requlation 
Formal regulation, by government agencies, of either the workplace or work 
practices is a relatively recent concept within England and America. In most of the 
developing world governments still play little part in the regulation of work practices. 
In the developed nations an increasing government involvement in regulation may be 
seen. This is particularly so in the British financial sector after the crashes of BCCI, 
Barings Bank and several unrelated investment firms. Examination of the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and the coming into operation of its associated enabling 
Act, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2001, reveals that whilst promoted as a 
wholly non-governmental body, the FSA does have close links with the government, 
including linkage through its website of "fsa. gov. uk". 
Despite the work of this and other regulatory agencies in the developed world, the 
study of regulation is not as developed as are studies of other aspects of socio-legal 
operation. It is recognised that there is a body of work on regulation in Australian 
nursing homes and pharmaceutical industry (Braithwaite 1984,1989) and on 
regulation of pollution in the United Kingdom (Hawkins and Thomas 1984, Hutter 
1988, Weait 1989). In addition, the discourse in 1990 between Pearce and Tombs 
and Hawkins has done much to inform current thought on the role and nature of 
regulation in the developed world. Much of the debate between these three, together 
with the work of Braithwaite, focuses on the role of regulation in the corporate sphere 
and the need for it to be either punitive or advisory. 
Whilst Braithwaite's works provide a Commonwealth perspective on regulation, its 
role and place in a state's justice system, there is no corollary in any other 
developing nation. As indicated above, whilst Commonwealth states other than 
Australia may have a few nominal regulatory agencies, the work of such bodies is 
significantly more limited, in volume, impact and the extent of the areas regulated, 
than are the British, America or Australian agencies. 
Upon beginning this study into the investigation and prosecution of serious fraud and 
allied methods of "dealing with fraud", there was a body of work upon regulation in 
both Britain and America predominantly increased and enhanced by the work of a 
small range of academics. During the course of the study this altered. Particularly in 
respect of financial regulation, one significant influence upon this change was the 
Financial Services and Markets Bill (1998), and subsequent Act (2000). This Bill was 
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described as "the demise of self regulation" (MacNeil 1999 p725), brought about by 
government dissatisfaction with self-regulation. Prior to assessing the impact of the 
Bill and Act, examination should be made of the concept of regulation and its 
application to the specific area under study. 
In the early stages of the study on regulation and specifically its enforcement 
Hawkins and Thomas wrote; 
The debate over the design and enforcement of protective regulatory laws is 
complicated by the nature of the problems that these regulations address. 
Unlike many areas of traditional economic regulation, the problems governed 
by the legal framework of protective are, for the most part, not specific to any 
one industry. The number of potential targets of regulation confronting the 
agency bureaucracy is vast, resulting in resource constraints on finding 
violations as well as patterns of partial enforcement. (Hawkins and Thomas 
1984 p 4) 
In examining their theory of enforcement of regulation, Hawkins and Thomas sought 
to establish and define what constitutes "enforcement policy', the "regulatory 
process" and the impact of the position of the regulator in the legal and social 
organisation. Through examination of specific agencies they sought to analysis the 
ways in which regulation is applied. Their position was significantly influenced by 
their assessment that, 
The regulatory agency has primary responsibility for the development of 
substantive policy together with the implementation of that policy. (Hawkins 
and Thomas 1984 plO) 
They accept Kagan's (1978) proposition that a specific legislative goal, such as 
protection of the environment, will be interpreted more strictly and enforcement policy 
be more punitive than that occurring in relation to legislation more ambiguously 
worded as exists in the situation of balancing the public interest protection of the 
environment against protection of pursuit of economic advantage. They highlight the 
different forms of regulatory response, including the distinction between compliance 
and deterrence, and the impact of both on the concept and practice of bargaining 
that they state as "central to both the formal and informal processes of regulation". 
(Hawkins and Thomas 1984 p 15) 
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Hawkins and Thomas' analysis is that, whether compliance or deterrence orientated, 
the enforcers of regulation fulfil a role that is more preventive than punitive within the 
justice system. This position is similar to that adopted by Kagan's 1980 study where 
comparison and contrast was made of the roles and operation of the police and 
inspectorates in relation to industry. He describes the latter as, 
... special police force for industry ... legally empowered to intrude upon 
private property, examine books and records, take samples and interrogate 
executives and workers in order to uncover evidence of non-compliance with 
the law. They can issue citations that can lead to fines, expensive remedial 
orders and, in some cases, criminal penalties. (Kagan 1984 p 37). 
After noting the similarities in the roles and operation of the police and inspectorates, 
Kagan noted the main differences between the two agencies. His assessment is of 
the police having been established to protect private property whilst the 
inspectorates were established to carry out the opposite social role of controlling 
those with property and their use of it in the pursuit of profit. He noted, as did 
Hawkins and Thomas, the importance of the social context in which the 
inspectorates operate and the "pressure" this exerts upon the inspectors to respect, 
implied as being more so than in police operation, the individual's "legal rights and 
personal dignity" (1984 p47). A further distinction is drawn in that the police act 
against the individual whereas the inspectorates operate in relation to businesses, 
corporations, and legal entities as opposed to persons. Central to this assessment is 
an allied assessment of those with whom the inspectors deal that Kagan had 
proposed in 1984 of corporations as being of one of three types, "amoral calculator', 
'political citizen" or "organisationally incompetent" (1984 p67-8). 
"Amoral calculators" is the description of those bodies that determine their action 
solely on the basis of maximising profits and have no regard to other factors, 
including employee welfare or protection of the public. If such bodies do not have 
regard for others, it must be imposed upon them by way of stringent policing of 
regulations and severe, usually financial penalties for failure to comply with the rules. 
In this way it becomes more cost effective to abide by regulation than to ignore it in 
efforts to make a profit. 
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Kagan's analysis of corporations was that they are predominantly not "amoral 
calculators" and as such the emphasis upon deterrence, with the regulatory enforcer 
acting as "policeman" is not appropriate. 
The assessment of the role and function of the enforcers of regulation as proposed 
by Hawkins, Thomas and Kagan was to influence studies of regulation enforcers for 
nearly two decades. The effect of their analysis was to suggest that regulation could 
be over-enforced. The importance of this lies in that, in efforts to increase the 
effectiveness of compliance with regulation, enforcers are shown as best deployed 
as "consultants" to the industries that they operate within, seeking to inspire 
compliance as opposed to obedience through fear of regular "raid" style "policing". 
In 1990, in the aftermath of the Union Carbide disaster and blatant disregard of large 
companies for their responsibility for worker/public safety, the established. 
perspectives of the regulators and the regulated were challenged by Pearce and 
Tombs. 
In 1990 they sought to re-examine the view of Kagan, Hawkins et al that they 
summarised as being that "illegal conduct of corporations necessarily calls for 
different forms of regulation than other kinds of law-breaking" (Pearce and Tombs 
1990 p 423). Pearce and Tombs at p 432-433 compare the law in respect of 
employment and motoring as the basis of their argument that the application of those 
laws, or their regulation, in respect of health and safety violations and motoring 
offences should be the same. Their argument is based upon three fundamental 
premises. 
The first is that motoring and employment in business are essentially lawful activities. 
The second is that that most health and safety violations and most motoring offences 
are due to "carelessness". The third is that motoring offences are judged on a 
defined code of conduct, the Highway Code, that equates to "law" whilst no such 
body of "law" exists in respect of employment. In the latter context they argue that 
health and safety violations are based upon informal Codes. These premises permit 
the conclusion that the fact of a defined code in relation to motoring and an 
undefined one in relation to employment allows a difference in the standard of care 
by which the actions of drivers and corporations are assessed. 
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Apart from the problem of identity that is inherent in their argument, in that motoring 
offences are by necessity committed by one individual whilst corporate offences may 
be committed by a legal entity or individuals within that entity acting in a manner not 
known to the office holder, a further difficulty lies in acceptance of the premise that 
the existence of an informal employment code is the only feature that permits the 
standard of examination of carelessness to be based upon considerations of 
11 reasonable practicability". 
Examination of discrimination case law, based upon non-compliance in the civil law 
with legislation as opposed to codes of conduct, reveals that the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1975 permits a successful defence of reasonable practicability in relation to 
claims of vicarious liability for employees' actions in the workplace. Within the 
criminal law, save in offences of strict liability, where a finding of guilt does not 
require that intent must be proved, an employer could escape liability for an 
otherwise criminal act committed by its employee by establishing that such a person 
acted without the employer's authority and the employer could not reasonably have 
known or prevented their actions. 
Pearce and Tombs argue that the motorist has to do, 
everything possible to avoid endangering others on the roads; an 
employer on the other hand, only needs to avoid endangering his or her 
employees to the extent that it is (economically) "reasonable" and 
"practicable" (Pearce and Tombs 1990 p433) 
They suggest this distinction is unjustifiable as supporting the argument for more 
punitive enforcement of regulation. 
Hawkins' response to their argument was swift and critical. He notes (Hawkins 1990 
p 445) that Pearce and Tombs confuse the focus of his work, upon practice, as 
being the same as Kagan that is upon enforcement policy. From this point he 
criticises their "mis-interpretation" of his studies of regulation enforcement within 
Water Authorities and their development of the argument of him as supporting the 
"compliance school" of regulation. Further criticism is made of Pearce and Tombs' 
discussion of the "amoral calculator" and others, notably Kagan's, analysis of it 
(Hawkins 1990 p 454). 
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A significant portion of Hawkins' response to Pearce and Tombs' argument is in the 
nature of the offences committed by businesses. He asserts that most of the 
regulation violations are not perceived by the public as being criminal and that if 
some measure of acceptance by the regulated to the regulators is not secured 
through methods including bargaining the whole regulation scheme will break down. 
It was thought that these two assumptions, the relevance of the public perception of 
the offence and the need for the goodwill of the regulated, would be central to 
examination of the operation of the DTI. 
Themes identified within the literature on fraud, the prosecution function, 
investiqators and prosecutors 
Themes identified by the literature review include the need to ascertain what the 
chosen agencies defined as fraud and the impact that this had upon both their 
operation (what did they deal with) and their interaction or co-operation with other 
agencies (how did these agencies deal with matters). Given the lack of definition of 
both these topics identified in the literature review, it was thought that there would be 
potential for over-lap of both definitions and functions but also the opposite, a lack of 
uniformity of definition in apparently related agencies. 
Closely linked to examination of the definition of fraud used by each of the chosen 
agencies is an identification and examination of other factors that influence action. 
These were thought to include organisational, cultural and personal factors, all of 
which had been identified in the literature review as playing a significant role in 
determining the scope of the agency's operation and its success in that role. 
Research and literature revealed that the decision-making processes of investigators 
and prosecutors were central to their operation and co-operation and should form a 
central part of the study of the chosen agencies' operation. Incorporated into this is 
an examination of whether formal or informal strategies or a mixture of both are used 
by and between agencies and what factors operated to determine the type of 
process adopted and its effect. This includes examination of means of referral of 
matters between agencies, official and informal. 
From the early studies of the prosecutor by Grosman (1969) to the 2000 Review of 
Criminal Justice in Northern Ireland, the existence and reality of the independence of 
the prosecutor from both the government and also from the conduct of investigations 
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is emphasised. The importance of this was taken to be the need for objectivity of 
decision-making, including the review function of the CPS in relation to police 
investigations. Examination is made of the members of each agency's perceptions 
of their own independence and that of the agencies with which they worked in 
responding to fraud. 
Equally important is the reality of the role and function played by the prosecutor, both 
in the "straight" criminal aspect of fraud as occurs in the operation of the CPS and 
also in the criminal/regulatory framework of other agencies. Subsequent chapters of 
the study seek to examine the extent of the role of offering advice when requested 
and to what degree, in practice, this could become a means of lawyers directing 
investigations as occurred within the police and DTL 
The themes identified in this chapter contribute to the parameters of the fieldwork 
conducted in the chosen agencies. Particular reference was included in the 
interviewing of investigators and prosecutors of the accountability of one to the other; 
the extent to which members of one agency could influence the decisions of 
members of other agencies and the form of communications between agencies. 
Examination is made of the stage at which lawyers became, and are thought should 
become, involved in the investigation. Allied to this is examination as to whether that 
involvement is perceived as directing or supervi sing investigations and how these 
perceptions accord with the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Examination of the 
operation of the police and CPS includes analysis as to the giving advice by CPS to 
the police, with this being compared to the results obtained from fieldwork in the DTI 
where the two roles, investigation and prosecution, existed within a single unit. In all 
agencies, examination would be made of investigators' and prosecutors' 
discretionary diversionary powers, including the power to discontinue cases, the 
extent to which this was used and the impact upon the investigators. 
The main themes of the research having been identified, the next stage of the study 
was to consider the various methodological approaches within which the study could 
progress. These are described in the following chapter, together with explanation of 
the methodology chosen. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the methodological context within which 
the research was conducted and to detail the nature of the research. In addition 
examination is made of the methods by which the research could be carried out, 
those that were used together with description of the reasons for the choice of those 
methods. 
Backqround 
As described in more detail in Chapter 2, for some years, fraud and related offences 
have been viewed as considerable problems within several Southern African 
Commonwealth countries. . The local media of the various Southern African 
Development Community (SADAC) countries have commented upon this as a 
problem that taints political administrations and hinders development. However, 
despite commentary in local and international publications, including UNAFRI (Press 
Release 21 October 1996), expressly calling for greater examination of the issues, 
little research has been undertaken into occurrences of fraud or how the SADAC 
countries' legal systems respond to this. It was not possible to look to these .... 
for 
relevant methods. 
In England and Wales there has been significant research into the way fraud is 
detected, investigated and prosecuted. Typically research into the work and 
operation of prosecutors (Rozenberg 1987) and police officers (Levy 1987,1999) in 
England and Wales and America has involved examination of files and interviews 
with prosecutors and police officers. The status of prosecutors and police officers as 
civil servants and public officer holders respectively has had a significant impact 
upon research conducted into their operation. 
On the one hand they are easily identifiable as members of a group that has a 
clearly defined structure and functions. In this respect this form of social research 
differs from research into purely social groups, such as that conducted by Foote 
Whyte (1943). Unlike research into non-employment/work related relationships, this 
study sought to examine individuals' views in relation to their work and interaction in 
an employment environment. Whilst in researching social group composition and 
the interactions between individuals it may be necessary to identify an individual's 
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position and role within the group by reference to other members of the group, this 
was not so necessary in my study. The reason for this lay in the formal and defined 
nature of the relationships existing in the context of the criminal justice system. Not 
only were these easily discernible for external source material, but also the concern 
of the study was less with the social than professional relations between members of 
different agencies. 
It was also important to look at the physical, and hence social, context in which 
people worked . In the organisations to be studied it was common for an office to be 
identified as being for the use of a particular individual with a particular role, or for a 
group with a particular purpose. Thus the head of a department would usually have 
their name and job title on their office door. Specialist groups might be similarly 
identified. Within the police uniform and insignia also assists in the identification of 
rank and, to a lesser extent, role. Within a single CID office several different 
investigative functions and roles may be conducted and, whilst CID officers do not 
wear police regulation uniform, it is visually possible to distinguish between these. 
Those more likely to be dealing with the investigation of fraud are more likely to be 
wearing suits than those investigating drug offences, who will be wearing more 
casual clothing. The office space of the two was also likely to be marked by plates 
on doors. 
So too in prosecution offices, it was expected that titles on doors would often assist 
in the identification of the work group to which an individual belongs. The type of 
files in an office could also assist this identification. An office with a large number of 
relatively thin files relating to many individuals in unconnected offences would be 
less likely to be used by a fraud prosecutor than a generalist. The fraud prosecutor 
would be more likely to have a large number of voluminous files relating to a small 
number of connected persons and offences. 
This ease of visual identification of research subject, as compared to other types of 
social research, is counterbalanced by the relative difficulty of obtaining access to 
the subjects, again in comparison to other social groups. Research access to both 
has to be sought and obtained by formal means. Unlike other forms of social 
research, however for criminal justice agencies the compliance of the subjects 
themselves is insufficient to ensure that legitimate access is obtained. However the 
views of the subjects are important as the research was to be overt and not covert. 
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Holdaway (1983), for example, had official authorisation to conduct his research, the 
fact and reasons of which were hidden from his research subjects. He details the 
strains brought about by this situation, compounded by his being in a situation of 
"participant observation". 
This study sought to avoid that situation and sought to capitalise on the co-existing 
similarities and differences between the research subjects and myself, described in 
Chapter 1. It was thought important that these features be apparent to the 
respondents. 
This was done by expressly advising both those authorising the research and the 
subjects as to the background to the request for research access as being based on 
an interest in the investigation and prosecution of fraud that originated from working 
in a Commonwealth criminal justice agency. Both sets of people were also expressly 
informed that the purpose was to study both the work and perceptions of members 
of English criminal justice agencies so as to report on these in a research context. In 
making this known to the research respondents it was accepted that, as in most 
overt observational studies, the research subjects might report their perceptions with 
their best interests in mind. 
It was for this reason that access to examine the files upon which they were working 
or had worked and their annual workload was al so sought. The purpose of seeking 
objective analysis of the files and statistical data was to obtain some empirical data 
against and with which the individuals' views could be analysed. 
Choosing research methods 
The information that the study sought to obtain and analyse had several layers. At 
the one level it was intended to ascertain what is contained within a police and 
prosecution file. This was to be done by examination of the files and interviews with 
police officers and prosecutors. Thereafter comparison could be made between the 
views of the two and assessments made as to the nature of the relationships, 
practical and perceived, between the two agencies. 
Consideration was given to the research methods by which the information could be 
obtained. Given the nature (formal, professional groups subject to codes of 
professional behaviour) and location (generally in an easily identified office or group 
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of offices) of the research subject, the use of questionnaires had some obvious 
advantages. These were that, as the subjects were easily identifiable, a single 'mail 
shot' delivery of a questionnaire could probably be arranged for the purposes of 
obtaining statistical data and some reports of perceptions. One of the disadvantages 
of the use of questionnaires was thought to be that it would not allow development of 
the respondents' views as would be possible using interviews. The main 
disadvantage is as detailed by Bell (1099), being low response rates to 
questionnaires. 
Respondents within all three groups chosen for study worked in units made up of 
relatively small numbers of staff, being members of specialist groups within a larger 
subset. Had questionnaires been used the response rates in terms of numbers of 
individuals within the groups would have been so low as to make the results non- 
representative and unreliable. As the numbers of respondents could not be varied, 
due to the nature and sizes of the groups to be studied, it was decided that use of 
questionnaires would not be an appropriate means of obtaining statistically reliable 
data. This decision was based on prior research and texts on the design of research 
projects, notably Bell (1999) that suggested that the likely results would be unreliable 
as indicators of general trends. 
Some social research, such as that conducted by Hutter (1984), had made use of 
observation of the research subjects in the course of their work. The legislation and 
professional context of those to be studied prevented such observational methods 
being used in the study, in respect of both police officers and prosecutors. Were 
permission to have been obtained for such observational research from either the 
police or CPS, which in itself was thought to be doubtful, legislation relevant to both 
sets of respondents could have required disclosure of research notes. The Criminal 
Procedure and Investigation Act (CPIA) 1996 could have required disclosure of any 
notes made during examination of specific investigations. Disclosure in terms of the 
provisions of the CPIA would certainly have had to be made to the CPS and defence 
teams and probably also to the police. 
In addition to all respondents being aware of the overt nature of the research, it was 
thought essential that every individual should remain anonymous. Several reasons 
existed for this. Not only does this accord with the requirements of ethical social 
research, described below, but also so as to prevent identification and contravention 
106 
of the Data Protection Acts of 1984 and 1998. Given the duration of this study, both 
the 1984 and 1998 Data Protection Acts applied to the study material. As detailed in 
Chapters 5,6, and 7, a number of the respondents did not appear concerned that 
their identity was protected. However it was felt that they would feel less constrained 
to comment on the operation of their units or that unit's working relations with other 
agencies, knowing that no comment as may be made could be attributed to them. 
The first stage of the research was to examine the law so as to determine what types 
of fraudulent activity were to be the primary focus of the research. This stage of the 
research indicated, in very broad terms, two categories of fraud. The one was a 
generic type whilst the other related to the operation of companies and businesses. 
Both types had degrees of seriousness, from the relatively trivial to the more serious. 
To both there are two types of response, that of the criminal and civil law. It was 
decided to examine the response of the criminal justice system to the more serious 
cases in terms of loss and complexity, of both generic and corporate fraud. 
The next stage of the research was to identify the agencies providing this response. 
As detailed above, in Chapters 1 and 3, previous research and reference to official 
literature assisted in identifying which agencies would be approached. These were 
decided to be the police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Department of 
Trade and Industry. 
In dealing with all agencies a similar method was employed to obtain research 
access and, thereafter, to conduct the study. This method combined pre-interview 
examination of the official statements as to the work undertaken and that agency's 
relationships with other agencies within the criminal justice system, interviews with 
members of the agencies, examination of their work, files and attendance at 
meetings and discussions. Examination of official statements of remit was intended 
to occur prior to approaching the agencies for research access, although frequently 
after the initial approach for research access, more official information was provided. 
Once research access was granted the first interviews were carried out and, at about 
the same time, examination made of a selection of files. This followed the 
methodology of Petrus Van Duyne's (1981) work on prosecutors in seeking to 
establish the criteria applied and working practices of officers and lawyers through 
examination of their work and their comments upon that work. 
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Details as to the means by which access to each of these agencies was obtained 
appear within the chapters of this study detailing the examination of the agencies, at 
chapters 5 to 7. The methods of data collection in each of these agencies were the 
same; it is this that is detailed in this chapter. 
Ethical and leqal elements 
In seeking and exercising research access to the various agencies confidentiality, 
both to the respondents and in relation to the material provided, had to be 
established as a priority. Some of the agencies required acceptance of conditions 
based upon the Official Secrets Act 1911 in respect of the material to which access 
may be given. There was no difficulty in providing this, nor complying with the Data 
Protection Acts 1984 and 1998 in relation to those named in files. A point sometimes 
overlooked in relation to data protection is that the "personal data" provisions of the 
Acts apply not only to suspects but also to "third parties". In the case of research on 
files, this description would apply to those members of the agencies and any other 
agency who were named in the file, even if only in correspondence between 
colleagues within the various criminal justice agencies. As such, none of the 
respondents could be described in any way as might enable their identity to be 
established. 
Having worked within the same environment as the respondents, there was an 
awareness of the possible concerns that individuals may have in relation to their 
comments being made known to the office management. All were assured that 
neither their comments in 'rough'form nor the subsequent chapters produced would 
identify them. 
This point was of relatively little concern to the majority of the respondents, however 
it was felt important to conform to the British Sociological Association 'Ethical 
Guidelines' 'concept of informed consent' as discussed by Hornsby-Smith (Gilbert 
2001 p 64) as far as possible. Hornsby-Smith, quoting directly from the BSA, 
describes informed consent as being the researcher's responsibility to, 
... explain as fully as possible, in terms meaningful to participants, what the 
research is about and how it is to be disseminated (2001 p 64) 
Discharging this responsibility and obtaining informed consent was aided by the 
initial research access request being based upon a clear statement of the aims and 
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scope of the research to be undertaken. This was first provided to the agency in the 
letter seeking access and thereafter in discussions with them. All agency heads 
approached were told of the author's research background as having begun as a 
prosecutor in Zimbabwe, and having had, at various times, responsibility for heading 
the serious crime and fraud prosecution sections. They were also informed of the 
aims of the study as being to determine the various responses of the English criminal 
justice system to fraud and assess the merits, * advantages and disadvantages of that 
system with a view to its application to other jurisdictions. 
It was made clear that any notes made in the course of the research would be 
disclosed to no one and that no respondent would be identified by name. The heads 
of department to whom the request were made all appreciated that, in that capacity, 
they would be identifiable. None raised this factor as being of concern to them. They 
were advised that the research would be submitted in the usual academic format of a 
thesis. None of the agencies required restriction on publication as a pre-requisite to 
provision of research access. 
Upon research access having been agreed and respondents identified, those 
individuals were told, at the beginning of the initial interview with them, of the 
research scope, alms and proposed dissemination in the same terms as used when 
research access had been sought. That some respondents indicated an interest in 
reading the thesis after its submission was encouraging. 
Detailed methodoloqical issues 
At the commencement of the study consideration was given to the format of the data 
collection. The initial request for research access sought to examine official 
documents, in the form of annual reports, internal statistics and the paper work in 
respect of that agency's operation, the police/CPS/DTI files. This stage included 
plans to interview a selection of operational decision makers. This was to obtain 
their views of the official statements as contained in their agency's publication 
(including definition of the agency's remit and work), to explain the official statistics 
and to provide their views on what worked well; what did not and why. 
The semi-structured interview model described by Fielding (Gilbert 2001 p 136) was 
felt to be best suited to the nature of the interview context and of the interviewer. All 
the respondents were professional people, trained in investigation or advocacy. As 
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such they would be used to an interview format that asked specific questions and 
developed themes within the answers provided. 
It was felt that questionnaires or interviews could be used to obtain and record 
personal views. Due to the nature of the material sought it was apparent that closed 
questions would be an inappropriate method to use. Newell describes closed 
questions as, 
drafted in advance, complete with all possible answers that could be given. 
Each respondent is asked to choose from one of the answers. (Gilbert 2001 
P101). 
As it was just those 'possible answers' that were sought, preparation of these 
answers would not be possible. 
Similar considerations operated in the decision to use interviews over 
questionnaires. As noted by Fielding (Gilbert 2001 p 140), the interview permits 
probing of the respondents, to get a 'fuller response' than is possible in a written 
questionnaire. Use of questionnaires does not permit development of the answers in 
the same manner as is possible in a discursive situation. Fielding notes that an 
interview is concerned with communication, a two way process. It was thought this 
would permit the respondents to provide avenues of interest that a questionnaire 
would not necessarily do; the use of the 'comments' section is often little used. 
In addition -it was anticipated that in order to obtain an academically acceptable 
response rate to questionnaires within busy offices, the target population would have 
to be 100% of the operational decision-makers and even then an acceptable and 
reliable return rate was not certain. 
A vast number of individuals work within the agencies that were chosen to be 
studied. As with most studies of the operation of large organisations, it was clearly 
impracticable to seek to obtain the views of all of those within the chosen agencies. 
Not only would some of them not be involved in decision making, but also there is 
recognised benefit in studying the response of a few. Arber notes, 
... researching a sample can yield can yield more accurate results 
than using 
the complete population. For instance, in survey research, if fewer people are 
studied, more resources can be spent on each interview, permitting better 
quality interviews ... Decisions about the sample 
design for a research study 
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must always take into consideration the trade off between using a larger 
sample or studying a smaller one more intensively. (Gilbert 2001 p 69). 
Samples have been described (Gilbert 2001 p 38) as providing study of a 
representative subsection of a clearly defined group, the purpose of their use being 
to provide information from which inferences can be drawn about the entire section 
or'population'. 
As Arber notes, 
The first step in most research is to define the 'population' to be covered... 
the 'population' is any well-defined set of elements. (Gilbert 2001 p69). 
From this the sample can be determined. In this research the population was to be 
those undertaking operational decision-making in either investigation, prosecution or 
regulation of fraud matters brought to the formal attention of the agency within which 
those individuals worked. The term 'operational decisions' refers to the content of 
the work of that agency as opposed to the administrative decisions taken by clerical 
and administrative staff. Whilst the latter are important, it was felt they are unlikely 
to affect the manner in which matters are dealt with to the same extent as will legal 
or technical decisions. Those making the operational decisions were assessed to be 
the case lawyers within the CPS, officers within the police and investigators and 
lawyers within the DTL 
Similarly, Gilbert suggests that, 
... it is usually neither practicable nor wise to interview everyone and observe 
everything. ( 2001 p xii). 
In some agencies dealing with serious fraud was a specialist aspect of that agency's 
standard work. This tended to result in relatively few operational decision makers 
working within one numerically relatively small office. In other agencies, responding 
to serious fraud made up the greater part of that particular part of the agency's work 
and greater numbers of operational decision makers were involved. 
Due to this feature, designing a sample upon statistical lines was felt to be 
inappropriate and unlikely to provide reliable data. For example, in a small office, 
choosing a sample based on one respondent for each ten members of staff could 
ill 
have resulted in two respondents' views being presented as representative of that 
population. In most of the chosen agencies efforts were made to have samples in 
which numerically the respondents constituted at least one third of the population. 
The determination of the population made it easier to identify the formal gatekeepers 
from whom agreement was required before the research could occur. As the 
population was to be those making operational decisions in relation to the serious 
fraud work undertaken by an agency, the obvious person to approach first was the 
head of the department involved in that work. As described in chapters 5,6, and 7, 
access to these people was often aided by informal contacts and a form of 'snow ball 
sampling' where members of one agency would refer me to another agency, 
sometimes assisting by arranging meetings with their counterparts within the other 
agency. 
The first stages of negotiation of access to each agency involved obtaining an 
indication as to numbers of possible respondents from that agency. In general once 
access had been negotiated with the head of the relevant department, the details of 
members of their staff who 'may be of interesf were provided. 
Where this system of referral operated with those identified being informed of their 
selection and of the aims of the research, this was a considerable advantage. 
However it was also found that not all of those making the selections for referral 
informed their staff of that. Such surprises could be minimised by making informal 
contact with those identified prior to the formal interview, so as to give them time to 
verify the referral. 
In practice it appeared that those identified had been selected on the basis of a 
belief that they would be the most likely to be interested in participating. Of course, 
this may have given rise to a subsequent biased sample, an unavoidable 
disadvantage given the need to talk to heads of departments. Particularly in respect 
of inter-agency referral, the system appeared to save considerable time in identifying 
persons who would be prepared to assist, once formal approval had been obtained. 
In some cases, it was those identified in this manner who advised how best to obtain 
formal approval. 
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In one particular agency a list of staff whose comments would be of interest was 
provided. This raised concerns that the list might just be of those who would provide 
the "'party line". So as to avoid alienation of the "gate-keeper" that had provided the 
list, those on the list were interviewed and used to provide introductions to other 
members of staff not on the list. This was achieved by picking up on cases featuring 
shared responsibility or by taking up chance remarks. As it turned out, those named 
from this agency were the most interested in the research, or in research generally, 
and the most informative, supporting the assumption that this was the reason for 
their being ide ntified. It became clear that although these presented the most 
enthusiastic representation of the office they were also those with the highest 
caseloads and able to provide the greatest information. Due to the need to obtain 
the views of others, the sample in that particular office was larger than had been 
initially envisaged. 
Tvpes of data collection 
The literature review in Chapters I and 3 revealed that, unlike Zimbabwe, the legal 
system of England and Wales does not recognise a specific offence of fraud. This 
required clarity as to what it was that the agencies and each respondent within those 
agencies referred when using the term 'fraud' as defined in chapter 1. This was a 
further reason for use of questionnaires not being considered best suited to the aims 
of the research. 
Use of official documents provided the official definition of the role of operational 
decision-makers and operational statistics. However, decision-makers' thoughts as 
to what constituted fraud, their role and issues of an operational nature can not be 
obtained by documents or statistics. It was felt that due to the imprecise nature of 
fraud, a questionnaire, even one using open questions, would not elicit as much 
information as would be obtained through interviewing the respondents. 
The format of all interviews began with an explanation that the anonymity of the 
respondent, their views and any official material to which they might refer, would be 
assured. The consequence of this was to require a very basic coding system to 
allow subsequent identification of which respondents had said what. It was soon 
found best to use a numbering system based upon the sequence in which the 
interviews were conducted together with some indication as to the agency, such as 
PO to represent the police respondents. Some of the agencies prohibited use of tape 
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recording equipment, whilst others did not object. However in the interests of 
consistency, it was decided to use written notes made during the course of the 
interviews. 
Due to the generosity of access granted both by the respondent agencies and the 
individuals within those agencies it was possible to go beyond this accepted form of 
obtaining research data, whilst remaining within the stated aims of the research. 
This occurred when invited to join the respondents on social functions. In these 
settings the main problem was recording comments. As Holdaway (1983) 
experienced, it is not always easy or appropriate to disappear to the lavatory to make 
notes. Noting words on palms or legs only works to a limited degree; the writing up 
of notes of both 'formal' and informal interview material had to be completed if not 
that day then certainly the first thing the following morning. 
In preparation for the conducting of interviews in the first agency, a pro forma 'crib 
sheet' was drafted. This was used in the first interview and various improvements 
identified. These were incorporated into the pro forma that was used in all 
subsequent interviews, in all the chosen agencies. 
Initially interviews were conducted with the interview plan on separate sheets of 
paper to the notes made to record the respondents' comments. After the first few 
interviews this system was modified and an interview plan used for each interview 
with space left between the questions for recording of comments. This system had 
its drawbacks, as respondents' answers to one question could lead to other 
questions that did not necessarily follow, on the interview plan, immediately after the 
original question. This problem was overcome by gaining familiarity with the 
questions, enabling me to go to the correct page of the interview plan without too 
much delay or turning of pages. 
This pro forma took approximately an hour to work through with each respondent. 
However, due to the freedom of access that was provided, a number of interviews 
exceeded this duration as the respondents identified issues of particular interest or 
concern to them, or they elaborated on their answers to the questions on the pro 
forma. Most formal interviews were conducted in the respondent's office. Where 
office space was shared, the respondent's colleagues tended to leave the office, 
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apart from one particular group of individuals within an agency who worked together 
and who all participated in what became a 'group discussion'. 
Throughout the formal interviews notes were made, using the pro forma sheets and 
additional paper where required. Any observations, including such 'non-verbal 
communication' that I thought striking were also noted on the interview pro forma 
sheets. 
In addition to the formal interviews, 'informal' interviews were also carried out with 
the respondents during coffee breaks and at meetings. At these times specific 
cases were discussed in addition to perceptions of working practices, colleagues and 
the nature of the work. Records were made of the respondent's various responses 
and comments by way of notes, that were made as soon as possible after the 
discussions. - 
In addition to 'informal interviews', informal observation was possible as permission 
to attend meetings and case conferences had been granted. At these it was 
possible to note the manner in which different individuals within the agencies related 
to one another and their colleagues in other agencies. In this way it was possible to 
assess the formal and informal procedures used by and between agencies. This 
occurred in the context of non-participant observation where all at the meetings or 
case conferences were aware of my attendance in the capacity of research student. 
In addition to the interviews and observations, permission was granted for 
examination of current and finalised files. These are made up of case papers, 
statements, exhibits, memos between officers and lawyers. Following Van Duyne's 
(1981) methodology, the contents of those files were discussed with the various 
individual respondents within the chosen agencies so as to obtain an understanding 
not only of what they did but why they did it, the decision making process and the 
factors influencing that process. 
Differing numbers of files were examined in the various agencies for a variety of 
reasons that included constraints of time, space and sheer volume. The research 
soon demonstrated that there is no such thing as an 'average file'. Any two files in 
relation to a given offence may contain significantly different numbers of exhibits, 
witness statements, professional correspondence and pleadings. The duration of 
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the alleged offence can impact upon the size of the file, as can the geographic areas 
over which the offences are alleged to have been committed. The amount involved 
in each count can similarly impact upon the size of the eventual file. Investigation 
files will not have the same volume of documentation as will occur in a prosecution 
file, due to the absence of pleadings and legal professional correspondence. 
In addition, comparison of files within an agency does not produce an average. 
Within any one agency a file for a specific offence, based on one set of facts and 
allegations, could easily be some hundred pages, whilst another file in respect of the 
same offence but different allegations, could occupy in excess of four full lever arch 
files without there being any suggestion of un-necessary paperwork. 
What was sought was a comparative examination of files between the agencies. 
This was attempted by asking the individual respondents how many cases of what 
type they would work on in a year, and their being requested to select a 
representative sample of that work. This was recognised as by no means perfect, 
however an objective assessment, in the absence of records of work - not 
maintained by all agencies - was not possible. 
In total, approximately four to five months was spent in each of the agencies. Of this 
time, about a month was given over to examination of the files within that agency. 
Data analvsis 
The statistics and interviews were analysed along two related lines. The statistical 
data and consideration of the agencies' documentation, including file content, 
provided an insight into the procedures and work rates of the particular agency. 
These could be compared between agencies to determine whether there were 
common ways of working, what these were and what were the dissimilarities in 
working procedures. 
The importance of this analysis was identified by the interviews in which respondents 
from the different agencies described the extent to which their operation depended 
upon or involved that of other agencies. 
The comments of the various respondents within each agency were examined to 
determine the common themes of views or perceptions within each agency. These 
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common themes were then considered between agencies. In this way it was 
possible to suggest perceptions shared by the different agencies and also the 
importance that the various agencies appeared to place upon them. Some of the 
themes were suggested by the literature whilst others were introduced by the 
respondents. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
AGENCIES STUDIED 
The following three chapters describe the work of each of the chosen agencies. 
What constituted the work of each agency was ascertained by examination of either 
internal or public documents that detailed the operational terms of reference of those 
agencies. In each of the following chapters' description of the agencies' work is 
followed by an examination of the operation of those agencies. This took the form of 
an examination as to the type and number of cases that sections within the agencies 
dealt with on an annual basis, as ascertained from departmental statistics. In each 
agency this was followed by a period, of approximately four to five months, during 
which examination was made of the operation of staff within those sections, 
attendance with them at case conferences, together with examination of the files on 
which they were or had worked and recording of their comments on their work. 
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THE POLICE 
The first agency studied was the police. From prior experience of prosecuting in 
Zimbabwe, it was expected that within the English and Welsh Home Office police 
forces there would be specialist units responsible for the investigation of allegations 
of specific forms of criminality. The force approached confirmed this to be correct 
and that a specialist unit for the investigation of fraud was well established. 
Commercial Branch 
The unit studied formed a section within one of the metropolitan police forces. It 
was referred to within that force as 'Commercial Branch', and operated from that 
force's Headquarters, based in the city centre. 
Ornanisational structure 
The unit was a CID section, headed by a Detective Chief Inspector (DCI), assisted 
by a Detective Inspector (DI). It comprised three distinct sections; Financial 
Investigation Group (FIU), Cheque Squad and Commercial Branch, the latter being a 
subset of the larger unit with the same title. For the avoidance of confusion the 
larger group, that includes FIU, Cheque Squad and Commercial Branch, will be 
referred to throughout as 'Commercial Branch', whilst the group within that entity will 
be referred to as 'Commercial Branch unit'. The staffing and arrangement of the 
units at the time of the study are described in detail in the following sections that deal 
with the three units. These arrangements were due to alter, as Commercial Branch 
was to move to alternative accommodation and it intended that additional officers 
would be joining the units, either on attachment or permanently. Ten years ago the 
section that has become known as the Commercial Branch comprised nine officers 
Home Office 1986 appendix Gp 231). The number of officers within what is still 
termed the 'fraud squad' (being the three units of the Commercial Branch) of the 
police service studied has nearly doubled in ten years. 
All three units and their support staff operated from a single, open plan area, that 
was separated from Crime Intelligence Section (CIS), Drugs Squad and the Firearms 
section by rows of filing cabinets. This arrangement was disliked by all officers and 
the subject of considerable complaint. The public address system, conversations of 
CIS and Drugs Squad officers, not to mention the occasional discharging of 
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weapons by the Firearms section operated to make quiet working conditions 
impossible. There were four telephones for the Commercial Branch officers' use, 
one on each group of desks. As telephone calls came directly through to these 
'phones rather than to the administrative staff, office work was further disrupted, 
particularly if a set of desks was unoccupied, as officers from nearby desks 
answered calls. This task was almost entirely a message taking exercise as in the 
absence of the investigating officer (also referred to as the officer in the case) it was 
unlikely that the officer answering the telephone would have any knowledge of the 
case about which enquiry was being made. The open plan arrangement and office 
layout made private conversation impossible, and officers generally did not choose to 
interview witnesses in the office due to this fact. The office situation was taken by 
most of the Commercial Branch officers as indicative of the regard, or lack of it, with 
which the Commercial Branch was viewed within the force. It is thought that this is 
unlikely to be a correct assessment of the situation, as all operational units within the 
Police Headquarters operated on this basis, Commercial Branch being treated no 
differently from any other unit. 
The following section describes the study conducted of the operation of the 
Commercial Branch, carried out from April to June 1995. 
Research access 
The initial request for research access was answered with a very wide authority to 
study the daily operation of the office, examine, and take note of, records of past 
cases over a three year period and interview officers within the Commercial Branch. 
As the study commenced this very wide authority was extended to permit attendance 
at case progress meetings, without prohibition being placed upon the taking of notes 
at such meetings. Access to the force computer was granted in order to assist the 
recording of statistical data and complete freedom of access to the files containing 
details of the conduct of enquiries for the years 1992 to 1995 was given. The study 
was further facilitated by the provision by the head of the Commercial Branch of a 
large number of documents that were thought to be of relevance and assistance in 
detailing the terms of reference and operation of the section. In this way it was 
possible to gain relatively quickly an appreciation of the official role of the section, its 
place within the broader force framework, together with an understanding of its 
operation. In addition further documents were provided that detailed the operation of 
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other fraud squads, thereby setting the context of the Commercial Branch in the 
broader context of the general operation of the English and Welsh police. 
After progress had been made in this stage of the study, examination of the details 
of ongoing work of the Commercial Branch was undertaken. This was to be the 
starting point of the statistical data collection stage of this study and began with the 
provision of details of the number of ongoing matters for 1995 and for those 
undertaken in 1994. The terminology used within the Commercial Branch will be 
used throughout this chapter, and requires explanation. 
At the commencement of this study the Cheque Squad had been in existence for 
only three weeks and no records existed in relation to the work being undertaken. 
This was due to the fact that its officers were conducting limited enquiries whilst 
examining the operation of similar units within other forces. This was a relatively 
small section, being staffed by one Detective Sergeant (DS) and three Detective 
Constables (DCs). It dealt exclusively with the investigation of reports of the passing 
of fraudulent cheques and fraudulent use of 'plastic'. It did not operate within 
published terms of reference at the time of the study, although it was expected that 
such terms would be prepared once the operation of similar units had been 
examined. 
The FIU operated in accordance with internally published terms of reference, dated 
May 1992. Its role is not the investigation of commercial crime but of providing 
assistance to investigations of any 'major incidents' by undertaking investigations 
into the movement of the proceeds of crime or the obtaining of what is described 
within its Terms of Reference as 'evidence of a financial nature which is likely to be 
of value during the investigation of major incidents'. The term 'major incident' is one 
common to the operation of all English police forces, and can be applied to the 
occurrence of a wide range of suspected criminal activity, from the non-economic 
crimes of murder to armed robbery and terrorism. In addition the unit undertook the 
compilation of production orders, search warrants and restraint orders in relation to 
the Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986 and the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984; 
assistance in the preparation of affidavits and production orders under PACE 1984; 
and the providing of 'advice and assistance on accountancy matters relating to any 
criminal enquiries involving complex business or personal accounts'. At the time of 
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the publication of its terms of reference FIU comprised two DSs, two DCs and an 
accounting technician. The latter worked on all Commercial Branch matters and not 
exclusively on specifically FlU matters. The staffing arrangement of the FlU did not 
alter during the study. 
Neither of these two units were described ps being, nor were they found to be, 
primarily involved in the investigation of serious fraud. Their operation was therefore 
not the focus of the study. 
Remit of the Commercial Branch unit 
The Commercial Branch unit's terms of reference, internally published in May 1992, 
suggested it to be the sole unit within the Branch directly involved in such 
investigations. This being so, those terms of reference may usefully be quoted in 
full; 
The investigative role of the 
_ 
Police Commercial Branch can be quantified 
as follows; 
1. The investigation of most allegations of Public Sector Corruption. 
2. The investigation of complexthigh value allegations of commercial fraud. 
No hard and fast rules can be imposed, but the governing factors to decide a 
Commercial Branch case are as follows; 
a) that the crime cannot be clearly placed on one _ 
Police division or even 
one force area 
b) that the investigation would entail a disproportionate use of divisional 
resources. 
c) that the case involves a degree of complexity or is in a specialist field, 
requiring the expertise of Commercial Branch staff 
3. The maintenance of an indextintelligence section containing information 
obtained from various sources relating to : - 
a) all enquiries under investigation by the department, 
b) past investigations 
c) active and potentially active fraudsters 
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d) information regarding bankruptcies, winding up procedures and 
liquidations. 
e) matters under investigation by other agencies 
f) intelligence relating to offences of fraud committed in other Police areas. 
Structure and operation of the Commercial Branch unit 
Those within the unit were a IDS awaiting promotion, two additional DSs heading two 
teams comprising a total of five DCs, and an accounting technician. All three units 
shared the services of a clerk, a typist, an administrator and two accounting 
technicians. The Commercial Branch unit operated under a team system, with two 
of the DSs being loosely responsible for supervision of the work of the DCs in the 
unit. This one of the supervisory officers described as, 
You don't want to look too closely and find something you have to deal with, 
too close supervision could lead to officers refusing to co-operate at all. 
(Pol) 
Examination of the operation of the teams suggested that the assignment of DCs to 
any one team was relatively flexible. Within a two month period several changes 
occurred in the teams' composition as officers were moved between units within 
Commercial Branch, and from the supervision of one to the other of the DSs. 
Distinct differences in supervision were apparent between the teams, which are 
explicable by reference to the manner in which work was allocated and the 
personalities involved. That there were only two teams tended to highlight the 
differences more sharply than may have been in the case in a larger group. 
Allocation of investigative tasks was made directly from the DCI or D) to the 
individual officer, and not from them to the IDS for distribution within his team as is 
the more usually applied police procedure of work allocation. Use of this system was 
suited to the supervisory system in operation whereby IDSs monitored the work of 
DCs within their team but did not actively direct it. It was thought that this system 
resulted from the absence of OSU monitoring of cases. As described above, 
supervising officers were aware of the ambivalence of their supervisory role. 
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This system was not invariably used, as examination of files revealed. Complaints 
could be received and actioned by individual officers without first being referred to 
the senior officer. This occurred when officers received telephone enquiries (as 
discussed following in relation to B) or information that could be investigated, albeit 
to a fairly limited extent, prior to reporting the substance of the contact to the DCl or 
DI. As has been discussed above, this aspect of operation can be problematic as, in 
the absence of a clear remit, wastage of, time can occur as officers pursue 
preliminary investigations that they believe warranted, a view that may subsequently 
not be shared by their supervisors. Given that this system operated, it was 
considered important to determine how officers decided what type of complaints to 
accept or reject as falling within their remit. 
Another drawback with this system of case management was that it required the 
head of the section and his immediate deputy to play a primarily administrative role. 
It also required close and frequent contact between these officers and those 
conducting investigations and diminished the supervisory role of the sergeants. 
Where the system operated it would be expected that the senior officers' perceptions 
of what constituted the remit of the unit would be applied. When the system was 
circumvented there was scope for officers to apply their own perceptions and filtering 
processes to either accept or reject matters. 
These features have both advantages and disadvantages. A number of officers 
stated that "any enquiry leads to the completion of a pro forma". Whilst it was true 
that at some stage, a pro forma sheet would be completed, it was found that some 
time could elapse before this was done. In this way an officer could undertake at 
least initial work before being subject to any supervision. 
As a general rule, whatever the way an enquiry entered the office it would at an early 
stage be recorded, on the pro forma sheet, as an 'enquiry and recorded as such in a 
running file maintained by the DI. Given that an officer may delay in reporting an 
initial enquiry there may be a delay in it being recorded in the running file. Whilst this 
was found to have occurred, the delays in recording the enquiry were generally 
short, being of weeks rather than any longer period. After the initial presentation, 
exploratory investigations were assigned to an officer by either the DCI or DI to 
determine a number of aspects, unless the matter was deemed not within the remit 
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of the unit. These discussions included the potentially divisive issues as to whether a 
matter fell within the remit of the unit and the likely investigative requirements, 
together with the less problematic as to the substance of the report. A decision that 
a matter did not fall within the unit's remit would be taken by the DCl, with input from 
the officer to whom it had been assigned. 
The results of these investigations were presented by the officer and discussed, 
either at a case meeting or more informally, and a determination made as to whether 
the enquiry should be afforded 'project' status and investigated in greater detail. 
Once an enquiry had been assigned, although a degree of informal discussion might 
occur, the progress made in the ensuing investigations would be the subject of case 
progress meetings at some stage. It was observed that efforts were made by the 
two senior officers to ensure that these meetings were held on a regular basis and 
that officers reported back on, at most, a monthly basis. Brief details of their reports 
were recorded by one of the two most senior officers and endorsed upon the enquiry 
sheets under the date of the meeting, together with details of the targets that had 
been set for the investigating officer. In this way, despite an officer approaching one 
or both of the two most senior officers, meetings would still be conducted and 
records made as to what had been said by the officer during the informal discussion. 
The timing of the meetings appeared to be almost invariably the decision of either of 
the two senior officers, and appeared to be based upon their estimation of the time 
that was needed to complete the investigative targets set during the meeting. As 
even projects in which virtually no progress was being made were still subject to 
regular meetings it appears that these meetings do not necessarily represent stages 
of the investigative process but are a combination of this and administrative 
supervision. 
Processinq of complaints bv Commercial Branch 
In one of the initial interviews of this stage of the study, the head of the unit 
described how a matter that came to the formal attention of the Commercial Branch 
was processed. The initial step was described as being that it was recorded as 
being an 'enquiry'. By 'formal attention' it is intended to convey the situation 
whereby a matter is recorded, by the police, as being officially dealt with, i. e. 
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investigated, by them. An enquiry could come to the Commercial Branch as a 
complaint; as information provided by a third party or by an informant. In addition 
matters might be sent for investigation from other sections within the same force, or 
other forces. In a similar manner matters or information might originate from other 
criminal justice or Governmental agencies (such as the DTI, CPS, Official Receivers' 
[O. Rs'] Office or Customs and Excise). In the description of the processing of 
matters, it was concluded that an "enquiry" was taken as being synonymous with 
"complaint". 
Although the existence of a complainant, as the latter term may imply, may not be 
apparent on the initial referral to the Commercial Branch, examination of files 
revealed that the existence of at least one complaint was a pre-requisite for any 
enquiry to be accepted by the Commercial Branch in order that a full scale 
investigation could be undertaken. 
The head of the unit described that once received by the Commercial Branch, all 
enquiries were briefly investigated to determine whether the substance of the matter 
fell within the remit of the Commercial Branch. Observation of the officers' work 
concluded that no generalisations could be made as to the extent or depth of these 
preliminary investigations. 
Officers described how each matter was treated on its merits and afforded such 
initial investigations as was deemed, by the supervising officers (who were almost 
invariably the DCl or DI), to be sufficient to establish whether the enquiry should be 
accepted for further and more detailed investigation, or referred to some section of 
the force, other force or other agency for their attention. 
If, after the preliminary investigation, an enquiry was deemed to warrant investigation 
by the Commercial Branch, it could become a "project". This term appeared to 
denote simply that the substance of the enquiry was such that it would require 
extensive investigation and that it had been found to fall within the scope of the 
Commercial Branch remit. The process of development of an investigation was not 
observed to proceed by set stages. It was apparent that an enquiry might continue 
to be investigated by the Commercial Branch for some time after the preliminary 
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investigations despite not being recorded as a "project". It is therefore not clear 
what purpose was served by the classification of an enquiry as a project. 
Commercial Branch statistics 
This system of management was introduced in November 1994, prior to which 
several differing recording systems operated. Prior to this time no records were 
maintained of those matters that came into the offices as enquiries but were not 
afforded project status and were, therefore, not investigated further. It is, therefore, 
not possible to ascertain the reasons for non-investigation by Commercial Branch of 
these matters. Nor is it possible, as it is with the post November 1994 matters, to 
determine whether these matters were referred to other police divisions; other 
forces; or other agencies, or whether they were classified by the Commercial Branch 
as civil matters at a stage prior to any detailed investigation having been undertaken 
and the length of initial investigations. In November 1994 a new system of record 
management was introduced, and a number of ongoing initial enquiries that had not 
previously been recorded were included into the records of the office. It may be 
assumed that inclusion of these matters in the 1994 records would swell the figures 
recorded in the previous years. This was not borne out by examination of the 
Commercial Branch's Annual Report for 1993, that nevertheless included statistics 
relating to 1994, and showed the number of new enquiries for the years 1990 - 1994 
to have been fairly consistent. 
Comparison of the figures for 1993 and 1994 revealed there to have been four more 
enquiries received in 1993 than in 1994. This may be seen as unexpected in light of 
the changes in recording process to the inclusion of all enquiries as opposed to only 
those that went to project status. 
When the DI was asked about what appeared to be anomalies in the annual report, 
he referred the query to the officer who had been responsible for the preparation of 
the report, saying, I don't want to hear him lie about this", having already indicated 
that he viewed the official figures as inaccurate and completely unreliable. 
The officer responsible for the compilation of the report explained the details 
succinctly, stating when asked where he had obtained the figures, I made them up" 
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(PO 6). In an apparent effort to demonstrate the report to have some credibility, this 
officer explained that he had gone through the existing records to determine the 
number of ongoing projects, then had asked other officers, "What have you got on 
your desk" before adding in a "few" (this being an unspecified number) of cases that 
he 'knew of as being ongoing enquiries. The inclusion of the 1994 details added to 
the unreliability of these official figures. Commercial Branch apparently had been 
late in filing its report and so submitted its 1993 report in 1994. At this stage no 
explanation was requested of inclusion of the 1978 - 1992 figures, largely due to the 
impression of the unreliability of the methods used. 
Examination of the statistics produced by the Commercial Branch for 1992 appeared 
similarly unreliable as several figures had been amended in pencil and the 
typewritten totals not altered. In addition some figures were marked with a pencilled 
question mark, raising doubts as to their accuracy and reliability. Furthermore there 
appeared to be no means of establishing how these statistics had been compiled as 
no-one in the office could recall who had complied the figures nor the basis upon 
which they had been compiled. 
Accordingly the diversity of recording styles made meaningful analysis of the official 
figures produced by the Commercial Branch difficult, if not impossible. This being so 
another method of data collection was thought necessary in order to attempt an 
analysis of the work of the Commercial Branch. It was decided to use the details 
taken from the hand-written enquiry sheets and case progress report notes (where 
applicable) to produce an analysis of the number and type of matters dealt with by 
the sections on an annual basis together with details as to the outcome of the 
matters. Where possible details of the dates of receipt of a complaint/query and its 
finalisation were recorded, as were the reasons for finalisation. These dates were 
recorded in order to determine the duration of police involvement in each 
investigation. The reasons for finalisation were recorded to ascertain a number of 
features, including the extent of referrals to other police divisions, to other police 
forces and to other agencies. It was intended that comparison of these reasons with 
the dates (indicating the length of time an officer had been engaged in 
investigations) would reveal the cost effectiveness of the Commercial Branch. 
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It was recognised that use of this method of data collection would have its 
drawbacks. The foremost of these was that no means existed of ensuring that all 
incoming enquiries had been recorded on these sheets, nor that all had been filed in 
the office filing system upon completion of the enquiry/project. There was no 
solution to this problem, but as there appeared no logical reason for the 
exclusion/non-filing of details to occur to any greater extent in respect of one type of 
query than another, it was assumed that the margin of error would operate equally 
across the years work. Thus it was assumed that whilst there may be an element of 
under representation of the work undertaken, this would operate equally across the 
year's work, with no one type of case being artificially excluded. 
When asked, the view of senior officers was that this method was more likely to 
present an accurate reflection of the work undertaken than the officially prepared 
reports and that very few report sheets would be missing. In the absence of any 
more reliable method, the method of using closed enquiry reports together with case 
notes for the years 1992 and 1993 was adopted to record details as to the type of 
matters that the Commercial Branch had dealt with for those years, together with the 
manner, explanatory reasons, and date of finalisation of these matters. 
In some instances it was not clear that a matter had been finalised nor were dates of 
receipt of the initial complaint/query necessarily recorded. The latter aspect is a 
particular problem when its implications, that had not been immediately apparent, 
were recognised. It was only when examination of one set of case notes revealed 
that an enquiry had been received some eight months before being allocated for 
investigation, at which stage progress report meeting dates commenced, that it 
became apparent that use of the dates of initial and final progress report meetings 
was an unreliable indication of police involvement. At best these dates provided an 
approximation as to the length of actual investigations. This was not a completely 
satisfactory or reliable method, but was thought to be preferable to relying upon 
officers' memories as to when a matter had been allocated to them, and the time 
period that had elapsed from that time to the holding of the first progress report 
meeting. 
A further problem, in respect of the 1994 and 1995 matters, became apparent when 
the files of case progress meeting reports for those years were examined. This was 
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that the 1994 file contained only those matters that had been undertaken and 
completed in 1994, whilst those that had been undertaken in 1994 but not completed 
were filed in the 1995 file. To a more limited extent this problem occurred in the 
1992 and '93 files, with some matters being recorded as taken on as projects in 
1993, whilst bearing dates that indicated that they had been accepted into the 
Commercial Branch prior to 1993. Several methods could have been used to 
overcome this problem. The most obvious was to use the date of initial report, 
where available (or the date of the initial progress meeting where such date had not 
been recorded) and use this to sort the matters based on date. This, and other 
methods, were rejected as it was felt that this would present figures other than those 
recorded by the Commercial Branch. Within the unit the disparity between the dates 
was explained as being due to the fact that the initial investigation of a matter, to 
determine whether the matter fell within the remit of the branch; whether any criminal 
offence was disclosed etc., could be a protracted business, and that it was only after 
this had been done and sufficient details establishing jurisdiction found, that the 
matter might be taken on as an enquiry and afforded further investigation. Such 
further investigation could result in the matter being given project status and still 
further investigations carried out, or being marked 'no further action', referred to as 
being NFA-ed. If continued the matter might progress to trial, at which stage 
extended delays might have been encountered as papers were prepared, 
conferences held and dates set. The completion of these stages could, and 
frequently did, span well over a year. In this manner notes of a matter initially 
received in 1993 might well be maintained in the current years file. This being so, it 
was thought best to compile the following analysis on the details as maintained by 
the Commercial Branch 
These details comprise the statistical analysis of the work of the unit for a complete 
three year period, from 1992 - 1994 inclusive, together with an analysis of the 
January - June 1995 details. The results presented below, using the descriptions 
that were given to the alleged offences under investigation, show the number and 
type of matters received by the Commercial Branch on an annual basis, together 
with details of the outcome of those investigations and the reason for the outcome. 
The descriptions given to the actions under investigation are not necessarily legally 
recognised, although some may be. An example of the former is those actions 
termed 'advance fee frauds'. Although this may be a recognised description, it is not 
an offence under the current criminal law. 
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The above graphs depict the work and its outcome as recorded by the Commercial 
Branch. Even cursory analysis of these recordings suggest several possible issues, 
including terminology and whether reliable comparisons between years may be 
made. For example "dishonesty" is not an offence, although it may well be expected 
to be an element of most if not all of the cases investigated by the Commercial 
Branch. Equally the description of cases as being referred to "other agencies" is of 
little assistance in identifying which agencies the unit works with and the processes 
and practices used. 
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The second stage of this study was concerned with examining the reliability of these 
official figures, ascertaining whether they accurately reflect the operation of the 
Commercial Branch and examining some of the issues they raise, particularly what 
the unit deals with, referral paths of complaints to and from it and relations with other 
agencies. 
What is "fraud" for the Commercial Branch 
When questioned as to the content of the work of the Commercial Branch unit, none 
of its officers made mention of the official terms of reference. Most used the term 
fraud, but were to varying degrees hard pressed to define what they took this to 
include. When asked 'What do you define as fraud' answers included the 
comments, 
I wouldn't be able to give you a 'law' definition. For me it's the theft of large 
sums of money by people in high positions in business, and firms of solicitors 
by means of false accounting, and criminal deception. A bobby on the beat 
would give you a different definition from us. (PO 1) 
There's no such offence - it's to sort of commit theft, the way is usually by 
deception.... It's an umbrella to cover theft, sections 1-7 of the Theft Act. 
(PO 5) 
I'd say that would be any theft where there's an element of trickery, not 
straight run of the mill theft, but some sort of trickery to conceal it. (PO 3) 
Fraud, that's a hellva question, there's no true definition of fraud in law as you 
know, so it's investigations of financial crime, basically white collar crime, 
basically theft, deception, forgery in sophisticated ways. (PO 6) 
Whilst comments such as these may be understandable given the legal system 
within which the officers operated, they also indicate the lack of certainty in the unit's 
remit that allows subjective determination as to whether a matter falls within that 
remit and of the decisions as to the evidence and charges that will be made at a 
number of stages in the investigation progress. In addition, the primary 
interpretation, that of the head of the section, may be expected to vary with changes 
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as to who holds that post. If this is so, variations in the unit's decisions as to 
whether complaints were accepted and investigated may be anticipated. 
Accepting that it is not possible to lay down definitive rules as to what constitutes 
'complex/high value' allegations of any form of criminal behaviour, it is suggested 
that the wording of the terms of reference is so loose as to severely limit consistent 
practical application. This supports the Commercial Branch applying its own 
definitions and thereby defining its parameters of operation. This may be desirable 
in that it can provide flexibility and allow investigation of differing types of activity 
should the social and economic situation appear to require this. However this 
flexibility can also limit uniformity within the unit were its officers to have unfettered 
discretion as to how they define their remit. Observation of their operation 
demonstrated that officers' discretion was not this wide, a degree of uniformity of 
approach being provided by the regular meetings with the head of the unit. 
Whilst defining the terms "serious" or "complex" is difficult, other organisations, 
notably the SFO, have used a monetary amount to provide a definition. Were this to 
have been done in the Commercial Branch's Terms of Reference a level of guidance 
would have been provided to those officers referring matters to Commercial Branch, 
and to officers within that section receiving initial reports, together with their 
supervisors in determining the merits of accepting investigation of any such report. 
In the absence of stated limits no restriction operates upon the unit's freedom to 
determine the limits of its own operation. As has been previously noted, this may 
have had both desirable and detrimental affects upon the operation of the 
Commercial Branch. Whilst it can encourage flexibility, there is potential for a lack of 
uniformity in the initial decision making stage of investigations that can have 
important consequences upon the internal operation of the Commercial Branch, 
relations with other agencies such as the CPS and the processing by the criminal 
justice system of complaints of fraud. 
Referral paths to and from the Commercial Branch Unit 
The internally published terms of reference document supported the head of unit's 
description as to the manner in which matters could come to the Commercial 
Branch. The official statement of referral paths was that matters could be received 
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directly from members of the public; or directly from commercial concerns; by referral 
from a police division, via the Detective Chief Superintendent; by referral from the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); or the Crown Prosecution Service's (CPS) 
Fraud Investigation Group or from self regulatory bodies under the supervision of the 
Securities Investment Board (SIB). 
On the basis of this document it was apparent that the Commercial Branch could be 
approached by almost anyone, anywhere in England and Wales, in connection with a 
broad range of matters. 
Examination of the police cases revealed that referral paths between other agencies 
and the police operated as a matter of routine, without any formal requirements 
being apparent. The case also demonstrated the unreliability of the referral paths 
and how several agencies, including civil non governmental bodies, could be 
involved in examining different aspects of the same matter. 
The criminal investigation and case of RvH originated with an SIB investigation into 
DG (a company carrying out, amongst other activities, investments and financial 
advice) of which N was the managing director, major share holder and main 
operator. This SIB investigation was referred to the DTI, which conducted its own 
investigation for the purposes of petitioning for a declaration of insolvency in respect 
of the company. The IDTI investigation revealed N controlled a number of additional 
companies, all of which were running overdrawn bank accounts. At the same time 
as the IDTI investigations were being conducted a compliance officer from an 
independent financial advisory body reported apparent irregularities in the running of 
N's businesses to the police. The police investigations were complicated by several 
factors. The two most obvious were that the IDTI and the independent advisory body 
required many of the police exhibits for their individual purposes. The problem for 
the police lay in the legal requirement of "best evidence", that original documents 
would be admissible in court whereas copies might not, where the originals were 
known to still be in existence. The second problem was that two separate police 
forces appeared to have received similar complaints and to be conducting 
substantially similar investigations. Officers in the force being studied described the 
other force's activities as, 
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What concerns us is that they're still dibbling about. (PO 10) 
The other force was described as "wanting to take on" the DG investigation, whilst 
the force under study did not want that force involved at all and wanted a broader 
investigation into other companies controlled by N. 
A mistrust of the abilities of other forces Was reflected by another officer who 
described the situation by reference to requests for statements to be taken by other 
forces of witnesses within their force area. 
(It is) not feasible. Either they won't do it or won't do it well (PO 11) 
It is suggested that these views relate to situations of two forces wanting to or 
dealing with the same case. That officers did not entirely denigrate the views and 
abilities of their counterparts was demonstrated in their explanation as to comments 
on matters of which they had no direct knowledge. A prime example was in relation 
to working with the SFO. When asked, separately, for their views and comments 
two officers commented that their views were from others, 
At the social in (area) last year P (an officer from another force) told me if 
they get involved you can pull the plug. They treat you like you know what 
and there's very little local input. (PO 9) . 
I get everything I know about them from people who have worked with them. 
H (an officer from another force) hates them, thinks they are an absolute 
waste of space. (PO 1) 
The informal and sometimes convoluted nature of referral paths was also evident in 
the case of WA report of theft of documents was made to a senior member of the 
force being studied by a private individual. The value of these documents was given 
as being E10.00. The matter was investigated and the complainant subsequently 
advised that the matter would not proceed any further unless additional evidence 
was discovered. Some six years later the complainant provided what initially 
appeared to be additional evidence. Investigations revealed complications as to the 
admissibility and reliability of the evidence obtained, in part contained in a book 
written by the complainant. The complaint was considered politically sensitive and 
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for this reason was passed to the Commercial Branch, notwithstanding the value of 
the property. 
The case of B was initiated by a telephone call from a financial institution in respect 
of what the police described as "internal discovery of irregularities" (PO 12). The 
police interviewed an employee suspected by the institution. That the institution's 
own investigations continued was evident from the fact that after this police interview 
an internal audit was conducted, leading to the discovery of further irregularities. 
These were reported to the police and the suspect re-interviewed. This resulted in 
ten counts of theft being charged and the case being referred to the local CPS. 
One of the unit's matters that was in its early stages project 67 evidenced how 
matters could be referred in-force and to other agencies in very informal ways. This 
case concerned information received by a different specialist unit within the force 
being studied, from one of that unit's registered informants, involving alleged theft of 
clients' funds totalling about E100,000.00. That information was relayed to the 
Commercial Branch, officers of which interviewed the informant. This was necessary 
to compile their own file. Having done so a decision was taken to refer the matter to 
an independent professional supervisory body, L. This was done and that body 
conducted its own investigation. In discussions of the case the police expressed 
concern as to that body's lack of success, 
The dilemma is do we leave it to L. We can't go fishing when L's been in and 
not found much. 
In light of these comments, it may be asked why the unit had not conducted raids on 
the suspect's premises as had occurred in the case of N detailed above. It was 
beyond the scope of the study to examine in detail the reasoning behind operational 
decisions, however, from conversations with the respondents directly involved in this 
case it was felt that an underlying issue for the police was the professional status of 
the suspect. 
Time limits and dela 
A feature of the work of the unit appeared to be the considerable delays that could 
occur from the time a complaint had been received by the unit, to the time when a 
final decision in relation to the investigations had been made. As discussed above in 
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relation to referral paths, the unit's final decision in relation to a complaint could have 
any of a number of outcomes. These included that the matter not proceed any 
further within the criminal justice system, by virtue an NFA decision, or that it remain 
within the system by referral to another criminal justice investigation agency, usually 
on the basis that the complaint fell more within that other agency's remit than it did in 
that of the unit. A matter could also remain within the criminal justice system by 
being referred to the CPS for that agency's decision to prosecute. In the majority of 
complaints investigated by the unit it was noted that the CPS had been involved in 
dealing with the case for some considerable time prior to the unit's final decision 
being made. By this is meant that, throughout the unit's investigations of any 
complaint, the advice of the CPS was usually sought well before the final decision to 
refer the completed investigation file to that agency. 
Due to the wide research access granted, it was possible to examine the operation 
of the unit so as to assess both the nature of the delays that occurred and consider 
possible reasons for these. That delay was an inherent part of police work in general 
and the operation of the unit in particular was accepted and recognised by the head 
of the unit. In conversation the head of the unit made reference to a study of which 
he was aware in which analysis had been made of the working hours of a detective 
constable. This he described as concluding that in a month, approximately 40 
working hours of a DC's time were spent advising and assisting the public or other 
police sections. This analysis he applied to the operation of the Commercial Branch 
stating, 
There is no reason to think this has changed. (PO 10) 
A time analysis study of the officers' work was not carried out although the head of 
unit authorised the study to be extended to include this towards the end of this stage 
of the study. It was suggested that a time analysis study be made of the operation 
of two specific DCs within the unit as an extension of the study that would not 
impede the two officers' operation and would provided management information 
useful to the unit. 
The two officers identified worked from desks next to that provided to for the 
purposes of the research. The contents of their desks were clearly visible and 
140 
majority of their conversations audible from the desk provided. It would have been 
possible to observe and record their actions without this being apparent to the 
officers or others in the office. However it was thought that the proposed extension 
of the study in this manner would be not be in keeping with the original undertakings 
and explanation of the study provided to the officers. Although an initially attractive 
notion, the research ethics of the proposal were thought to be so questionable as to 
be highly undesirable. 
It was therefore necessary to inform the head of unit that this suggested extension of 
the study would not occur and to do so in a manner that did not question his 
judgement. This was done by explaining that due to the exactness of the 
observation and recording that was possible, it was thought that either or both of the 
officers would become aware of what was occurring and that this could be disruptive. 
The head of the unit accepted this. Without conducting a time analysis of officers' 
work it was possible within the study to examine which, if any, time limits applied to 
the operation of the unit. 
Time limits 
Blackstone's Police Manual notes, 
In the law of England and Wales the general rule is that there is no restriction 
on the time which may elapse between the commission of an offence and the 
commencement of a prosecution for it. ... However, there are a number of 
statutory provisions prohibiting proceedings once a certain time has elapsed. 
(2001 p13) 
For the purposes of investigation and prosecution of crime, the foremost of these is 
s127 of the Magistrates' Court Act 1980. This requires that prosecution of the vast 
majority of matters triable in the Magistrates' Court must be commenced within six 
months after the date of the offence. Those matters that are indictable only (triable 
in the Crown Court) or triable either way (in Crown or Magistrates' Courts) are 
expressly excluded from these time limits. As such, subject to case law, these 
matters may be investigated and prosecuted at any time after the commission of the 
suspected offence. The Attorney-General's Reference No 1 of 1990 (1992) 95 CAR 
296 and case law significantly limits the apparent absence of time limits. 
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Attorney-General's Reference No 1 of 1990 (1992) 95 CAR 296 provides authority 
for the proposition that, even where the delay could be said to be unjustifiable, the 
imposition of a permanent stay should be the exception rather the rule. At this time 
the law stated that no stay should be imposed unless the defendant could show on 
the balance of probabilities that no fair trial could be held. The case law in the early 
1990s supported the proposition that staying of proceedings as a result of delay was 
the exception as opposed to the rule. However in the mid 1990s this situation began 
to alter, with an increasing emphasis upon the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
At the time of the study officers within the unit worked on the principle that a delay of 
four years from commencement to conclusion of investigations was likely to result in 
abuse of process arguments. It was not apparent as to the origin of this view 
although the subsequently decided case of Rv Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrates, 
ex parte Department Of Trade & Indushy (1999) supported the reasoning. 
In ex parte DTI (1999) it was held that the magistrates had been entitled to stay 
criminal proceedings against the defendant as an abuse of process of the court as a 
result of the delay of proceedings being brought. The case began in September 
1996 with allegations that the defendant had fraudulently removed company property 
between June 1994 and June 1995 and made false statements relating to the 
company's property or affairs on or about 10 August 1995. In March 1998 the 
defendant was informed of the decision to prosecute, and summonses were served 
in May 1998. At committal it was asserted that the proceedings should be stayed as 
an abuse of process as a result of the delay in bringing the proceedings. This 
application was granted, leading the prosecuting authority taking Judicial Review 
proceedings. These proceedings were unsuccessful. 
By 2001 and Attorney- General's Reference (No. 2 Of 2001) sub nom RVJ (2001) 
[2001] EWCA Crim 1568 the shift in judicial focus was more distinct. This case held 
that the relevant starting point for calculating whether there had been an 
unreasonable delay under Art. 6(1) European Convention on Human Rights was 
normally the formal charge or summons, criminal proceedings should only be stayed 
as a result of a breach of that right if the accused was prejudiced to an extent that 
interfered with his right to a fair trial. The accused had been charged with violent 
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disorder following a serious disturbance on 26 April 1998, suspects being 
interviewed in June and July 1998. On 11 February 2000, informations were laid 
against the seven accused and the matter went to trial on 31 January 2001. The 
judge concluded that the period of delay between the interviews and the summonses 
was unreasonable and that the appropriate remedy was to stay the charges, specific 
reference being made to consideration of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
At the time of the study, this shift had yet to be reported, but in all agencies studied 
varying levels of concern that delays in the investigation processes might result in 
abuse of process arguments were voiced. 
Tvpe of dela 
As detailed above, weekly meetings occurred between the DSs and the DCs they 
supervised. In addition all investigations were, at some point, subject to discussion 
on a monthly basis with the head of the unit or his deputy. Although the head of the 
unit or his deputy were the only two officers within the unit who were entitled to make 
an NFA decision, much of the day to day investigation was found to be governed by 
the decisions of the DCs as supervised by the DSs. 
Despite this relatively focussed, directed and supervised investigation, examination 
of the cases revealed that most had been under investigation by the unit for several 
months, some for more than one year. It was apparent that delay could occur in one 
of several forms. Unlike studies of other forms of police investigation, examination of 
files revealed that delays within Commercial Branch investigations did not only occur 
in the file preparation, after the investigations had been completed. 
i) Lack of co-ordination of effort between the investigators and prosecutors 
In the first fortnight of the study the case of RvH was discussed with the DCL One 
of the investigation team reported that he and an officer had been to a financial 
institution to collect details of an account held by the suspect. 
We were surprised to learn that it was a mortgage account and not a savings 
account 
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This led to a discussion with the DCl, the DI and investigation team as to the 
possibility of another branch of the enquiry, described as "mortgage fraud" opening, 
separate and distinct from the investigations that had already commenced. 
Throughout the course of the study this new aspect of the investigation developed. 
However, at the same time, the original investigations were progressing, with two 
additional officers joining the team, specifically for the purposes of dealing with the 
exhibits. 
Although predating the Criminal Investigations and Procedures Act 1998, and the 
s tatutory requirement to make both primary and secondary disclosure in all cases, 
the work of the unit was found to involve considerable time spent in dealing with 
rE! quests for access to exhibits. In one case studied, Operation Bill, exhibits and 
statements were collated from approximately 200 witnesses, involving a number of 
potential criminal charges. Defence solicitors requested access to the material, 
arguing that this should be received and studied prior to their clients being 
interviewed. This was agreed, the DCI deciding that a specialist firm should 
undertake the photocopying and supply of exhibits. Copying of the material took two 
months. Many of the suspects had not been interviewed by the time this stage of the 
study had been concluded. It was subsequently learnt that one suspect was indicted 
on six, specimen, charges. 
One of the original investigation team (PO 1) explained that of the original charges, 
the CPS had chosen six as representative of the criminality involved. They had 
decided to proceed with a prosecution on these charges on the basis that 
prosecution of any of the other, remaining matters investigated would not have 
attracted any difference in sentencing. However the police had not been informed of 
this, or the likelihood of a decision of that nature being taken. For this reason the 
investigation had involved many months of gathering, collating and analysing 
evidence and interviewing suspects on charges that were not relevant to the 
subsequent prosecution. This may be viewed as acting to re-inforce officers' 
negative views of the CPS. Cases such as this illustrate how lack of communication 
between the CPS and the police may result in perceptions within the police of lack of 
common ground between the two agencies. The officer who described what had 
occurred in this case, whilst accepting the CPS power to make such decisions, 
appeared to question the propriety of those decisions, without having any formal 
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means of making his views known or receiving any response from the CPS to such 
views. 
ii) delay in identifying witnesses, exhibits and suspects 
Examination of the investigations in Operation Acorn revealed the difficulties 
investigators could face in their presentation of their investigations. This was an 
investigations into a series of linked mortgage frauds. The original allegation was 
that the suspects had obtained a mortgage over a property that they did not own. A 
check of the Land Registry revealed a number of other properties registered to the 
suspects. These were examined further and it found the provision of finances to the 
suspects had been secured against properties that they did not own. In addition the 
suspects were found to have purchased properties on the basis of significant 
mortgage funding and thereafter not made any repayments. The individual 
mortgage applications were separate, yet linked, transactions. The first link was 
through the suspects. The second was by the applications falling into one of two 
types of deception. The one type of fraud was the making of an application based 
upon the deception that a property was owned by the suspects when it was not, the 
other was the making of serial applications for financing over different properties 
without repayment being made. 
Due to the two types of fraud and that different groups of people were involved in 
each, officers faced difficulties in ensuring the continuity of exhibits and presentation 
of a case that flowed in both time and type of fraud. In addition considerable 
practical difficulties were experienced in obtaining original financial documents 
referred to in witness statements. Officers expressed the views that this was due to 
concern on the part of the financial institutions as to any prosecution bringing 
attention to their lack of diligence in scrutinising the applications. 
iii) delay in receipt of complaint 
Project 71194 illustrated how considerable time could be placed, arguably mis- 
placed, into an investigation that officers accepted was not going to proceed within 
the criminal justice system. As will be recalled, this matter was referred to the unit 
some 2 years after the suspected offence had come to light. A report was complied 
for the CPS suggesting that the matter be NFAed due to the age of the complaint 
and delay in investigating. Despite this feature, the CPS had requested a full file be 
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submitted before any decision to terminate the investigation or other criminal 
proceedings was made. 
Duration of an investiqation case 
One of the aims of this stage of the study was to assess the time span that could 
elapse from a complaint being received by the unit, through its investigation to the 
conclusion of the unit's responsibility for the matter. It was concluded that 
assessment or calculation of an average duration of an investigation would be 
neither reliable nor meaningful due to a number of factors. These included the 
unreliability of the unit's statistics; the findings detailed above as to the different 
routes into the unit and that a matter could be dealt with in any of a number of ways 
after its receipt by the unit. In addition, due to the opportunity for officers to receive 
complaints and commence investigations before formally recording the complaint as 
an investigation accepted by the unit, it was thought that there would inevitably be an 
element of error in any assessment of the length of time taken for investigation once 
a complaint had been accepted for investigation by the unit. It was thought that the 
extent of this error would be of less relevance than that arising from the unreliability 
of the data held by the unit. As will be recalled, a senior member of the unit had 
expressed considerable reservations as to the reliability of the official statistics 
produced by the unit. In addition these statistics did not take account of the fact that 
cases could, and frequently did, remain within the unit from one year to the next. 
As illustrated by the graphs produced from the unit's statistics, of the three years 
operation studied, in only one did more cases proceed to trial than were marked "no 
further action" ("NFAed"). It is suggested little should be read into this as, but for the 
final year, the statistics did not record ongoing investigations. Examination of the 
files of the unit suggested these were a broadly accurate assessment of both the 
annual volume of work and the manner of disposal of the unit's cases. Unfortunately 
what was not recorded, as occurred in other departments within the Force studied, 
notably Discipline and Complaints and the Criminal Justice Administration 
Department, was the year in which cases commenced and the year in which they 
ended. 
146 
After it had been accepted that the official statistics were too unreliable and limited 
for use in calculation of the duration of investigations, consideration was given to 
other methods of calculation. The first was thought to be examination of the actual 
files. It will be recalled that the study had revealed that complaints could be received 
some months before investigations were commenced, in one instance eight months 
having elapsed. However more problematic was thought to be the determination of 
the end point of cases within the unit. 
The obvious end was that of the final decision. This in itself presented difficulties as 
that final decision could be anything from a decision that the unit's investigations be 
referred to another agency, cease (NFA), be referred to the CPS for advice after 
which the investigative decisions could be taken over, to varying degrees, by the 
CPS, or that the investigations were complete and it could be referred to CPS for 
prosecution without any further involvement of the unit. 
Due to the variety of different outcomes that could occur, it was thought that any 
calculation of an average duration would be, at best, of doubtful validity and of little 
relevance to the realities of the unit's work. A meaningful alternative was thought to 
be an assessment of the duration of the cases examined. 
This revealed that, in relation to the total number of cases being investigated by the 
unit, a few would be investigated for a period of anything from several months to just 
over a year before a decision was taken by either the 10 or the head of the unit that, 
for whatever reason, the matter would not be investigated further by the unit. 
Examples of this duration were projects 61 and 71194 (both detailed above). 
These and other cases revealed the decision could be made on the basis of an 
assessment by either the 10 or the head of the unit on the basis of any of a number 
of factors. These could include that the act complained of did not amount to 
criminality, that criminality was involved but of a type that did not fall within the remit 
of the unit or of the police or that for evidential reasons (absence of witnesses etc) a 
conviction was unlikely. 
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Other cases examined in the course of the study (such as M revealed that, once 
accepted by the unit, a matter could remain "live" for in excess of six years, albeit 
that investigations tended not to be conducted after approximately the first ten 
months after the complaint was received by the unit. 
It is suggested that these case should not be dismissed as "one off instances. Due 
to the number of such cases it is suggested that the preferable approach would be 
that they should be viewed as a small but predictably consistent portion of the work 
of the unit. 
Examination of files shows the largest proportion of the unit's work involved on-going 
investigations. These files revealed that a matter could remain within the unit for 
anything from two to three years to in excess of five years. It should not be thought 
that this equates to investigation of the original compliant or that this was the 
investigation time. In a number of the files examined it was found that the initial 
complaint had triggered an investigation of the suspect or activities that led to 
discovery of more instances of criminality. The time a file remained with the unit 
included its referral to CPS for advice and the possible resultant further enquiries. 
In addition, files remained "live" or ongoing in the unit throughout the committal and 
trial proceedings. Since committal and trial proceedings are more usually taken as 
CPS proceedings, inclusion of these stages in the calculation of the duration of 
police investigations may be challenged. It was thought, however, that, due to the 
need for the investigating officer (10) to obtain additional information or provide 
clarification to the prosecution throughout the trial, this was justified in the context of 
this study. 
Examination of those cases that progressed to trial made clear that the police 
decision making did not end with the referral of the case to the CPS for trial. After 
the referral of a matter to the CPS police involvement in investigations continued with 
responsibility for interviewing of suspects, ensuing all statements were of the content 
and format required. Following the coming into operation of the Criminal Procedure 
and Investigations Act 1996, statutory responsibility lay with the police for providing a 
disclosure officer. Whilst this Act placed responsibility upon the CPS for advising the 
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defence as to what constituted primary disclosure, the police retain responsibility for 
cataloguing, preserving and providing access (to both members of the CPS and 
defence teams) to this material. 
As Operation Trophy revealed, these tasks could occupy officers for up to eighteen 
months as preparation was made for trial, and trials were conducted, the duty ending 
only with the finalisation of the criminal trial. Some six years later, in 2002, the 
impact of disclosure experienced by the unit was being commented upon by other 
branches of the police that dealt with allegations of complex criminality. The director 
of the National Crime Squad was quoted as stating that its operation was "seriously 
disrupted" due to 20 % of its officers being tied up dealing with disclosure, 
Detectives are also disclosure officers who spend years going through 
disclosure issues raised by the defence. It can take five years for a case to 
come to court. (Orr-Munro 2002) 
In relation to the Commercial Branch, it was thought that all these reasons would 
make reliable assessment of the average duration of an investigation impracticable. 
What was thought possible was the drawing of some general conclusions. 
It was clear that the unit could receive complaints some months before investigations 
were commenced, several cases supporting the assessment that a six month delay 
was not unusual. Once initiated, investigations of anything up to a year could be 
conducted to determine if the original complaint fell within the remit of the unit. This 
was not required in all cases as the initial complaint could provide sufficient 
information to establish, either by the amounts of money or victims involved that the 
complaint was within the unit's remit. In most cases examined, these preliminary 
investigations were concluded well within a year, most taking approximately six 
months. Once completed these would be presented at the monthly case 
conferences to the head of the unit and investigation parameters agreed. 
Once this was completed, the duration of an investigation was assessed as being 
controlled primarily by the 10. It was accepted that, in theory, the head of unit could 
curtail investigations that deviated from the parameters previously agreed. In 
practice, however, officers could delay advising the head of unit of what they were 
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doing. In addition, when presented with evidence of new lines of promising 
investigations, particularly those suggesting a different type of criminality to that 
originally complained of, the head of unit appeared more likely to agree to the 
broadening of the investigation parameters. 
Within the first three years of any investigation, no time limits appeared to be placed 
on the main investigations. As investigations neared being ongoing for four years, 
both officers and members of the CPS were found to comment on the possibility of 
arguments of abuse of process. In all but investigations involving very complex 
chains of evidence, exceptionally large amounts of money or large numbers of 
victims, such arguments were found to lead to a conclusion of investigations and 
submission for considerations for trial. In some cases, where the CPS had not been 
involved prior to this stage, the investigations were finalised and marked no further 
action at this stage. Where there was prior CPS involvement, the investigations 
tended to be concluded and the contents of the file referred to CPS. During the 
study access was provided to one of the unit's more complex investigations. Due to 
CPS and police concerns as to abuse of process arguments, investigations were 
concluded just over four years after receipt of the initial complaint. Some two and a 
half years later the criminal trial concluded. 
The overriding conclusions from this portion of the study were that lack of set 
investigation time limits operated. In addition absence of formal mechanisms for 
involvement at set stages of the CPS and allied absence of focussed review of 10s' 
decisions could resulted in cases being protracted over a number of years or ended 
after considerable time but little progress. The decisions of individual investigators 
could limit or expand the investigations from the original complaint. The primary time 
limit, found to be applied by officers and CPS whilst cases were still in the domain of 
the police, was that of abuse of process argument. 
Relations with other aqencies 
Examination of the police files revealed that referral of complaints could and did 
come from a number of different sources and routes. Despite the findings detailed 
above, that the unit was demonstrated to have dealings with a number of different 
agencies and organisations, officers stated that they did not have much contact with 
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other agencies. Whilst it was not possible to provide a definitive list of those 
described in the statistics as "other agencies", examination of the files revealed that 
the most extensive contact was had with the CPS. 
CPS 
One officer described the relationship as, 
Ours is different from other police. On the fraud side it's so involved that 
there is quite a lot of contact, but they don't understand how long it takes. 
(PO 11) 
Explanation of this sentiment was provided by reference to a case the officer had 
dealt with, 
I interviewed this man as a potential suspect and took his statement. Now 
they want me to make it into a witness statement. 
The statement was shown, being a 100 page statement under caution, that in the 
particular force is typed up in a question and answer format, making transfer into the 
statement of a single person, time consuming. The officer explained that as the 
case was to be sent to committal proceedings in some two months time, the full file 
was required by the CPS one month prior to the committal date, for the purposes of 
fulfilling legal requirements in respect of disclosure. These time limits provided the 
officer with a month to complete the statement, a situation he described as, 
You can only stretch an elastic band so far. (PO 11) 
Examination of cases and attendance at case conferences also revealed the nature 
of the relationship between the officers of the unit and CPS. Examination of the 
comments in case conferences and interviews with the officers revealed that their 
perceptions of the relationship with CPS were based on the actions and approaches 
of individuals within both agencies. 
In a briefing by a DC to the DCI, on project 71194, the former commented on the 
CPS decision making by reference to the individual prosecutor, 
It's that woman; she won't make a bloody decision until she has a full file. 
(PO 12), 
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71194 was a complaint from an insurance company that had been received two years 
after the events complained of. The DC had sought advice from the CPS as to his 
views that the complaint should be "NFAed" due to the lapse in time. The CPS reply 
had been that a full file was required in order to advise, effectively requiring a full 
investigation. With the particular lawyer in question it appeared accepted, but not 
liked, that advice would not be made in the absence of a full investigation. 
The tension between the roles of the police, investigation, and CPS prosecution, in 
respect of complaints was succinctly described by another officer as, 
They think they're in control, we think we are (PO 2) 
The same officer spoke of his good working relationship with a specific lawyer in 
CPS, whose office he would visit to request advice, would obtain verbal advice as to 
what evidence was required and what not and would conduct his subsequent 
investigation accordingly. 
It was apparent that some CPS lawyers conformed to the police perception that 
contact with them was, 
... always formal. The woman I saw yesterday will have been writing down 
what I said as soon as I left the office and I did the same. There'll be a 
conflict some time and I keep my notes so I can say'You didn't say that'. (PO 
11) 
Whilst others operated informal lines of referral and advice, the operation of which 
largely depended on inter-personal relations than formal procedures. 
When (X) was first arrested, my boss wanted to make sure before we went 
any further, not to waste time, so during the weeks following arrest CPS was 
approached and (they) advised to go ahead.... I will probably see him (CPS 
lawyer) again, as he will be responsible for the case (PO 7) 
b) Other agencies - 
i) the Official Receivers Office 
When asked as to relations with the Official Receivers Office, one officer 
commented, 
152 
... very little contact... It's all one way. We don't have a good relationship. 
They want information from us, but it's all one way way, they won't tell us 
anything. (PO 11) 
Another, described his relations with the same agency as 
very helpful. It's all been one way. They've wanted nothing from us (PO 2) 
ii) the Serious Fraud Office 
It was apparent from interviews and examination of cases that the unit had little 
contact with the SFO. Comments of those officers who had dealings with the SFO 
suggested that formal procedures, such as the setting of financial guidelines by the 
SFO, did not result in that agency accepting responsibility for the investigation and 
prosecution of all matters that fell within those guidelines or for smooth relations 
between the two agencies, the officer viewing the application of the guidelines as, 
One of the things they'll look at is whether they can win this one. That will be 
one of the unofficial criteria that they apply (PO 9) 
Another officer described inter-agency relations in general as, 
We're working to different agendas. When you bring in things like 
performance indicators and budgets it's not surprising that we don't see eye 
to eye. (PO 1) 
Responsibilitv for "fraud" 
The comments of officers and examination of cases on which they had worked 
suggested potential for disagreement between the various investigative agencies 
and independent organisations as to whether one or the other should investigate a 
matter. Considerable scope for complaints of fraud to be rejected by the police, 
other investigative agencies or regulatory bodies and thereafter the CPS or SFO, 
indicated the possibility of complaints escaping attention from either of the criminal or 
civil justice investigative, prosecutorial or regulatory agencies. 
Due to possible internal uncertainty as to what matters fell within the remit of the 
Commercial Branch, all officers within the unit complained of their work situation, 
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many doing so strongly and outside of the research setting. The comment of 
officers that, 
.. Ahere's a load of bloody rubbish (PO 12), 
to, 
severity levels are going down all the time. (PO 9), 
may be viewed as indicating the officers had thoughts on the subject. It was the 
extent to which such comments were made, across all ranks, that suggested that 
this situation was a matter of some importance to the officers. 
Uncertaintv as to what "fraud" is for Commercial Branch 
In a similar manner the unit's terms of reference did not state how "commercial 
fraud" differed. from any other type of fraud, or what constituted a "specialist field". 
The terms do not provide a clear, functional basis upon which enquiries can be 
assessed. It is therefore not surprising that their content was not well known by 
officers within any of the Commercial Branch units. In such a situation it is 
unsurprising that a commonly repeated comment was that, 
this sort of job should never have been taken on, 
without officers substantiating their comments or providing a definition of a "proper' 
job for investigation. This may explain that, whilst this and similar comments were 
made, no direct confrontations between officers occurred in relation to the 
investigation of any matter. 
The terms of reference of the Commercial Branch refer to its "expertise", and it was 
referred to in conversation by CID officers as a "specialist" squad. Interestingly, the 
Force's Good Practice Guide did not include Commercial Branch under its list of 
specialist squads. The 1993 Annual Report detailed of the operation of the 
Commercial Branch on the final page of the Report. Under the index, The 5 Key 
Service Areas, the topics that preceded the very brief eight line report on the 
Commercial Branch were, calls from the public; community consultation; reassuring 
the public and keeping the peace; traffic management and crime management. It is 
in this section that the Commercial Branch report is the penultimate entry. In this 
Report no mention is made of the millions of pounds 'at risk' with which the 
Commercial Branch dealt with on an annual basis, whilst anti-crime initiatives such 
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as Operation Picasso, directed against 'graffiti artists' who caused E15,000 of 
damage is mentioned. The importance of this, it is suggested, lies in that it was 
viewed by the majority of officers within the unit who were interviewed as reflecting 
the actual force perception towards fraud and its investigation. It was felt that 'they 
don't understand fraud' and that this caused the unit to be regarded as less 
important than other sections. Throughout the. study it was noted that officers within 
the Commercial Branch unit perceived a number of apparently innocuous factors to 
be a slight upon the work of the unit and themselves as investigators. 
Unlike other police units and sections, the Commercial Branch had no set 'ground' 
(Holdaway 1983 p36) that its officers could call their own. By virtue of its terms of 
reference, the Commercial Branch operated in a manner different to all other 
sections within the police force. It was specifically authorised to accept as its 
responsibility that, which all other sections within police forces try to avoid, matters 
involving investigations in more than one force area. This being so, there were no 
certain and established territorial limits for its officers to work and establish power 
relations within. Accordingly not only did the nature of its work differ from that of 
other sections within the police, but also the manner of its operation. 
Holdaway (1983), in describing the operation of a different section of the same force, 
wrote of the 'primacy of police control' that other organisations were obliged by the 
section to respect in relation to its work. The situation in which the Commercial 
Branch officers operated differs considerably from the more traditional police culture, 
as described by Holdaway. The unit relied upon the assistance of various groupings 
that other CID squads will never deal with, such as the banking and financial sector. 
Whilst these sectors can be obliged by court order to provide certain information or 
documents to the unit, the unit had no control over their operation as does general 
CID over a number of criminal justice or social welfare agencies. 
Other features operate to distinguish the unit from general CID. The Commercial 
Branch was described internally as being 'the most autonomous section within the 
force' (P. 0 . 10), a description used and accepted by officers from other sections of 
the force. This has several important effects. Firstly it permits operating procedures 
that are not to be found in the majority of the force. The prime examples of this are 
the supervision of work within the unit and contact with the CPS. Force Regulations 
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stated that use was to be made of the Operational Support Units (OSU), formerly 
known as the Administration Support Unit (ASU). Commercial Branch did not route 
its requests for advice nor its submission of files to the CPS through the OSU, but 
through its own senior officer. To function effectively this system requires close 
supervision of the senior officers within the section. This could either take the form 
of the senior officer maintaining direct supervision of the work of all officers, rather 
than use the more usual supervisory pattern of inspector or higher ranking officers 
supervising a few sergeants, who in turn supervise a larger number of constables. 
Alternatively the DSs fulfil a close supervisory role whilst referring all matters in 
which they feel investigations to be completed, or requiring CPS advice, to their 
senior officer. The system can produce repetition and may explain why the former 
system was used within the unit. 
Unlike other sections, both uniform and CID, the Commercial Branch officers could 
virtually never generate 'action' to fill in the dull portions of the day. Their work 
involved no fast cars or urgent calls for assistance. Instead they were either in the 
office, or out, obtaining statements or information from individuals, a number of 
whom worked within the professional sector. If officers were in the office they would 
be working on statements, preparing reports or trial documents or talking amongst 
themselves. Some days were marked by extended periods of relative inactivity, with 
much of the conversation being of a social nature, or a large portion of the day spent 
answering the telephones, particularly if a number of officers were out of the office. 
Raids upon premises and dramatic arrests were few. Most of the Commercial 
Branch suspects were requested to attend rather than officers being sent out to 
arrest them. The daily work of officers was remote from that of uniform or general 
CID and there was little 'action' that could break up the routine. 
Yet some elements of the traditional police culture were discernible, as may be 
expected given that all officers joined the section having spent time in general CID. 
All officers spoke of the 'outside' when referring to non specialised, usually CID, 
police work and it was their work on the outside that formed the substance of the 
majority of 'tall' tales. The impression given was that excitement was to be had on 
the 'outside' rather than in the operation of the Commercial Branch. In such 
circumstances it may be expected that there would be less communal spirit than in 
other sections. At the time of the study this appeared to be the case. Groupings 
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that were said to have previously existed had been largely broken down by 
retirements and transfers. Thus not only did the unit lack a ground, it also lacked a 
sense of alliance amongst the officers as a whole. 
None of the officers within the unit mentioned exhibited any of the proprietary 
behaviour described by Holdaway (1983), in respect of complaints of fraud. They 
appeared resigned to playing second fiddle not only to other agencies and 
institutions but also within their own organisation. This manifested itself in a widely 
held belief amongst a number of those officers who had been in the Commercial 
Branch for any length of time that they were overlooked for promotion and career 
advancement, and that they would fail to achieve either if they remained in the 
Commercial Branch. The fact that during the period of the study three officers 
successfully applied for positions in other sections, all of which carried prospects of 
promotion and career advancement did not affect this view, but re-enforced the 
belief that officers had to leave the section to obtain advancement. Given that it has 
been accepted since the time of Operation Countryman and the investigation into the 
West Midlands Serious Crime Squad that officers from within any section should not 
be promoted to a high station within that section, but in other sections, it is 
suggested that there was nothing out of the ordinary in this. 
Unlike the work of other CID sections, Commercial Branch work was primarily desk 
based, and relied upon analysis of figures and documents. Its detection lacks the 
machismo and excitement that form a considerable portion of the 'canteen culture' of 
the police (Reiner 1985). All officers in the Commercial Branch spent several years 
operating in terms of that culture, and may unwittingly have been applying its 
emphasis on excitement, action and danger to their present work, that clearly lacked 
these characteristics. in this manner they could become their own harshest critics. 
The opportunities for this to occur were thought to be increased by the fact of their 
working in close proximity to sections such as Drugs and CIS, that embody the 
"canteen culture" values. 
Whether this perception of the work of Commercial Branch was justified could not 
be ascertained by this study, as it did not seek the views of police officers in postings 
other than Commercial Branch as to the operation of the unit. Given that, during the 
time of this study, a number of officers applied for transfer or attachment to the 
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Commercial Branch, may be viewed as indicating that the negative views of officers 
within the unit as to its operation were not, necessarily, reflected in the general 
perception of the unit. This may be supported by the assessment that a poor 
perception of the unit and its work was apparent in the comments of a number of its 
longer serving officers, than those officers who had joined the unit more recently. 
The latter group viewed posting to the unit as providing opportunity for acquisition of 
greater skills and career advancement. 
A number of officers commented that their work in the unit was under-appreciated 
within the force, most commenting that it was not properly understood. Comments 
made by Cohn in discussion of the police: public relationship may be applied to the 
situation of the Commercial Branch and the broader body of the force, if 'citizenry' is 
replaced with 'force', 
There is no doubt that the police suffer from the fact that their role has been 
misunderstood. But the police frequently contribute to this level of 
misunderstanding by their lack of concern, unwillingness to share 
information, and/or lack of desire to involve the general citizenry in policy 
formulation and implementation. (Cohn 1979 pI 1) 
Whilst 'lack of concern' should not be held to suggest indifference within the 
Commercial Branch in respect of their work, it was clear that the feelings of 
ambivalence in the unit as to the worth of that work were communicated to those 
outside the unit, rather than positive impressions as to the importance and extent of 
the work. A higher profile could be given to the work by ensuring that other sections 
know more of its work. This has been successfully done by one of the units, FIU, 
who enjoyed direct contact with a number of other divisions and sections throughout 
the force area. Unlike the Commercial Branch unit, FIU had clearly defined roles. It 
may be that this feature assisted both the FIU and other sections within the force in 
that there was certainty as to what the FIU did and when it should be involved or 
approached for assistance by other sections. It is possible that a sharper focus upon 
what is and is not the remit of the Commercial Branch unit may assist in creation of a 
similar situation within that unit and in the force. 
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The entire Commercial Branch was described by both its own officers and senior 
management within the force as operating in terms of an unusually high degree of 
autonomy. This autonomy can be seen to operate on two levels. The first is that, as 
has been previously described, the usual supervisory arrangements did not operate 
as they did in other sections, with the work of a large number of constables being 
monitored by a smaller number of sergeants, who in turn were responsible to still 
fewer inspectors. Secondly the unit was not subject to the same type of control and 
direction from senior management/commanders as were other CID sections. 
The implications of these factors are that the unit could set its own terms of 
reference and criteria for accepting (and thereafter conducting) investigations, or for 
declining to do so. The consequences of the second aspect are that decisions of 
the Commercial Branch might not necessarily either be referred to (or back to) other 
sections within the force, or to other forces or agencies, or that investigations might 
be stayed as no further action (NFA) is taken. 
Accordingly the decision-making process as to whether to accept a matter for 
investigation is of considerable importance. It is this that, in all probability, will be 
the sole determinant as to the outcome of a matter coming to the attention of the 
unit. 
Examination of the views of the officers within the unit revealed the extent of the lack 
of clarity, and the consequences of this in the creation of personal criteria. This is of 
importance given the initial question asked of all respondents was 'what is the work 
of your section'. As was anticipated, all answers mentioned 'fraud'. This uniformity 
permitted the asking of questions designed to determine what this term 
encompassed and its practical application within the unit. These were (1) what is 
fraud, (2) what type of frauds do you deal with, and (3) what type of frauds do you 
not deal with. 
Whilst officers tended to define fraud either in terms of type (mortgage frauds, 
advance fee frauds etc. ) or in terms of form (involving substantial amounts of money 
or complex investigations), the answers to question (3) revealed two interesting 
features. The first was that considerations of both form and type were applied in 
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determination of what was or was not an appropriate matter for investigation by the 
unit. The second was that despite appearing to apply the same criteria officers 
within the same section could apply very different criteria as a result of the lack of 
definition as to what constitutes large amounts and serious or complex 
investigations. One officer (P. O. 1), in referring to monetary limits within the terms 
of reference (that do not exist) mentioned the sum of E20,000, whilst another (P. O. 3) 
took the limit as being E 40 - 50,000. 
The relationship between type and form was shown to be bound up with this limit, the 
same officer stated, 
I would not take anything that was a simple theft, 
theft being the criteria he applied to acceptance of a matter as being within the unit's 
remit. "Simple thefts" were explained to be 'shoplifting, that sort of thing'. Further 
questioning revealed that 'non-simple' thefts were those where a number of 
complainants existed or a lot of money was involved. 
Use of these criteria was thought to be problematic, as cases revealed, notably that 
of W, involving E10.00. In addition, allegations of criminal conduct involving relatively 
small amounts could nevertheless be complicated matters, due to the nature of the 
conduct and the investigations required to prove it. The case of RvH at first 
involved relatively small amounts (f-100,000), but required examination of several 
different business concerns and business accounts, some of which were based in 
foreign jurisdictions. Equally the reverse could also be true, allegations involving 
large sums of money being simple to prove and investigate. Complications could 
arise from the status or position of the parties involved as much as from the manner 
in which the deception was achieved, as suspected in the matter of case 67. 
It was concluded that complaints could be referred formally and informally to the unit, 
and to individual officers within it. The perceptions of the officer receiving a 
complaint were of considerable importance in determining not only the form of 
investigations, but also whether an investigation was warranted and its extent. 
Given the diversity of referral paths, it was concluded that these perceptions would 
not necessarily be those of the head of the section, but could be of individual 
investigators who received a telephone referral. Whilst the unit operated reviews of 
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officers' decision making and progress of investigations, contact with other 
investigative agencies could result in complaints not being accepted for investigation 
by an agency or by more than one, leading to possible confusion and conflict 
amongst the investigators that did nothing to progress the case in a coherent 
manner to a stage at which it could be referred to a prosecution agency. 
Of those investigations that were processed beyond the first enquiries, most of the 
unit's cases were found to be referred to the CPS for prosecution. Only a small 
number of the unit's cases were found to be referred to other investigative agencies 
or to prosecutorial agencies other than the CPS. Referrals to the CPS were found to 
usually occur in the early stages of an investigation for advice. Case examination 
and officers' comments indicated that the processes by which CPS advice was 
sought and obtained were not consistent or reliable, personal relations impacting 
significantly upon the nature and outcome of contact between the agencies. 
It was apparent that neither the unit nor its prosecutorial counterparts within the CPS 
operated a shared definition as to what constituted fraud or how such cases should 
be processed. As such it was concluded that a considerable number of factors could 
influence the investigation of a complaint, chief amongst these being personal 
definitions, perceptions and approaches to the role of the respective agencies. The 
main focus of the study was the progress of complaints of fraud through the criminal 
justice system. This stage of the study concluded that this was erratic and selective, 
with the suggestion that progress through the civil justice system was similarly 
complex and subject to chance. 
The next stage of the study was to determine how matters progressed through the 
criminal justice system once they were not within the sole domain of the police and 
were moving or had moved into the stage at which they were being processed for 
prosecution. Examination of police files and discussions with officers suggested the 
CPS to be the agency with which the police had most dealings as complaints of 
fraud progressed through the investigative stages to prosecution. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE CROWN PROSECUTION SERVICE (CPS) 
During the study undertaken with the police, examination of police files and 
discussions with officers showed that, in the investigative stage of a complaint of 
fraud, the majority of police dealings with other criminal justice agencies were with 
the CPS. This confirmed the findings of the literature review, that the CPS was the 
criminal justice system agency with primary responsibility for prosecuting police 
investigations. 
It was ascertained that a specialised group within the CPS operated in respect of 
fraud prosecutions. This was the Fraud Investigation Group, generally referred to as 
FIG, the offices of which were based in London. Whilst the local CPS offices 
occasionally dealt with Commercial Branch investigations, examination of Area CPS 
files revealed that Area offices were more likely to deal with investigations involving 
smaller amounts of money; smaller numbers of complainants. It was concluded that, 
in general, local CPS offices dealt with the less complex investigations; the more 
complex or larger (in terms of amounts or numbers of complainants involved) cases 
being referred to the FIG. 
As, in the study population, the CPS was the prosecuting authority for all police 
investigations, the aims of the next stage of the research were to discover what 
criteria were used to determine which police investigations went where and how 
those whose task it is to advise and review matters that have been investigated 
related to the police who undertook that investigation. 
Status of CPS 
The CPS is a creature of statute. The 1986 Prosecution of Offences Act provides 
that the Director of Public Prosecutions shall appoint a staff sufficient to carry out the 
functions of the DPP, these being, 
(i) to take over the conduct of all criminal proceedings, other than specified 
proceedings (being those specified by the Attorney General) instituted on behalf 
of a police force 
(iv) to give, to such extent as he considers appropriate, advice to police forces on 
all matters relating to criminal offences 
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These roles are governed by the Code for Crown Prosecutors that states, 
The police usually start proceedings. Sometimes they may consult the Crown 
Prosecution Service before charging a defendant. Each case that is sent to 
the Crown Prosecution Service is reviewed by a Crown Prosecutor to make 
sure that it meets the tests set out in this Code... 
Review, however, is a continuing process so that the Crown Prosecutor can 
take into account any changes in circumstances. Wherever possible they talk 
to the police first if they are thinking of changing the charges or stopping the 
proceedings. This gives the police the chance to provide more information that 
may affect the decision. (HMSO 2000) 
The Code details the evidential ("realistic prospect of conviction") and public interest 
tests that are applied in reaching these decisions. 
As one of the concerns of this stage of the study was to determine when and in what 
manner the CPS would become involved in a case, examination is made of the terms 
"advise" and "review" in practice, given the considerable prosecutorial discretion 
provided for in the Act. It was thought that any agency empowered to operate "to 
such extent as considered appropriate" was likely to exhibit variations in practical 
application of the Code for Crown Prosecutors. Interviews with police officers 
supported this assessment, and the suggestion that different definitions could be 
given to the same words by different agencies, with potential for differing perceptions 
and a mutual lack of understanding between the police and CPS. 
It was thought that in carrying out their functions of "advise" and "review', 
prosecutors would have the greatest degree of contact with police investigations. 
For this reason examination of these two terms is made to determine what, for CPS 
purposes, constituted a case and whether this differed from the police definition. 
Examination is also made of the term fraud, to determine if its use within the CPS is 
as undefined as in the police. It was thought that if the perceptions of investigators 
and prosecutors differed, potential exists for differences in practices and working 
relations between the two agencies. Another aim of this section of the study is to 
establish if differing definitions are applied between the two agencies and, if so, the 
significance of this. 
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The Fraud Investiqation Group 
At the time of making the request for research access to the CPS head offices the 
FIG was a group, based in London, comprising lawyers and administrative staff who 
had previously been described as "CPS Headquarters - Fraud Division". Approval 
was obtained to conduct interviews with members of this office. During the last 
weeks of the study the Northern region division of the FIG began to operate from 
offices in York. It was suggested that there would be little merit in examining the 
operation of that office at that point in time, as it was anticipated that much of work 
generated from police forces in that region would continue to be channelled through 
the London offices for some time. This suggestion was accepted on the basis of 
letter from Head of Fraud Provincial Division to all Chief Constables, dated 20 June 
1995, confirming the referral route as being through the London office for some time, 
until the York offices were fully operational. 
The FIG Office 
The London FIG was situated within the City, in modern accommodation that also 
housed the CPS Headquarters. The staff comprised the Head of Division, twenty 
four lawyers of CPS grades 6 and 7, eight staff in the Accountancy unit and fifty two 
other support staff of whom four were Higher Executive Officers; three were team 
leaders (executive officer grade) with the remainder being almost equal numbers of 
caseworkers of executive and administrative officer grade. Equal numbers of 
administrative assistant caseworkers and suppo rt staff to lawyers completed the 
staff. 
The FIG occupied one floor in the building. The first offices on the floor were 
allocated to the lawyers, most of whom shared their office with at least one other 
lawyer, generally being in the same "team" as those with whom they shared an 
office. The final office was a large semi open plan office occupied by the 
caseworkers and other support staff, whose desk arrangements bore no correlation 
to the grouping in which they were officially supposed to operate. The caseworkers' 
area of this office did not have the space or privacy of the lawyers' offices. Whilst 
there were some comments as to the noise of the general office there were no real 
complaints, the over-riding view of the caseworkers being that their work was 
assisted by their close proximity to forms and to each other, rather than to the 
lawyers in whose group they were listed as working. All CPS personnel had access 
to the well-stocked library was on another floor within the building. 
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Methodoloq 
The initial request for research access to the FIG was made by letter. The response 
to this was an invitation to meet with the head of the FIG to discuss the request. The 
meeting that took place resulted in an agreement that access would be permitted, 
subject to the signing of an Official Secret Act declaration and the CPS'S own 
research declaration. It was further agreed that the timing of research access could 
be negotiated directly with the unit. This was done and a date agreed on which the 
study would start. On that date it appeared the substance of the first discussion, 
particularly the requirements of signature of undertakings, either had not been 
communicated or was not considered essential. 
On arrival at the FIG offices it was apparent that the respondents were not aware of 
the nature of the study and the first day of the agreed access was largely spent 
drinking coffee with members of the FIG who were either interested in, or 
undertaking, further education, particularly research studies. It was through this 
contact that one of the respondents offered the use of a desk within their office. 
That offer resulted in an accepted space within the office for the duration of the study 
and assisted freedom of access to others within the FIG and to all the facilities of the 
FIG office. 
The study of the FIG took place over five months : August to December 1997. 
During this time periods of a week to a fortnight were spent each month with the FIG 
so that, in total, approximately three months were spent with the Group. After the 
first meeting with the head of the FIG, no further contact was had with this individual 
and all further arrangements were made directly with the lawyers and staff of the 
FIG. Once the respondent lawyers were made aware that I would not be in their 
offices on a daily basis, an arrangement was reached whereby either a time was 
diaried for the next few weeks or it was agreed that files would be left in their offices 
for collection and that these could be examined in the absence of the lawyer. 
Examination of the files was permitted using either the office of the file provider, or 
the office space that had been made available on the first day of the study. 
The informality of the study arrangements, both in terms of timing of the study 
periods and understanding as to its exact nature, had distinct advantages. Once the 
members of the office grew accustomed to a new presence, it was possible to move 
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largely at will and be accepted as somehow part of the Group. Not only did this 
result in access to a wide range of materials, it also resulted in informal 
conversations as to the workings of the office that possibly might not have occurred 
but for this quasi-insider status being presumed. 
A second result of the lack of notification of the proposed studies was that none of 
the FIG staff expected to be interviewed. This was slightly overcome by the coffee 
session of the first day, during which some members of the Group agreed to discuss 
their work. A number of these interviews took place during the first week of the 
study, after which the quasi-insider status appeared to have become accepted, 
resulting in the remaining members of the Group agreeing to timetable discussion of 
their work. 
During the first week, three of the respondents undertook to discuss in greater depth 
various aspects of their work. At this stage of the study it also became clear that, 
due either to a lack of information supplied to the Group and resistance to providing 
information that had not been specifically sanctioned, or due to genuine difficulties in 
making a meaningful correlation between the figures and changes in the composition 
of the FIG, access to annual statistics would not be provided. 
In light of this opposition to providing statistics it was accepted that the quantitative 
aspect of the study would have to be dropped. In order to attempt to discover the 
types of investigations being referred to the FIG; the identities of the agencies 
referring such investigations; the type of work undertaken by the FIG and the 
relations between the agencies, it was decided to examine a sample of the files of 
one lawyer from each of the divisions within the FIG. This was done by asking a 
lawyer from each division to estimate their annual case load and to describe the 
charges under which prosecutions were taken, so as to assess the frequency of 
usage. The same lawyers were then asked if examination could be made of a 
sample of the files in relation to the list of charges. In all cases, those to whom this 
request was made, agreed to it. 
Whilst this method gave some insight into the working of some members of the FIG, 
its main disadvantages were that the numbers of cases were, at best, an estimation 
of the work of specific individuals and that their responses could not be verified 
independently. In relation to the request to examine files, it had to be accepted that 
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the lawyers' choosing of cases could be influenced by a number of variables, such 
as providing "evidence" of a particular view or to give an impression that all the 
matters dealt with were of a complex nature; involved large amounts etc. As the 
study of this specialised unit progressed it became apparent that this estimation of 
caseloads would provided, at best, a highly unreliable indication as to the work loads 
of the unit. This was because the distinction had not been made between cases 
followed through by the lawyer to prosecution and those that had been dealt with 
before referral to other lawyers within the unit. The possibility, as detailed later in 
this chapter, that a case could be dealt with by a number of FIG lawyers during the 
processes of advice review and prosecution led to a real possibility of cases being 
counted more than once. It was for this reason that, although the estimations were 
recorded during interviews, this means of data collection was not included in this 
chapter. 
The absence of statistical data also prevented comparison of disposal rates between 
the various agencies and analysis of which agencies shared the greatest number of 
cases. Examination of files could only provide an indication as to the length of time a 
complaint had taken to be processed once it had come to the attention of the FIG. 
What this examination made clear was that files were submitted to the FIG at any of 
a number of stages, from almost initial complaint to virtually completed 
investigations, and that FIG involvement with an investigation could last for several 
years before finalisation of the matter 
Due to the unreliability of the data collected or the absence of data, direct correlation 
of caseloads between the CPS and the police was not possible. What was possible 
was to establish the parameters of the FIG operation by reference to perceptions of 
its lawyers and examination of a sample of its files and to compare the results 
obtained to similar studies undertaken in the other chosen agencies. 
All the interviews were recorded at the time they were conducted, using a crib sheet 
with large gaps in which notes of what was said could be written. For the more 
responsive, this was by no means ideal. However, during the first meeting, use of 
tape recorders had been specifically excluded as a means of data collection. Where 
informal discussions occurred it was usually not practicable or possible to make 
notes. In these situations the respondents' comments were written up as soon as 
possible after leaving the meeting places. It was recognised that this method would 
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not always produce a totally accurate accountof what was said. However, it was 
thought better to use this method than to compromise the quasi insider status that 
appeared to have become accepted. 
In the approximately two months spent with the FIG offices, the majority of lawyers in 
the FIG were interviewed, together with the Higher Executive Officer, whose job 
included acting as office manager. Examination was also made of a number of case 
papers and files that individual lawyers had made available. 
Operation of the FIG offices 
a) Referral paths to FIG 
1. From the police 
One of the early stages of this part of the research was to identify the means by 
which cases entered the FIG. This was done by questions posed to the lawyers who 
dealt with those cases once the FIG'had accepted them. One of the responses 
made mention of the CPS computerised case management system known as 
CAMES. Interviews with a member of the administrative staff as to the operation of 
this system revealed that, in theory, all matters originating from the police were first 
received into the FIG by the Administration Support Officer who logged them onto 
CAMES. Unlike most other police to CPS referrals, fraud matters did not usually 
pass through the police Administrative (or Operational) Support Units, ASUs or 
OSUs. It is for this reason that, in the investigation to referral to CPS stages in the 
processing of a complaint of fraud, all decisions on the conduct of investigations and 
file content were made only by police officers and not police support staff. This was 
unlike the situation occurring in all other criminal investigations. In this way the 
investigation of fraud remained very much the remit of those officers dealing with it 
and no one else, until matters were referred to the CPS. 
In describing the operation of the CAMES system, it was said that the FIG examined 
these referral by the police upon receipt. Examination of that process in operation 
showed that this examination did not include any legal analysis of the files submitted. 
The examination observed to occur was of documentary details. Administrative staff 
would examine whether details of the suspect; complainants and officers had been 
provided and that there was a summary of the case as the police assessed it to be. 
The importance of this was that all submissions by the police of a report or file to the 
FIG were guaranteed to get the matter onto CAMES and into the system for 
consideration, without filtering out at the initial stages. 
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One of the consequences of this was that, on being allocated to a lawyer, a matter 
could be assessed as not falling within the remit of the FIG and referred to either the 
local CPS offices or to other agencies for them to prosecute. The importance of this 
lies in the potential for delays in processing of the complaint. It was thought unlikely 
that these would be of significance to the progressing of the case through the justice 
system but could impact negatively on the complainants who might perceive their 
complaint as being passed around and not dealt with. Of more importance was 
thought to be the impact of possible misconceptions as to the remit of the receiving 
body and that body's resources levels. 
Given the lack of internal certainty in the police and CPS as to what fell within their 
own remit and the remit of each other, it was thought that referrals to other agencies 
could be similarly affected, with the result that a complaint could be sent to an 
agency not best placed to process it. 
The description of the CAMES system indicated that this was possible in the FIG, as 
the initial examination was more a recording of the names of the 
defendants/suspects, the charges or proposed charges and the investigation force, 
than "examination" of the file. Thereafter matters were given a unique and 
permanent FIG reference number, which together with the details first recorded were 
logged onto CAMES, after which the new FIG file was sent to a FIG Grade 6 team 
leader for consideration and allocation to a lawyer for detailed examination and/or 
review within a time limit specified by the team leader. It was at this stage that legal 
analysis would occur and the impact of definitions of terms of reference might be 
expected to occur. 
Interviews with lawyers and examination of files demonstrated both that the official 
system could be relatively easily and successfully avoided and that the initial 
matterial submitted by the police could vary case to case to significant degrees. 
Comments included, 
Files are supposed to arrive via the front line CPS Branches and area. 
Frequently the police approach us directly however. (CPS 11) 
(1) Rarely receive matters direct from officers (CPS 10) 
I'm just given work (CPS 7) 
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Another lawyer described a dual system, in which some matters were accepted 
directly from officers whilst others were allocated in accordance with the official 
system 
Only in relation to mortgage fraud and art and antiques where I (receive files) 
from officers. All others are allocated. (CPS 12) 
This system may be explained by this lawyer's comment 
Art and antiques is a personal preference. 
Referrals of complaints "via the front line CPS" were shown by reference to cases 
not to be without definitional problems. In the case of RvL these concerned what 
constituted "serious" fraud. 
This case was the result of a report from the auditor of a group of companies 
called (name removed) which was sent to ( ... ) Police in December (date 
removed) following which it was referred almost immediately to FIG in London 
via the branch Crown Prosecutor. The branch Crown Prosecutor offered to 
retain the case even though he acknowledged that it involves sums at risk over 
E6 million (as it then appeared). The case regarded as straightforward by him 
subject to the provision of accountancy support to investigate it. 
Examination of files and discussions with lawyers illustrated that the form of referrals 
varied from anything from a preliminary police report of between 2 and 30 pages, in 
which the police are "seeking directions" to a virtually complete police investigation 
file that was submitted f or a decision as to whether the suspect is to be prosecuted. 
In some instances the first referral of a matter to FIG was as basic as the forwarding 
by the police of a report as to their suspicions, together with a request for advice, as 
illustrated by the case of RvL above. 
That such variation could occur leads to the conclusion that there was no clearly 
definable stage at which a matter can be called a police "case". The relevance of 
this for the study lay in the possibility of there not being a practical or formal test of 
whether a matter falls with the FIG remit before it is enters the CPS system for 
review or advice. The official means of entry into that system were clearly avoided 
by both lawyers and police officers, suggesting that personal perceptions of role and 
remit could have a significant effect upon the progression of a case through 
consideration for prosecution. 
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Another lawyer described a dual system, in which some matters were accepted 
directly from officers whilst others were allocated in accordance with the official 
system 
Only in relation to mortgage fraud and art and antiques where I (receive files) 
from officers. All others are allocated. (CPS 12) 
This system may be explained by this lawyer's comment 
Art and antiques is a personal preference. 
Referrals of complaints "via the front line CPS" were shown by reference to cases 
not to be without definitional problems. In the case of RvL these concerned what 
constituted "serious" fraud. 
This case was the result of a report from the auditor of a group of companies 
called (name removed) which was sent to ( ... ) Police in December (date 
removed) following which it was referred almost immediately to FIG in London 
via the branch Crown Prosecutor. The branch Crown Prosecutor offered to 
retain the case even though he acknowledged that it involves sums at risk over 
E6 million (as it then appeared). The case regarded as straightforward by him 
subject to the provision of accountancy support to investigate it. 
Examination of files and discussions with lawyers illustrated that the form of referrals 
varied from anything from a preliminary police report of between 2 and 30 pages, in 
which the police are "seeking directions" to a virtually complete police investigation 
file that was submitted f or a decision as to whether the suspect is to be prosecuted. 
In some instances the first referral of a matter to FIG was as basic as the forwarding 
by the police of a report as to their suspicions, together with a request for advice, as 
illustrated by the case of RvL above. 
That such variation could occur leads to the conclusion that there was no clearly 
definable stage at which a matter can be called a police "case". The relevance of 
this for the study lay in the possibility of there not being a practical or formal test of 
whether a matter falls with the FIG remit before it is enters the CPS system for 
review or advice. The official means of entry into that system were clearly avoided 
by both lawyers and police officers, suggesting that personal perceptions of role and 
remit could have a significant effect upon the progression of a case through 
consideration for prosecution. 
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Discussions with the lawyers showed that officers with good relations with them were 
able to approach the lawyers directly and, particularly if the case took the interest of 
the lawyer, complaints could be entered into the system and progressed by the 
lawyer for some time without reference to the formal remit of the unit or to other 
lawyers. This may explain how the consideration of matters referred to as "arts and 
antiquities" could be accepted by a lawyer within the unit despite that category of 
work not appearing in any of the official descriptions of the unit's work. 
It is suggested that the importance of this feature of the acceptance of work lies in 
the possibility of the development of informal procedures and practices of advising, 
reviewing and considering cases for prosecution that are only effective whilst those 
persons involved remain the same. 
The reverse situation was thought to be equally possible, where good relations did 
not operate and contact between the referring officer and the lawyer could be 
adversely affected by perceptions of remit and role. 
It is suggested that the importance of either situation is that the manner in which a 
complaint may be dealt with by the police and thereafter by the CPS is largely a 
matter of chance, dependent on the perceptions and approached of those to whom 
the complaint is allocated. 
2. Referral from other agencies 
In addition to referral paths to the FIG from the police, discussions with lawyers and 
examination of files revealed that different methods of referral of matters to the FIG 
could occur. All the lawyers interviewed were asked in which agencies the cases 
that they dealt with had originated. Their answers shown that a number of non- 
police agencies were involved in the investigation of fraud within the criminal justice 
system. The agencies mentioned by prosecutors included the Official Receivers 
(CPS 4), Ministry of Defence Police (CPS 12), DTI (CPS 4,5,6,10 and 11) and 
Customs and Excise (CPS 10) 
These referrals proceeded in the FIG in the same way as investigations referred by 
the police. 
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3. Referrals from the FIG 
Examination of the cases revealed that matters could be referred to the FIG by an 
agency other than the police and subsequently from the FIG to the police for further 
investigation. 
The case of RvB demonstrated that the processing of such referrals could be 
difficult, 
By my letter dated (date removed for reasons of research confidentiality) we 
referred this matter to the (name of Force removed for reasons of research 
confidentiality) Fraud Squad with a request that they undertake an 
investigation.... About a fortnight later I had a brief discussion with ( ... ) Police 
about it and they expressed some concern bordering on reluctance to 
investigate the matter. The Fraud Squad office indicate that they think it 
unlikely that Police Headquarters will allow them to investigate the 
matter ... They point out that the matter was referred to us in (date) by 
(another 
justice agency) but that they (the police) were not requested to investigate at 
the time. 
From the case papers it was ascertained that several months after the above notes 
were written the FIG discontinued this case. The lawyer who made the decision to 
discontinue the matter expressed his views as to the police reaction to the referral, 
as 
I suspect the Detective ( ... ) would wish to protect his force from any allegation 
that they failed to investigate the matter. I may be overly suspicious but I 
suspect that attempts are being made to "set up" the CPS on the basis that this 
matter should have been referred in 19... than in (one year later) and that 
continued references to abuse of process are symptomatic of that. (CPS 3) 
Further in the papers the same lawyer suggested other reasons for the police 
approach, 
It should be borne in mind however that in addition to the large fraud enquiries 
the police have, there has been, of late, a dramatic increase in violence/sex 
offences in (area) and a large increase in the "clear up" rate. The police 
particularly in (part of the area) are under immense strain. (CPS 3) 
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Three issues were thought to be raised by this case. The first was that, 
notwithstanding the official description as to how the FIG became involved in a case, 
it was apparent this type of referral could proactively be made by the FIG to the 
police. Secondly, that referral could be made with very little if any prior consultation 
or negotiation and thirdly, the effective refusal of the police to investigate the 
complaint would result in criminal justice processing of the complaint ending. This 
being an exercise of police discretion it was* recognised that the CPS, unlike the 
SFO, could not ensure that the investigation occurred. This was described by the 
prosecutor as, 
I regret that this situation has occurred but this office has no power to compel a 
police force to undertake an enquiry. (CPS 3) 
This file suggested a willingness on the part of the FIG lawyer to play a proactive role 
in directing police investigations and a marked reluctance on the part of the police to 
commence an investigation, despite the specialist fraud units of both agencies being 
involved. This apparent anomaly led to a more detailed examination as to what 
definition of fraud the FIG applied to its consideration of complaints and the working 
relations between the police and FIG. 
What constitutes "fraud" for the FIG 
Despite reservations as to the possibility of lawyers providing only the more 
"glamorous" of their self-assessed work load, it became apparent that the lack of 
definition of the terms "fraud" ensured considerable latitude in interpretation of the 
formal guidelines as to what work fell within the remit of the FIG and permitted use of 
the police based definition of serious fraud that linked the nature of the offence to its 
size and complexity in investigative terms. Both comments made in interviews and 
the files themselves suggested that matters involving relatively small amounts were 
submitted and taken on by the FIG. It was not always self evident from the case 
papers that the matters were complex in the sense of involving difficult chains of 
evidence or procedural or factual points. Examination of cases accepted suggested 
that rather than. "complexity' being the determining factor in the FIG's acceptance of 
a police investigation, the prospect of lengthy investigations, involving a number of 
witnesses, was significant. The written FIG instructions to the police in the 
investigation "R v G" demonstrates both this and the extent to which some lawyers 
may be involved in and direct the investigative stages of the processing of a 
complaint of fraud, 
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"Although on the face of it, the matter appears complex due to the retrieval of 
all documents (although a large volume of papers) and a full knowledge of the 
witnesses involved, the matter is clear cut. G is not aware of police 
involvement at present and I suggest whilst this is the case the majority of 
statements should be obtained. Following this G will be arrested and charged* 
When asked about police reference of such matters to the FIG, the comments of 
several lawyers indicated an acceptance of the police view on and definition of the 
fraud, that links size to seriousness, rather than an objective application of any FIG 
guidelines. One lawyer described the approach of the police to some fraud 
investigations as, 
All police officers think their baby's beautiful (FIG 6). 
If this approach is accepted, it would suggest that a number of lawyers either do not 
wish to, or due to other factors, do not tell the police otherwise or refuse to accept 
investigations as failing within their remit. 
Given recognition within the English legal system of prosecutorial discretion 
(McConville et al 1991) and application (in thd existence of the Prosecution of 
Offences Act and Code for Crown Prosecutors), the reason for any reticence of 
some prosecutors is not their lack of power or status in the criminal justice system. 
It is suggested that the basis of a reluctance to refuse police assessments as to what 
constitutes a case and the reverse situation, where lawyers direct what the police 
investigate and even charge, lies in the absence of any definition of the term "serious 
fraud". Examination of the FIG files and interviews with lawyers supports this 
suggestion that, as found in the operation of the police, the extent to which an 
individual's personal definition is applied in their dealings with cases and other 
agencies is both significant and the determining factor in the progressing, or not, of a 
complaint of fraud through the criminal justice system. 
As demonstrated in the comments of lawyers and examination of some of the files, 
what constituted the work of the FIG was not clearly defined. Both official 
statements, such as the text of the statement delivered by the Attorney General in 
the House of Commons on 31 March 1995, 
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The (Davie) Report emphasises that fraud covers a wide spectrum from the 
highly sophisticated frauds involved for example in the collapse of BCCI or 
the Guinness case to relatively straightforward deception. 
and initial discussions with the FIG lawyers confirmed that, as far as the CPS 
generally and the FIG in particular were concerned, the term "fraud" did not have 
precise definition. 
Study of the Glidewell Report revealed this situation had not changed, 
Fraud encompasses a wide range of crime from the relatively trivial to the most 
serious. Many fraud cases are neither more complex nor more time- 
consuming than the prosecution of other offences of dishonesty. It is, 
therefore, entirely appropriate that cases in this category should be prosecuted 
by CPS staff in Areas (Glidewell 1999 p 151 at para. 37) 
Given this context, it was not clear how both the FIG lawyers and those within other 
agencies with whom they worked would determine what matters fell within the remit 
of the FIG. 
As a result attempts were made to ascertain what, if any, criteria were applied to 
determine what matters were dealt with by local CPS and what were referred to the 
FIG. 
The Glidewell Report noted that whilst the less serious cases could properly be dealt 
with by local CPS, the most serious cases "go to the SFO" (how and why is not 
examined by the Report). The review panel had concerns as to the distribution of 
what they refer to as intermediate level fraud cases. Of these it is noted, 
We have failed to understand the justification for the sharing of serious fraud 
between Central Casework and Special Casework Lawyers. There are, we 
realise, established criteria for deciding into which three categories the non- 
SFO frauds should be placed, but the criteria do not justify there being so 
many categories (Glidewell 1999 p 151 at para. 39) 
Throughout the study it was found that within the CPS, these criteria were either not 
clearly understood or, if understood, not consistently applied. In interviews 
conducted at local CPS level it was stated that, 
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There is no hard and fast rule as to what I take, there are guidelines but they 
are only rough guidelines.... There is a lot of flexibility within the system, there's 
no set criteria. The sort of things considered are the amount, three quarters of 
a million pounds, and national publicity (FIG 6) 
Despite local CPS reference to this (in this interview the criteria were read out from 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors), the description given by a lawyer, who had only 
recently joined the FIG, was, 
I think I've picked up from others, no-one's said, that it's E750,000. (FIG 7) 
Although most respondents made mention of there being some tests as determining 
what they should deal with, given the vagueness of the mention it was thought open 
to question as to the accuracy with which these were applied 
What constituted a twical FIG file 
Examination of files that evidenced FIG acceptance of matters that did not satisfy the 
financial aspect of the official criteria, together with the fact that not all the 
respondents correctly referred to the tests, calls into question the accuracy with 
which these could be applied. Similarly, references to the complexity of matters, 
which occurred thoroughout this stage of the study, from the statements of the AG to 
interviews with several of the FIG lawyers, were not necessarily supported by the 
content of the FIG files examined. 
It was thought that, as had been found in respect of the police decision making, 
assessment of complexity was a subjective judgement and one that could take 
account of a number of variables. In the context of prosecutorial discretion, an 
additional subjective element was introduced through the requirement of the Code 
for Crown Prosecutors that a prosecution should be in the public interest. The study 
revealed considerable differences of approach in the exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion and decision making. Whilst one FIG lawyer might consider whether to 
accept an investigation from the perspective of its presentation to a jury, another 
worked on the basis of the volume of transactions or actions to be evidenced, as 
being the "complexity" of the case, and another from the perspective of the public 
interest in a high profile prosecution. 
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From observations of the operation of the FIG offices, examination of matters and 
interviews, it was thought that both acceptance into the system and subsequent 
treatment of any matter was therefore entireiy dependent upon the approach of the 
individual lawyer that received it. This view conflicts with those (McConville, Sanders 
and Lang 1991) that suggest that the CPS is both entirely dependent upon and 
largely influenced by the police. These differing perspectives of the operation of the 
CPS are examined below in relation to discretionary decision making. 
Teamworkinq 
During the first interview it was stated that tearnworking was fundamental to the 
operation of the Group (FIG 1). Given both the context of the meeting and the 
position of the maker of this statement this was taken to be an official statement of 
the operation of the FIG. In the subsequently produced Glidewell Re port (1999) it 
may be noted that in March 1995 (some few months before the first interview was 
conducted), 
in an internal memorandum pointed out that progress towards "iptegrated 
working" in the Fraud divisions has been stopped. Integrated working was 
the author's preferred form of teamworking .... 
(Glidewell 1999 Appendix E 
paragraph 10) 
The Glidewell Report briefly discusses teamworking within the CPS as being a 
sharing of the work arising from prosecutions and that the introduction of 
teamworking in the particular form used within CPS has caused resentment. From 
this description and observation of teamworking in practice within the FIG, it was felt 
that, at best, the meaning and position of teamworking within the FIG may be 
described as vague. In practice there appeared a clear and sharp distinction 
between the lawyers who were appointed to specific groups or "teams" and the 
caseworkers and support staff that assisted those teams. As has been described 
above, the office accommodation reflected this. 
No evidence was gathered of resentment of teamworking, rather it appeared to be 
ignored by the lawyers. None of the lawyers or the support staff interviewed 
described themselves as part of the teams within which they were officially listed, nor 
were they observed to work in a team. Instead each lawyer dealt with his or her own 
matters. The teams to which lawyers were notionally assigned were based upon a 
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description of the work reflecting its geographic origin. The teams were London City; 
London Metropolitan; Provincial South and Provincial North. 
It was not possible to determine how the original allocation of lawyers to teams or to 
offices had been made. In some instances, prior to re-organisation of the FIG into 
the groupings that existed at the time of the study, lawyers had been working on 
substantially the same type of work. Those who had joined the FIG more recently 
appeared to be more likely to have been allocated to their team as a result of 
successfully responding to vacancies or having been relocated. The allocation of 
offices to lawyers appeared to be similarly random. Some room allocations followed 
assignment of an individual to work from one of the geographic regions whilst other 
officers from different teams shared offices. From what was said or implied in 
interviews and informal discussions it was concluded that those lawyers with longer 
service in the FIG appeared to have a relatively strong input into the type of work 
that they did and their room allocation. 
One of the offices in particular appeared to be shared by friends who, prior to various 
internal re-organisations of the Group from sub sets dealing with London City and 
London Metropolitan, had worked together for a number of years and had chosen to 
stay together as part of a team. Whilst this group of friends often discussed their 
cases with each other and appeared to know what cases other members of the 
group were working on, this was not true of all the lawyers. A number of the lawyers 
within the FIG appeared to work primarily on their own. Interviews and discussions 
with the people with whom they shared offices demonstrated that their colleagues 
had virtually no knowledge of the matters with which they were dealing. 
The overall impression gained from this part of the study was that members of the 
FIG did not consider themselves to be part of a cohesive group or as part of any 
particular team within that group. Although all the lawyers dealt with broadly similar 
allegations of criminal conduct, most of those interviewed defined their work as being 
different to that of their colleagues by virtue only of their being part of different sub- 
groups within the FIG. Examination of the groups revealed them to be based upon 
geographic areas. The content of the work within those geographic areas was 
largely similar, with the same broad categories of alleged criminal activity being dealt 
with by all the groups. 
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Only two of those interviewed described the work undertaken by themselves and 
their colleagues as being fundamentally the same, or the elements of that work as 
being the same. Interestingly these two individuals did not work within the same 
team. The evidence suggested was that team working was largely a notional, as 
opposed to actual, feature of the operation of the lawyers within the FIG. 
The same impression was not gained in respect of the operation of the lawyers and 
their caseworkers and support staff team members. Most of the support staff in any 
particular team provided relatively accurate accounts as to what the lawyers in their 
team were working upon when asked. Comprehensive interviews were not 
conducted with the caseworkers and whilst this did not appear necessary in terms of 
the aim of the study, being concepts of fraud and how these affected operation, they 
may have provided a greater insight into the internal operation of the FIG. 
Mana, qemen 
A commonly mentioned feature of the operation of most of the lawyers was of their 
being under threat from adverse scrutiny of the DPP (FIG 10,4 and 9). No one 
interviewed produced any evidence of this and it was never clear from what was said 
whether there really was a threat or whether the complaint was based upon a 
perception of the management of the CPS. A number of those interviewed 
discussed their feelings of working in a situation of adverse publicity and media 
threat of examination and change. 
Without it being apparent how this had come about, there appeared to be a general 
resentment of a number of the management issues. These ranged from the threat of 
adverse review and possible cuts in staff, which was seen as being imminent, 
described by one lawyer as being, 
It's not that the writing is on the wall, they are putting up the neon signs (FIG3), 
to the management style of the then DPP as being over-bearing. 
The lawyers in one of the teams, that appearing to be a group of friends, had made a 
collage of less than complimentary photographs, cut from newspapers and other 
publications, of the DPP. This covered the greater part of the internal side of the 
office door and was clearly visible once inside the office as the door was kept closed. 
Whilst the study was being conducted a visit was anticipated from either the DPP or 
a senior member of staff and the collage was removed, only to be replaced once the 
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time of the visit had passed. The attitude of this group was one of determination to 
continue with protest that, judging by the informal comments of other lawyers, had 
become either ignored or discredited. 
When questioned in a formal interview context as to the main problems encountered 
in the prosecutions with which they dealt, none of the respondents (including 
members of this group) spoke openly of what appeared to be obvious discontent with 
the management of the CPS. Publication of the Glidewell Report supported the 
assessment of discontent, p 51 at paragraph 23, reporting that of the CPS staff who 
wrote to the review panel mention, a large number were highly critical of senior 
management (90% of 235 letters). 
In less formal discussions, all of which occurred away from their offices, several of 
the lawyers described how they wished to remain in their line of work but to move 
into a less threatened or more receptive environment. Two spoke openly of wanting 
to move to the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). Some time after the study was 
completed it was learnt that both they and another of their colleagues had left the 
CPS for the SFO. The perceptions of job insecurity noted in the Glidewell Report 
appeared to operate equally in the FIG as does the Report's comment that this is, 
... far higher than would conceivably be justified by the reality of the situation 
(Glidewell p5l at para. 20). 
In several interviews feelings of lack of understanding of their work; lack of 
recognition for that work and low morale were expressed. The police respondents 
expressed similar views. This may indicate a potentially worrying trend of those 
being responsible for dealing with examination and trial of allegations of serious 
fraud feeling alienated within their respective organisations and the criminal justice 
system. 
The suggestion that the creation of a single offence of "fraud" could improve this 
situation is clearly open to criticism as being too simplistic and in conflict with existing 
English criminal justice theory and practice (Omerod 1999). However, given the 
potential and in some instances actual extent of co-operation and involvement of 
lawyers in decisions falling within the remit of the police, it is suggested that a shared 
understanding of the offence could be of greater assistance than closer working 
relations between these two agencies. 
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As discussed in chapter three, examination of the criticisms of the SFO indicates 
that, in relation to complaints of fraud, the provision of closer working relations 
between the police and lawyers has done little to improve the decision making 
process. In part this may be attributed to the SFO's power to select for itself those 
cases that it wishes or deems appropriate to accept as its own. However, as 
discussed by Levi (2000), two factors additional to this feature of the SFO's 
operation may influence the current situation. These are firstly the negative impact 
of the lack of a substantive offence of fraud and secondly the absence of a shared 
understanding existing between the investigators and prosecutors as to the subject 
matter with which the other deals. In addition consideration may be given to the 
impact of a lack of shared operating procedure between police and lawyers. 
Application of criteria; advice; review, and discretionarv decision makinq 
In the informal conversations mention was made of, 
being free to get on with the real work. (FIG 4). 
This view was expressed by several of the lawyers, who, in a number of 
conversations commented that there was too much bureaucracy, resulting in less 
time being spent on the "real work" that was described as being, 
dealing with files and advising the police (FIG 5). 
However as discussed above, what constituted the subject matter of that work was 
not clearly defined. The processes of the work were ascertainable by reference to 
the Code for Crown Prosecutors as being to advise and review police investigations. 
a) Advice and review 
Within the interviews conducted in the FIG only one respondent made specific 
reference to the Code. This reference was made in describing the remit of the 
section within which they worked as being, 
(To) review cases investigated by the police and, if the criteria laid down in the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors are met, prosecute them (FIG 10). 
It was apparent from this respondent's description of their work that contact with the 
police and provision of advice to them, either as a result of the review process or 
through a direct request, was not a feature of this respondent's work. In response to 
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the question "What is the role of the Fraud division in the conduct of investigations", 
the same respondent answered, 
We do not and should not become involved in the investigation. Before charge 
we advise only. That matter should be made clear to the police. Operational 
matters, in particular, remain the domain of the police. (FIG 8). 
and of "Do you encourage (the police) to approach you directly with queries, 
why/why not", the terse response was given, 
No I don't. Too much work. Drives me mad. (FIG10). 
confirmed the assessment that this respondent preferred to work at a distance from 
the police, on a fairly mechanistic or legalistic basis. This was unlike the majority of 
other respondents in the FIG whose comments, when asked at what stage they felt 
the FIG should become involved in a police investigation, indicated a common desire 
for an early and often greater involvement, in such statements as, 
.. pre charge, always (respondent's emphasis) (FIG1 1), 
whilst the first respondent again adopted a more distanced approach, stating that, 
... it depends entirely upon the nature and the circumstances of the case so 
there's no blanket answer. (FIG10) 
In the case of RvL the involvement of lawyers in the investigative process was 
recorded by more senior CPS lawyers in a complimentary manner without 
expression of reservation as to the extent of that involvement, 
Case conferences were held relatively regularly (on average about once every 
six weeks) and full and comprehensive minutes of some of the excellent and 
apposite discussions are kept on the file. It is clear from the tone of the 
minutes that the case lawyers from time to time (there was a change of case 
lawyer in this case at least once) were involving themselves in decisions 
relative to the investigative stages of the case and giving advice and making 
decisions about the areas to be investigated, setting timetables, abandonment 
of enquiries etc.... 
The main management control of this case appears to have been through the 
case conference system in respect of which minutes are very full and helpful. 
Good advice appears to have been given and accepted and acted upon. 
This situation may be contrasted with that in RvB. Two immediate differences 
between the two cases are (i) L was referred by the police to CPS, B was referred by 
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the CPS to the police (ii) the officers in L were of relatively low rank whilst those 
involved in the decision making in B were of significantly higher rank. Although the 
two cases involved different police forces, the referrals to and from CPS occurred at 
about the same time. As such issues as to other calls on investigative resources 
may be expected to have been similar in both forces. However, without it being 
possible question the officers involved, it was not possible to delve further as to the 
reasons for the different outcomes, L resulting in a prosecution and B being 
discontinued upon the police refusal to accept the referral for investigation. 
Within the FIG it was realised that there are potentially problematic issues in the less 
formal approach. The main issue spoken of can be described as advising in 
situations in which there is very little evidence on which advice is sought. Some 
lawyers, whilst wanting to early involvement in investigations, also sought some 
protection of their position, stating , 
I think it would be a good thing to have CPS in the police station, I give informal 
advice to the police over the'phone but say, "I'm not quotable on this" (FIG 7) 
and, 
As a general rule (I am approached for advice) after the defendant has been 
interviewed but before he's charged. The police will present me with the 
evidence they think can go to make a case. More frequently they are coming 
to me before interview. I'm quite happy with that but the only problem is that it 
is sometimes hard to give definitive advice. I've got no papers, they come and 
discuss, there's a potential for misunderstanding (FIG 6) 
Comparison of the different responses revealed how greatly the individual 
prosecutor's attitude appeared to determine the nature of the review and advice 
processes. Whilst it was recognised that the perceptions and practices of the police 
should be taken into consideration (in their analysis of the Lawyers at Police Stations 
(LAPS) scheme Baldwin and Hunt (1998) found that the police seeking of pre-charge 
advice was a "rare occurrence", taking place in only 11 of 600 cases (1.8%) of cases 
examined), it was felt important to examine the formal processes so as to ascertain 
what, if any, limitations or restraints were imposed upon the individuality of approach 
as to what constitutes a case suitable for acceptance by FIG and what form advice 
should take. 
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The comments of one of the lawyers may be viewed as seeking to extend their 
advisory role to operational decisions, 
The investigation was not particularly complex but was hampered in a number 
of respects. The most obvious was that there were only ever two policemen 
assigned to the case and they were not operating full time in relation to it. 
Some difficulties were encountered at one point when the Case Controller and 
Counsel had to make firm representations about the possibility of these officers 
also being withdrawn from the case. (R v L) 
Another lawyer, in described his perception of his role as being, 
We'll try and turn a case into something decent. (CPS 6). 
Not all respondents shared this approach. Some lawyers were more prepared to 
advise the police that there was insufficient evidence to justify a prosecution, with 
some going so far as to indicate that, in their opinion, there was no reasonable 
prospect of obtaining such evidence as would be required to justify initiating 
proceedings. 
The vigour with some lawyers advised or, as in RvL, became involved in operational 
matters themselves was in marked contrast to the view that the CPS is entirely 
dependent upon the police, as expressed by McConville, Sanders and Leng (1991). 
On this issue the primary conclusion drawn from the study was that the personality 
and perceptions of the individual lawyer had a disproportionately high effect upon 
case handling and operated without formal check. 
b) Discretionary decision makinq 
Examination of files and interviews revealed an advice file would receive a formal, 
written response. In contrast there was no systematic recording of informal advice or 
advice provided during telephone conversations. Similarly no system operated by 
which the reasons were recorded for a particular course of action being decided 
upon. Whilst McConville, Sanders and Leng (1991 p 133 - 172) discuss the lack of 
CPS independence from the police, the operational practice observed within the FIG 
suggested that in practice, the police did not exercise significant control over the 
CPS operation. 
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Very few of the files examined evidenced any scrutiny of the individual lawyers' 
decisions by other lawyers, at the time those decisions were made. Nor was there 
evidence of any CPS procedure for review of decisions taken by lawyers once a 
matter had been submitted by the police or other agency. As such, some cases may 
be anticipated to pass through the criminal justice system without anyone save for 
the Investigating officer and reviewing CPS lawyer examining its progress. In 
practice this could result in the processing of complaints of serious criminality being 
undertaken by two individuals, who could have differing perceptions of their remits 
and little pract ical chance of referring the matter to another agency should either 
determine that investigation or prosecution was inappropriate or not within the remit 
of their agency. 
Given evidence that some lawyers appeared to work in complete isolation, with not 
even the person sharing their office being aware of their work, and the possibility of 
their being disinclined to have close contact with the police, the limits upon 
discretionary decision making appear almost non-existent. Equally, in the absence 
of functioning lines of communication of officers' discontent or concerns to either the 
individual lawyer or anyone else within the CPS, the chances of a lawyer's decision 
being formally challenged and reviewed appear remote. 
Thus, whether a complaint of fraud was accepted by either the police or FIG was 
largely a matter of personal perceptions on the part of the investigating officer and 
reviewing lawyer. Once accepted by either, the manner in which the complaint was 
progressed was equally influenced by individual decision making in a context of an 
almost complete absence of others reviewing the decisions of the investigator or 
reviewing lawyer until such time as the matter was prepared for trial. Should either 
the police investigator or CPS lawyer determine that the matter not progress to trial, 
the likelihood of that decision being challenged appeared remote. 
It can be concluded that in practical terms a FIG lawyer has the ability, that is not 
subject to either formal scrutiny or challenge by the police (or other justice agency), 
to terminate a prosecution on receipt of what may be an evidentially scanty initial 
report. It has to be accepted, each case being different and relying on unique 
evidence, there are valid reasons for requiring such decisions to be made on a case 
by case basis. However there are also good reasons, not the least of which is the 
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interests of justice, for there to be a system of examination or review of such 
decisions. 
It was not possible to obtain statistics on the cases dealt with by the FIG so as to 
ascertain whether in making these decisions the stated criteria were applied, at 
which stage they were applied, or to determine the role of the complexity of a matter. 
Similarly lack of statistics prevented a numerical analysis of the agency of origin of 
the prosecutions or the methods of disposal. It was thought that the reluctance to 
permit access to statistics lay in concern as to the possibility of criticism of the work 
of the FIG that could not arise from the qualitative side of the study. Given the need 
not to alienate those who had granted research access, the quantitative aspect of 
the study was not pursued. 
Another result of this was, as previously indicated, that it was not possible to assess 
the duration of case progression through the CPS. Examination of some of the files 
provided suggested that, as with the police, delays in processing of cases through 
the justice system could be considerable. 
Dela 
Within this chapter it has already been noted that some delay in CPS processing of 
fraud investigations could occur in the initial assessment by lawyers within the FIG 
as to whether a case fell within the remit of the Group. It was thought that such 
delay was likely to be relatively short. It has also been noted that files could be 
submitted to the FIG at any time during their progression through the investigative 
and prosecution stages. Due to the lack of statistical data, it is not possible to 
determine the average time within which the FIG files were processed, nor the 
reasons for variations from any such average. Examination of FIG files 
demonstrates that some matters could be within the unit for a period in excess of a 
year before progressing to trial or finalisation. This did not necessarily equate to 
delay in processing the matter, given that the referral could have been made at an 
early stage in the investigations. In such cases, the time a matter was within the FIG 
also represented a significant portion of the duration of the entire investigation, there 
being no clear division between its progression from investigation to prosecution 
case. 
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It was apparent that not all cases that had been within the unit for long periods of 
time could be explained in this manner. Examination of files suggests that the 
personal views of prosecutors and police as to the role of the CPS in the 
investigative process had significant influence upon the processing of files. As 
previously discussed, the CAMES system was avoided by those prosecutors who 
accepted requests for advice from the police without requiring that the files be sent 
through the official channels. Such officers may be expected to respond more 
positively than do others to prosecutors' requests for additional evidence. 
It may be expected that this procedure would speed up the processing of cases as in 
such cases it appeared more likely that the case would remain the responsibility of 
one prosecutor and that that individual could ensure that all the evidence they 
thought necessary was obtained. However even in this system quite lengthy delays 
could occur. As discussed above, due to the number of differing referral routes to 
the FIG and the stages in the processing of a complaint at which these could be 
used, no universal conclusions can be drawn as to the length of delays that occued 
once a file was accepted by the FIG. 
What was apparent from the case studies is that due to prosecutor inability to direct 
police investigations, lack of police resources had considerable impact on delay in 
processing files. The case of RvB, discussed in detail in the following section of 
this chapter, illustrates that, had the police been more honest in their dealings with 
the FIG, this case could have been discontinued far earlier in its time in the FIG than 
it eventually was. The reason for eventual discontinuance was lack of evidence, the 
police not having the personnel to obtain the necessary evidence. 
The case of RvL shows how procedural requirements can delay the processing of 
FIG matters. In this case a delay of several months occurred in the obtaining of 
statements from willing witnesses in the banking sector in Scotland. Further delay in 
preparation of the full case had been caused by the fact that in interview L had 
refused to comment. This had prevented the prosecutor's consideration of what 
evidence needed to be gathered by the police in respect of what subsequently was 
stated to be L's defence. 
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Reasons for dela 
Examination of FIG files indicates that the time cases may be dealt with by that unit 
varied from case to case. It was clear that in some matters delay was occasioned by 
factors beyond the influence of the FIG, including the operation of the laws of 
criminal procedure and evidence. 
Unlike the situation observed in the police, delays in processing FIG files did not 
appear to be the result of lack of FIG resources. In all the files examined, decisions 
not to continue with proceedings were based on the lack of police resources, not on 
a lack of prosecution resources. 
It is apparent that some prosecutors' disinclination to engage with the investigators 
and preference to remain at arm's length from police investigations resulted in files 
being referred to the FIG on a number of occasions, each time dealing with separate 
evidential issues, rather than dealing with a set of issues that appeared likely to be 
linked. In contrast, some prosecutors provided pre-emptive advice to investigators. 
What is clear is that personal style on the part of the prosecutors and investigators, 
in addition to resource constraints on the police, could not only delay a case but also, 
effectively, end processing of the matter within the criminal justice system. It is also 
apparent that there was no formal process within the FIG by which delays in 
processing or decisions to end a case could be challenged. 
The impact on the role of the prosecutor of legislative powers to direct investigations 
At the time of the study, there was precedent for the role of the CPS prosecutor in 
the investigation and prosecution of fraud within the criminal justice system to be 
other than it was. Both DTI and SFO lawyers had, and still have, statutory powers to 
direct the course of a criminal investigation. In the Scottish prosecution system the 
procurator fiscal can direct that certain actions or investigations be undertaken, 
criminal liability attaching to non-compliance with their advice. 
As I had come from a background in which the prosecution effectively had de facto, 
if not de jure, power to direct the manner of investigation, and was able to build up 
very close links with the investigators, I was interested in the views of CPS 
prosecutors as to this aspect of their role. One of the questions asked of the FIG 
lawyers was whether they thought their impact upon the prosecution of fraud could 
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be improved, either by gaining powers comparable to section 2 of the SFO or by 
playing a greater part in the investigation. 
The majority of those interviewed were opposed to the acquisition by FIG 
prosecutors of anything similar to s2 powers. Most argued-that their statutory 
function required that the CPS be completely independent of the police and that S2 
powers would erode that independence. With-the successful legal challenge to use 
of powers that compel response, Rv Lyons and others [2001] EWCA Crim 2860, 
and the recommendations of the Glidewell (1998) and Auld (2001) Reports, it is 
suggested that the processing of fraud cases is more likely to be effected by 
changes in prosecutors' powers to direct investigations than by the provision of 
powers of compulsion to the police. 
The involvement of FIG lawyers in a fraud case can end with their decision that there 
is sufficient to justify placing the matter before the courts'. At the time of the study 
and in relation to all the files examined, the actual prosecutions of such cases were 
briefed out to barristers. They were not conducted by CPS in-house or employed 
barristers. The reason for this may be found in the principle that employed lawyers 
lack the necessary independence to prosecute the same matters, having been 
directly involved in the cases. However, during the course of the study there was 
discussion of this changing, with the suggestion that CPS lawyers should, as a 
function of their office, be entitled to exercise full rights of audience. Whilst this was 
not realised during this study, towards its end a number of CPS lawyers gained 
"higher rights". This enabled them to act as solicitor-advocates, with rights of 
audience in the Crown courtand higher courts. These lawyers were able to present 
the CPS case in these courts, as opposed to appearing only in magistrates' courts. 
Whilst this occurred in some criminal cases, the study found no evidence of any FIG 
cases being presented by the CPS's own solicitor-advocates. 
In some instances involvement can end prior to that stage as in the matter of F Ltd the non 
investigation of which was described by FIG 3 as "The ... Constabulary have continued to 
maintain that they have no resources available to investigate this company or indeed its 
successor. I have not been offered any prospect of an improvement in this situation. In 
those circumstances the matter is likely to become too state within a relatively short period 
to allow any proceedings to go forward. Any prosecution would likely be stayed by the 
Court on the basis that the proceedings were an abuse of process. I regret this situation 
has occurred but the question of allocation of officers is one solely for the police. The CPS 
is unable to compel the police to undertake any investigation. " 
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Throughout the study, most FIG lawyers went to court with only the less serious 
matters and then only for the purposes of remands or listings. These proceedings 
were usually in the magistrates' courts. The lawyers' involvement in advocacy and 
actual prosecution at the trial stage of cases was negligible. . 
However they had 
considerable power in respect of the progress of a police investigation to the 
prosecution since it is they who determined whether or not the matter could be 
placed before the courts. There was no official or formal route by which the police 
may challenge that decision or seek more detailed explanation of it. Similarly, no 
formal system existed by which case-lawyers' decisions could be reviewed. 
In the absence of a formal system, particularly in relation to lawyers who discourage 
direct contact with police officers, there is potential for the police to be aggrieved by, 
or not to fully understand the reasons underlying FIG decisions. As these decisions 
need not be discussed those with the police, lawyers might have been unaware of 
the impact of their decisions on police perceptions of them personally and their work. 
As such police resentment or feelings of isolation from the final stage in the progress 
of "their" case can develop. This has potential for negative future dealings with 
either a particular lawyer or with other members of the CPS in general. On a point of 
practical improvements being achieved, important issues of aspects of law, evidence 
or presentation may not be incorporated into the police operation as they might were 
there to be greater explanation and discussion of lawyers' decisions with the officers 
in the case. 
Both the FIG and police stand to be disadvantaged by the absence of an official 
means of challenging or simply seeking more detailed explanation of decisions. The 
disadvantage is probably greater upon the police, given a legal system that obliges 
them to rely upon the CPS/FIG for prosecution of most of their fraud investigations. 
However the FIG lawyers could also benefit from a formal system of case review, by 
being required to explain their decisions and possibly receive a second legal opinion, 
with potential for sharing the combined FIG legal experience. Additionally, given that 
there were only a relatively few police officers in fraud squads and that tenure within 
these units tended to be longer than in most police sections, greater shared 
understanding between officers and lawyers could create a situation of improved 
knowledge of current legal and judicial issues, from the earliest stages at which a 
complaint of fraud enters the criminal justice system through its investigation and 
consideration for prosecution. 
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Under the FIG operating system the extent to which the police could benefit from the 
experience of FIG lawyers during any trial may be limited by a combination of the 
perceptions of the individual lawyer and the FIG procedures. Once a case lawyer 
had taken the decision to place the matter before the courts, use of the office 
management system might result in the file being passed to an administration officer 
for preparation of a brief to Counsel, after which the matter might be dealt with by the 
appointed barrister from that stage onwards, with no further contact with the original 
reviewing lawyer. 
The FIG law clerk might go to court with Counsel for committal and trial, being 
responsible for taking notes at all court appearances. These notes will be extensive 
or brief depending upon any requests from the case lawyer or, if none had been 
made, the perceptions of the law clerk. The police would not, in the usual course of 
things, be aware of these notes or their contents and would be unlikely to discuss 
aspects of a case with the law clerks. 
Where this was the situation the police could only approach the barrister to ascertain 
what is happening with the case. This was not always possible or encouraged. In 
such circumstances there was potential for the strengthening of police perceptions 
that their role stands in isolation to the prosecution role, with there being little 
harmony in the legal process. 
During the study it was observed that there were lawyers who made it their 
responsibility to keep abreast of the progress of their cases from the law clerks, 
dealing with telephone enquires from the officers whilst other lawyers would refer 
such queries to the Admininstration Officers. 
Interviews with the lawyers suggested that those observed taking a proactive and 
responsive approach to the police were more in favour of adoption of a role similar to 
that of the SFO lawyers, with s2 powers, 
The absence of section 2 powers was a considerable handicap in this case (R v 
L). Two particular areas have been highlighted by the case lawyers. The first is 
that the obtaining of banking evidence from Scotland took a very long time - over 
three months - from witnesses that were otherwise willing to co-operate. Section 2 
powers would have solved that problem practically overnight. The other was that 
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some of the defendants, notably L who was aggressively defended, refused to 
make any comment when interviewed about the offences and filed an inadequate 
case statement. It was felt that Section 2 would have enabled his defence - which 
was not identified until late in the trial and was somewhat curious in nature - to 
have been identified at an earlier stage (if it had been a real one) and more 
consideration could have been given to dealing with it. (FIG 3) 
In respect of another matter it appeared that the lawyer would have preferred a 
primary role in directing the investigation, such as may arise from use of section 2 
powers, as opposed to acting as an arms length advisory and reviewing body with no 
direct powers over the police, 
This is a clear illustration of 'taking a horse to water, but not being able to 
make it drink'. I take the view that the police are making an artificial excuse for 
refraining from investigating this matter. In the cold light of day it has nothing 
to do with the matter not being referred earlier. A good deal of work was done 
by this office and the DTI between 1988/89 to target the necessary lines of the 
police investigation. Had the police been called in at the earlier stage as they 
suggest then it is likely that much duplication of effort would have taken place. 
The real reason for not investigating is a simple lack of resources. The flavour 
of recent correspondence from the police indicates their wish to escape 
through the back door by asking us to condone 'an abuse of process 
argument' (FIG 12 in respect of Rv B). 
It was these lawyers who were found to be more likely to arrange conferences with 
Counsel, attending along with the police. Such lawyers appeared to be perceived by 
operational officers and to adopt the role of being the individual to look to for 
explanation of events and the law. They did not appear to regard themselves as 
investigators or exhibit what one CPS, non FIG, respondent described as, 
I get lawyers wanting to requisition size ten boots to go on raids with the police, 
you have to tell them they can't do it. (CPS 15). 
Another respondent, who was observed to prefer working closely with the police, 
described his perception of advising, drawing a distinction between carrying out an 
operational decision and advising as to what decision should be made and how it 
could be carried out. In advising on the execution of decisions his perceptive was 
how best any trial could be served. He drew a distinction between becoming 
192 
involved in putting into effect police operational decisions, this being unacceptable 
involvement, and informing the making of those decisions by advising in relation to 
them, this being acceptable involvement, 
The police will come to me for advice and increasingly they are coming to the 
CPS at an early stage of investigations. We have to be careful not to become 
part of the investigation process. We shouldn't say how people should be 
questioned in the interview room but we- can say 'if you bring me this sort of 
evidence it will be admissible in court. Sometimes it's a fine line. Evidence 
collection and operations are for the police but I'm happy to advise as to how it 
will affect the subsequent trial. (FIG 6). 
In the absence of definition of the nature of the review and advice provided by the 
FIG it was the individual lawyer's perceptions that determined the service provided to 
the police. It is this that ensured that the official FIG office system could operate 
either to engender a very close relationship in which the lawyer could exert 
considerable influence over all police decisions in relation to an investigation, 
including operational decisions, or a more separate relationship in which lawyers 
played no part in any decision of a vaguely operational nature, primarily concerning 
themselves as to whether the police investigation satisfied CPS criteria. 
From the comments of members of FIG and examination of a sample of the FIG files 
it appeared that a number of factors impacted upon the effectiveness of the 
operation of the FIG and its co-operation with other agencies. Some of these, such 
as financial and personnel resources, are enduring and can not reasonably be 
expected to improve markedly. The impact of others, such as varying management 
styles, can not realistically be assessed. From discussion with CPS lawyers and 
examination of FIG files it was concluded that the processes of reviewing and 
advising were largely determined by the individual lawyer with little, if any, internal 
scrutiny. 
It was hoped to compare the results of this stage of the study with those to be 
obtained through examination of the work of the DTI. In the DTI the prosecutors' 
and investigators' functions are undertaken within the same agency, DTI lawyers 
having the power to direct rather than advise on the process of investigation. It was 
hoped that these studies would permit, firstly, assessment of the effect upon both the 
investigation and prosecution of fraud in a situation in which the roles of each branch 
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are more clearly understood as being part of an integrated unit or the use of a 
system that includes the power to ensure that the lines of investigation believed to be 
required are undertaken. Secondly it was hoped that comparison could be made 
between this operation and that of the CPS. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY 
After completing examination of the operation of the police and CPS in relation to the 
investigation and prosecution of fraud, the next agency examined was the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). Of the three agencies studied, the 
mandate of the. DTI is the broadest and most extensive. Its various units deal with 
matters ranging from the issuing of import licences to the investigation of 'live' 
operational companies, winding up insolvent companies, instituting disqualification 
proceedings against company directors and prosecuting companies or individuals 
that breach statutory provisions. 
In an official publication, "IDTI Objectives for 1999", this is described as, 
The purpose of the Department of Trade and Industry is to increase UK 
competitiveness and scientific excellence, generating sustainable growth, good 
jobs, opportunities and enhancing the quality of life for all 
The same publication lists the DTI objectives as being to 
* improve the openness efficiency and effectiveness of markets at home, in Europe 
and across the world 
0 ensure the Science and Engineering Base achieves standards of international 
excellence 
* ensure consumers are given a fair deal, by improving provision of information, 
advice, representation, protection and redress 
improve and enforce the regulatory framework for commercial activity, while 
removing unnecessary burdens on business 
ensure secure, diverse and sustainable supplies of energy to business and 
consumers at competitive prices 
improve the framework of law and regulation for employees and employers in a 
skilled and flexible labour market founded on the principle of partnership 
increase the capacity of businesses, especially SMEs to grow and to improve their 
productivity, through innovation, adoption of best practice and investment 
e increase the capacity of business to exploit market opportunities abroad 
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increase competitiveness, economic growth, enterprise and opportunity in the 
regions 
ensure that science, engineering and technology are used across Government 
and in industry to maximise sustainable growth and quality of life. 
Subject identification and research access - Legal Services (Prosecutions) Unit 
Given the DTI's diverse purposes and aims, before any fieldwork could be 
undertaken identification had to be made of a branch or unit whose work was most 
relevant to the study. Determination of relevance encompassed assessment of the 
roles and functions of the unit, together with assessment as to whether its work fell 
within the definition of fraud detailed in chapter one. In making these assessments, 
considerable assistance was had from police officers whose work had formed the 
early part of the study. Not only were they able to identify particular units as being of 
possible interest, but one of the officers who had been part of the unit described in 
chapter five had retired from the police and joined the DTI as a fraud investigator. 
This individual suggested that of the various sections within the DTI that dealt with 
fraud, the work of Legal Services (Prosecutions) would be most relevant to the 
study's definition of fraud. Not only was this the section within which the individual 
worked but also the section was officially described as dealing with both the 
investigation and prosecution of matters and staffed by both investigators and 
lawyers. It was suggested that any request for research access be addressed to the 
head of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. This was done and for some time a 
correspondence occurred with the DTI as attempts were made to obtain access. 
The initial response to the request was encouraging but the study was not able to 
progress due to the request being referred to another Directorate in order that the 
necessary documentation was completed. Upon query it became apparent that 
whilst the approval of the Head of Legal Services (Prosecutions) was sufficient for 
the study to proceed in principle, it was thought within the DTI there would be a set 
documentation process that required completion. The request had become lost in 
obtaining this documentation. 
In an attempt to resolve this situation, a discussion was arranged with the head of 
the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit and the nature of the research discussed. 
Although arranging a time for the initial discussion was problematic, once this was 
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overcome and the meeting occurred, an offer of research access was forthcoming. 
During the first meeting it became apparent that this issue of formalising research 
access was unlikely to be speedily resolved. This was due to the various internal 
authorisation forms not having been sent to the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. 
During the discussion it was possible to present this as becoming a cause of 
concern, which was accepted and, once the parameters of the proposed research 
were discussed in greater detail, it was informally agreed that the research could 
proceed, provided that the Official Secrets Act was understood to apply. 
After this was agreed, the work undertaken by this section of the DTI and its staffing 
were explained in detail. This discussion unexpectedly became both the first 
interview of the study and a means of ensuring access to members of the unit. 
The unit consisted of investigators and lawyers, there being approximately 20 
investigators and 18 lawyers. The number of investigators was not fixed as several 
posts were in the process of being either advertised or appointed. Once the 
numbers of investigators and lawyers were known, it was possible to request 
interviews with a representative number of staff from both groups. An offer was 
made that the DTI would provide the names of a selection of investigators and 
lawyers with a range of experience and that all arrangements for interviews would be 
made direct with these individuals. This offer was accepted, recognising the 
potential for this sample to be less representa tive of both groups than would a 
random selection of those to be interviewed. The advantage of this offer was that it 
facilitated entry into the agency, leaving open the possibility of seeking interviews 
with additional staff should it become apparent that the range was too restricted. 
When all the interviews had been conducted it was apparent that the individuals 
selected represented a broad range of experience, in terms of years of work 
experience within the DTI, and views. 
During this discussion, a specific request was made for access to information that 
could provide statistical data relating to the operation of the unit. It was anticipated 
that, if granted, this request would equate to conducting a trawl through the archives 
to ascertain the number and type of matters with which the investigators and lawyers 
had dealt, together with details of the outcomes. However the head of the unit 
suggested that the officially produced statistics be used, although these had only 
been recorded in computer generated form since 1996. These were immediately 
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provided. These statistics provide an indication of the work of the unit and enable a 
detailed analysis of the unit's operation of the unit over a three year period, being 
April 1996 to September 1998. They also established the context within which the 
interviews with the investigators and lawyers were conducted. 
Methodolo-q 
Given the small numbers of staff, particularly lawyers, within the Unit studied and the 
operation of the office, described below, there was concern that use of any case as 
typifying the work of the unit would identify the individual lawyer or, to a lesser extent, 
the investigator. This was one of the reasons that, within this chapter, case details 
were not used to the same degree as they are in chapters five and six in respect of 
the work of the CPS. 
This concern was expressed in all interviews with the DTI staff, none of whom 
expressed any reservations about being named and quoted. All were extremely 
concerned that the anonymity of the companies and individuals that had been the 
subject of their cases should be maintained. Provision is made for this concern by 
not using examples of cases as had been possible in respect of the other agencies. 
Access was granted to examine the live and finalised investigation and prosecution 
files within the unit. The early stages of a number of these had been reported upon 
in the media, again making use of details of any case, as had been possible in the 
examination of other agencies files, impractical. 
In some cases the investigation subjects are either live companies or company office 
holders who continue to operate after receiving advice or return to "the trade" under 
another name or form, without the company in which they work itself being involved 
in any illegality. For example, an individual who, by prior DTI action, is disqualified 
from being a director, may re-offend by subsequently acting as a director of another, 
unrelated company. The second company itself commits no offence and can lawfully 
continue to trade. The effect of these factors is to make it very difficult to make any 
significant use of case studies in this section of the study without revealing the 
identity of the subject of the case. 
In contrast, it was agreed that unrestricted use could be made of the unit's statistics 
that had been provided. These did not provide any details from which either the 
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subjects of investigations or prosecutions or those involved in those processes could 
be identified. 
Official remit of the Leqal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
A guidance manual provided to all Legal Services (Prosecutions) staff, although 
described within the unit as primarily prepared for the unit's investigators, detailed 
the unit's remit as, 
This branch ... has the principal responsibility for 
deciding whether or not to 
initiate a criminal investigation following the receipt and consideration of the 
reports outlining criminal allegations. Ninety percent of its work consists of 
cases sent by the Department of Trade and Industry Insolvency Services 
Executive Agency which relate to offences uncovered during corporate or 
personal insolvency proceedings undertaken by the Official Receivers 
throughout the country, after having been vetted by the Agency's Prosecution 
Unit.... In addition cases are sometimes referred to the (unit) by Companies 
House (also an Executive Agency) and by other DTI Departments whose 
responsibility is to award grant for various schemes under the Industry Act. 
The makeup of the Leqal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
Of those agencies examined in the course of the study, the Legal Services 
(Prosecutions) unit had the longest history of lawyers and investigators working as 
part of the same unit. Although the police, CPS and SFO all work with each other to 
varying degrees, none work as a single entity. The SFO is the closest in 
composition but does not have a permanently staffed investigative arm as does the 
Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. The SFO has police officers are seconded to it 
for the duration of enquiries and investigations supervised by its permanent staff of 
lawyers. In the Legal Services (Prosecutions), investigating officers (10s) are 
permanent members of the unit's staff. 
Documents published by the DTI describe the unit as being within the Legal Services 
Directorate D. These describe the unit as dealing primarily with allegations of 
contraventions of the Insolvency Act 1986, the Companies Act and the Companies 
Directors Disqualification Act 1986, although also dealing with allegations of theft or 
other dishonesty if these emerge in an investigation primarily involving breaches of 
any of these Acts. The documents also describe the unit as staffed by 18 lawyers 
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who work from the DTI office in London and a larger number of investigators based 
within five sites, Manchester, Nottingham, Watford, Croydon and Gloucester. 
The number of lawyers included the Director or head of the unit whose primary role 
is as head of the section but who also maintains an active case load; 4 senior 
lawyers(range C1 1); 11 lawyers (range C1 0) 1 legal officer (range C1 0) and a legal 
trainee (range 135). These individuals worked on the same floor of the DTI offices 
together with a support staff of typists, and a 'practice manager', who was a senior 
member of support staff. The Chief Investigator (CIO) was based upon the floor 
above this section of the staff. 
Two Deputy Chief Investigators (DC10s) were based at each of the three regional 
offices in Manchester; Croydon and Watford. The remaining two regional offices, 
Gloucester and Nottingham, were each headed by a single DCIO. The DCIOs were 
responsible for a staff of between 6 and 10 investigators (10s). Most, but not all of 
the 10s were ex-police officers, often of Superintendent rank. There were a small 
number of 10s who did not come from a previous career in the police. At the time of 
the study there was a single female in the investigative staff, in the position of DCIO. 
Work of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
a) remit 
The Head of the unit described its work as being, 
investigation and prosecution of offences arising from insolvencies, either 
corporate or private individuals. 
A senior lawyer stated, 
Our role is to look at the offences to see if sufficient evidence exists to justify 
prosecution (DTI 2). 
Unlike the other agencies studied, the unit regularly produced concise information as 
to its operation. This includes statistics covering the number of matters dealt with, 
the origin of those matters and the outcome. When it was asked whether there was 
a possibility of this being noted for the quantitative aspect of the study, an offer was 
made of a photocopy of the most recent statistics. The request for previous years' 
statistics was meet with a similar response, photocopies of which were provided at 
the end of the interview (Annexe A). 
200 
The Head of the unit encouraged a policy of its senior lawyers conducting 
presentations to other agencies, both commercial and governmental, as to its remit 
and composition. In order to ensure uniformity of presentation content, these 
lawyers worked from a set of computer based notes. Of all the agencies studied, 
none but this unit had such an active policy of self-promotion or self-examination. 
When asked as to the reason for the production of monthly statistics, it was 
explained that that they were to, 
... spot trends. We like to know how many cases are coming in, like to know 
what to expect. The Insolvency Service let us know what they expect to send 
to us, we would like it to be a regular flow but its just like any other part of the 
criminal justice system, you say' We can't take any more' and the next one is 
a rape or a murder and you have to take it, you can't not. It's like that with us. 
(DTI 1). 
Despite the last aspect of this statement, there appeared to be a distinct difference 
between the work of the DTI lawyers and those of the CPS. The former held regular 
monthly meetings with their main'supplier, the Insolvency Services (IS), and were to 
a degree able to plan their workloads to an extent that did not appear to operate in 
the police / CPS relationship. 
The DTI/IS relationship was similar to that of the CPS / police in terms of 
investigator/prosecutor inter-dependence but quite different in operation. One of the 
primary differences appeared to be the degree and nature of contact between the 
DTI and IS as compared to that between the CPS and police. The Head of the unit 
and more experienced lawyers operated a system of regular meetings with the IS 
Examiners. Due to the regularity of this system the lawyers and examiners did not 
meet only when there were disagreements over DTI decisions as could occur in the 
CPS police relationship. 
The ability to plan workloads was reflected in the relatively even statistical analysis of 
in-coming matters and in the comments of those interviewed as to the use of 
information on incoming, on-going and out-going matters. This was perceived as 
being necessary, 
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... in order to be able to deploy resources. If we found out that all our 
Manchester cases had folded and the lawyers had no work, we would want to 
know so we could redeploy them. (DTI 1). 
Copy of these notes was supplied at an early stage in the research, as were 
statistical data, following it being asked whether there was an official definition of the 
work of the unit and, if so, the content of this. These notes detail the entities and 
offences with which the lawyers deal. These are divided by identity of alleged 
offender, being companies and bankrupts (Annexe B) 
Statistics and Analvsis of the work of the Leqal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
The official statistics compiled by the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit confirmed 
the extent to which the IS was the main 'supplier' of matters, the average breakdown 
of case referrals being, 
Insolvency Service 75% 
Companies Investigation Branch (CIB) 10% 
Other (CPS; referrals, Companies 15% 
House and the Employment Service) 
From the statistics provided it was possible to determine the origin and processing of 
the work undertaken by the unit. Taken over a three year period the "Prosecution 
statistics - throughput of cases" revealed that between 72% and 85% of all cases 
dealt with by the unit originated from Insolvency Service referrals, making that 
Service the unit's largest supplier of work. Over the same period the CIB provided 
5.5 to 6% of the unit's work. The remaining 22 to 11 % of referrals to the unit were 
described as "other", which the head of the unit explained as being, 
mainly voluntary referrals, from the CPS. They are under a duty to report to 
the DPP any insolvencies. (DTI 1). 
These statistics made no reference the "other DTI Departments whose responsibility 
is to grant awards ... under the Industry Act", referred to 
in the unit's official remit as 
providing it with work. It was noted that the official remit did not mention receipt of 
work from the CPS, though that accounted for a sizeable portion of the annual cases 
received by the unit. 
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The head of the unit described it as receiving approximately 900 cases each year. 
Further statistics were provided that evidenced the numerical monitoring of case 
progression. From these figures it was possible to calculate in percentage terms the 
results of cases being referred to the unit. 
Over the same three year period, between 30 to 285 of referrals to the unit resulted 
in the matter being processed by way of court proceedings. The number of referrals 
that the unit initially accepted but thereafter not process any further appeared both 
high and variable, being between 37 and 44% of all cases received by the unit. 
These figures would suggest that just under a half to a third of all referrals to the unit 
did not get processed by the unit. This appeared to be a very high level of refusal. 
Further examination of these figures and their explanation by members of the unit 
reveal that approximately a third of all "turn downs" were "warning letters". These 
letters did not have a statutory basis. They were described as intended to notify the 
suspect of the DTI's examination of their operation and concerns as to the manner in 
which that was occurring. The main purpose of these letters was to "warn" against 
repetition, emphasising the regulatory work of the DTi that conformed to the 
deterrence model. 
The statistics revealed that the number of cases on-going in the unit for every month 
since April 1996 was recorded in detail. The source or agency of origin of Legal 
Services (Prosecutions) referrals was recorded, together with the number of cases 
going to court; the outcome of court proceedings, and the number of "turn downs". A 
"turn down" was established as being a discontinuation by the DTI that equated to 
the "NFA" used within the police and CPS. The DTI recorded the stage at which this 
type of decision was made, being divided between pre- and post-investigation 
discontinuation. The number of "other actions" was also recorded. These comprised 
a further break down into number s 216 Companies Act warning letters, "advice 
cases" in which the individuals or companies are offered advice as to the operation 
or practices (these also being the informal "warning letters") and 'other reasons' 
which were explained to include referrals to other agencies. 
Unlike the situations that had been experienced in the two other agencies, the Legal 
Services (Prosecutions) unit was both able and willing to supply statistical data as to 
their work. The ability to do this may be explained by the considerable use made by 
all lawyers and 10s of computers. One result is that a considerable amount of 
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information was stored in a readily accessible form that was freely available for 
research purposes upon the express understanding that complete anonymity of all 
those involved, location and court was guaranteed. It will be recalled that, in theory, 
a similar system of computerised case tracking was observed in the CPS. Unlike the 
CPS system, the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit operated its system to maintain 
contact between its lawyers and investigators. It was also used by lawyers to 
monitor and control the conduct of investigations. 
Interviews with lawyers provided indications as to the annual number of cases that 
each could deal with and the processes involved. Those lawyers without supervisory 
roles in relation to other lawyers within the unit described themselves as dealing with 
200 cases a year (DTI 4) and 110 cases in six months (DTI 6). Unlike the situation 
in the CPS, the primary work of these lawyers was high volume matters that could be 
quickly processed by the lawyer, as opposed to all being major investigations. 
Discussions with the lawyers also revealed that once a decision to prosecute had 
been made a lawyer was at liberty to hand over conduct of the case to an "agent". 
Agents were explained as being barristers or lawyers in private practice. This was 
explained in terms of the high volume of work undertaken by lawyers and costs, 
I don't want to spend hours on the train to do 10 minutes of court submission 
(DTI 5). 
It was explained that all queries on a case would be received and responded to by 
the lawyer who had made the decision to prosecute, with the agent being instructed 
by that lawyer and answerable to them (DTI 6). Whilst the costs and resources 
ar gument was accepted, it became apparent from the interviews with the DTI 
lawyers that the perceived complexity of a case would usually result in the lawyers 
handling all aspects of a case, including court appearances, 
If a matter is complex or likely to attract publicity or serious, I like to keep them 
in-house (DTI 5). 
Practical issues of workloads were also alluded to, 
When you see a case with 20 boxes of exhibits you say 'that's one to send to 
the agents! ' (DTI 4) 
Areas of work studied 
At the time of the study the high media and political profile of the DTI was 
immediately apparent from the national media. Considerable media coverage had 
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been given to the Kevin Maxwell case (The Times 16 March 1999) and to Peter 
Mandelson's resignation from office as Head of the DTI. All such coverage had 
emphasised the position of the DTI as a Government agency. This was a position 
emphasised throughout the unit. In the job description accompanying an 
advertisement for the CIO this was reflected as, 
Good investigations (particularly those where there is a strong public interest) 
with a successful outcome presents not'only the directorate in a good light but 
in today's climate when law and order is looked upon as a major political issue 
the imag e of the Department as a whole is viewed favourably and one of its 
objectives of maintaining confidence in the market is achieved. 
As a result of this approach, it was felt important to explore not only the relationship 
between the unit's lawyers and 10s and their respective functions and roles, but also 
to examine whether both viewed their work as being influenced by politics. The 
respondents were asked what, if any, is the effect of the influence of politics upon 
their operation. 
Before being able to undertake this, it was essential to have an understanding of the 
official description of the work of the unit in respect of both lawyers and 10s and 
thereafter to examine the perceptions of both groups as to the nature and content of 
that work. 
The media commentary on the operation of the DTI did not appear overly to concern 
the unit's lawyers. This is confirmed by a number of the unit's lawyers, who stated 
that they viewed media reporting as to be expected, in the circumstances of the DTI 
being viewed as a single entity, although un-deserved and therefore of less 
relevance to their particular unit, 
At the end of the day it's the inspectors who went after Maxwell. The DTI is 
huge and an easy target. (DTI 2). 
A number of the lawyers interviewed referred to the media presentation of the 
criminal justice system in general, the work of the DTI in particular and expressed 
hopes that "playing to the media" would be avoided, 
I think that sometimes the CPS look too much to The Sun or Daily Mail 
headlines (DTI 2), 
... the media is fickle (DTI 4). 
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Interviews with lawyers and examination of the unit's cases reveal that no financial 
limits or filters were applied to the matters received by the unit. Accordingly, for 
example, lawyers and investigators would accept and process a complaint of the 
statutory offence of a bankrupt obtaining credit in excess of E250 pounds without 
declaration of their status as a bankrupt, whether the credit obtained was E251 or 
thousands of pounds. Many in the unit referred to the bulk of their work being "book 
offences", which are described as being failure to keep proper books of account as 
required by the Companies Acts. 
The more complex cases and those usually involving sums of money similar to the 
complaints investigated by the police and prosecuted by the FIG are those of 
fraudulent trading. These involve companies trading in the knowledge that 
insufficient assets are held to cover the company's liabilities and companies trading 
as, 
... scams from the outset, such as furniture companies getting orders, never 
having any intention of supplying (DTI 1). 
Having established the work of the unit, the next stage of the study was concerned 
with establishing how that work came to the unit. 
Referral paths to the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
Official statistics reveal that most of the unit's work came from the Insolvency 
Service (IS) and was in relation to the operation of companies that had been 
liquidated or of individuals who had been declared bankrupt. If the IS, in their 
dealings with such companies or persons, found a range of behaviours, from failure 
to keep proper books to fraudulent trading, they provided the unit with a report that 
incorporates their investigations and actions. Allocation of these matters to lawyers 
within the unit depended upon the type of wrong-doing and the experience of the 
lawyer (DTI 1). 
Upon their receipt of matters, the lawyers considered the reports against the Code 
for Crown Prosecutors, the allegations having to meet the requirements of 
sufficiency of evidence and being in the public interest. It was at this stage that, due 
to the potential for different interpretations of 'sufficiency of evidence' and 'public 
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interest', it was thought possible for differences in decision making and so the 
outcome of a referral to occur. 
This was considerably minimised by the way in which decision-making occurs and 
also monitoring of files within the unit. If the two tests under the Code are satisfied, 
the matter was referred to the CIO for allocation to an 10 for 'investigation'. In some 
instances this was something of a misnomef, as there was very little investigative 
work carried out, as the offence was self-evident and the 10s task was to obtain 
statements as required by the lawyers. As shown in case study C, in some cases, 
much of the evidence gathering had been completed by the time a matter was 
referred to the unit, 
The Inspectors have gathered a substantial amount of direct and circumstantial 
evidence and it seems to me that it is unlikely that an 10 would uncover any 
significantly new material. It may therefore be sensible if you are planning to go 
to counsel for advice as to whether there is a realistic prospect of obtaining a 
conviction, to do so at this stage. If Counsel is of the opinion that the case is 
worth pursuing then an 10 could be appointed to obtain such formal evidence 
as may be considered necessary 
Reports from the CPS were another source of in-coming work. All private liquidators 
are obliged to report to the CPS any irregularities found when conducting voluntary 
liquidations. Should the DPP consider that offences under the Companies or 
Insolvency Acts have been committed, the liquidator's report is referred to the unit. 
The actions of live companies were dealt with by the unit through its interaction with 
the Companies Investigation Branch (CIB). This section of the DTI received 
complaints from the public or other companies as to the operation of live companies. 
After investigation by CIB a report was submitted to the head of the Legal Services 
(Prosecutions) unit for consideration as to whether there was sufficient evidence to 
justify prosecution. If the CIB wants advise on the prosecution the matter was 
referred to another Directorate, D1, that was the advisory arm of the DTI to the unit's 
prosecution remit. 
Referral paths within Leqal Services (Prosecutions). 
The referral paths within the unit were described in detail in the Investigating 
Officers' manual, that stated that once a lawyer has assessed a matter as meeting 
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the requirements of the Code for Crown Prosecutors, it is to be forwarded to the 
DCIO for allocation to an investigator. Thereafter, 
The Investigation Officers are to stay within the lawyers' written instructions 
and depart from them only after consultation with the lawyers. In cases where 
the Investigation Officer discovers further enquiries which might be relevant to 
the investigation or another possible it is essential that he seeks the lawyer's 
consent to extend the ambit of his 'enquiry as the lawyer is ultimately 
responsible for the overall conduct of the case. (DTI Guidance Manual). 
Referral paths from Leqal Services (Prosecutions). 
The 10s' manual details the three main types of referral from the unit. The first was 
in relation to matters considered not to be in the public interest to prosecute. The 
lawyer making that decision formally notified the O. R. s of their decision. A system 
had been introduced whereby the O. Rs were given 6 weeks to respond to this 
notification. Within that time, representations could be made and considered by the 
lawyers, if necessary with the adjudication by a senior, supervising lawyer. The 
head of unit stated that, since introducing the system approximately 18 months prior 
to the interviews, he had not had to arbitrate on these discussions for "several 
months". Another lawyer whose duties included arbitrating decisions not to 
prosecute described the situation as, 
I can't think of the last time I did, I can think of some of my decisions that 
have been challenged. We have such good relations with the agencies that 
they tend to respect our decisions and discuss them with us ( DTI 2) 
The system was stated as having been introduced to replace the "confrontational" 
model that had previously operated and to ensure that the O. Rs received more 
information that had previously occurred. 
If you sit down and discuss it, it takes the heat out of the situation. I also think 
it's important that the lawyers are aware that they may be called to account 
and must have valid reasons. (DTI 1) 
This system was described by several others interviewed and thought to operate as 
a matter of routine. In its existence and uniform operation, the system differed 
notably from the situation in respect of the police notification of CPS decisions, that 
had been found to be informal at best and often non-existent. 
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Examples of the second type of referral from the unit were not observed within the 
unit, although one form was recorded in the official statistics, being referrals to the 
police. The Manual refers to this as being in relation to matters, 
when all allegations are of pre-bankruptcy Theft Act offences, 
and, 
If the lawyer feels that the case requires investigatory powers which the 
Directorate does not have. (DTI) 
In addition, mention was made by lawyers, and the Manual, of the fact that if very 
large fraud cases were received, consideration would be given to referring these to 
the SFO due to lack of resources and/or PACE powers. 
Decision makinq 
i) official guidance 
New lawyers joining the Legal Services (Prosecutions) described their being 
provided with an official guide and definition of the work of the unit. A copy of that 
document was provided, detailing the specific offences with which they would deal. 
That the amount involved in the alleged wrongdoing was a relevant consideration 
was apparent from the use of the description "prescribed monetary limits" in the 
guidance. Similarly the relevance of likely penalty to be imposed was assumed from 
its inclusion in the guidance. A copy of this guidance was provided, unlike in the 
CPS where no internal guidance to prosecutors had been available for the purpose 
of the research. This distinction between the two agencies has to be considered in 
the light of the timing of the study. After the CPS stage of the research, the change 
in CPS senior management resulted in its being increasingly open about the Guide 
to Crown Prosecutors and removing restrictions upon its publication beyond the 
original limits of immediate employees. 
Although not much importance was made of the supervision of lawyers in the DTI 
there was a definite procedure for the supervision of less experienced lawyers in 
which the Head of the unit played an active part. All the more experienced (and 
senior in terms of scale) lawyers spoke of having responsibility for the supervision of 
less experienced lawyers. The Head of the unit saw supervision as comprising 
allocation of the in-coming matters, 
... to try and marry a lawyers experience to the type of work, and to direct 
examination of their decisions, being very rigorous in the early stages of their 
209 
joining the unit. Those new to the department, I'd check every file they do. I 
also look at every file they turn down as it is a very important decision to make. 
When a case goes out for investigation and comes back I dip into the cases to 
make decisions as to whether to prosecute or not. That gives me a chance to 
see the instructions that went out and the quality of decision making. 
Whilst undertaking the research it was observed that lawyers would move between 
offices, discussing issues with their colleagues, as opposed to formally submitting 
files or written requests for advice to them. This relatively informal exchange of 
views and ideas continued in the meetings that the Head of the unit encouraged with 
the 10s. This system was based upon monthly meetings attended by two or more 
lawyers, one of whom was an experienced DTI prosecutor whilst the other, or other 
two if more than two lawyers were attending, would be a lawyer of less DTI 
experience. During these meetings recent case law would be presented and its 
implications discussed. 
A system of "marginal meetings" that took place with Examiners of the Insolvency 
Service was another venue within which the less experienced lawyers were provided 
with an opportunity to participate in situations of disagreement resolution. At these 
meetings legal advice was given to the IS and a common understanding of the 
remits and law promoted through discussions. 
If they (the Insolvency Service) think that a case isn't worth running they won't 
send it to us. If they are in doubt there will be a marginal meeting. Once a 
month we (DTI 3,2 and 12) go and sit down with an Examiner and go through 
20 odd cases and give them on the hoof advice. Either they go back to the 10 
or drop it. That system works very well. We sit and advise, taking a young 
lawyer with us. They bring in 3 new ORs from other areas (DTI 3). 
As with the DTI's 10s, this lawyer felt it important that the two groups had a shared 
understanding of each other's remit, that was brought about through a common 
interpretation of the concept of 'public interest, 
I see it as a good way of establishing common standards and a uniform 
approach to 'public interest'. In some areas you could get examiners applying 
different notions of what constitutes 'public interest'. 
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In this way not only did the less experienced lawyers meet with other new members 
of the DTI with whom they would eventually work but also their instruction as to the 
DTI interpretation of 'public interestwas re-inforced. 
All those lawyers interviewed who were new to the unit spoke highly of the more 
experienced lawyers in relation to their personal style and the manner in which they 
performed their managerial role. This was particularly true of the Head of unit who 
was viewed as "leading from the front", being easily accessible and approachable. 
The Head of the Unit spoke of moving away from "confrontational" procedures and 
intentionally introducing an ethos and accompanying systems of accountability. This 
was described as 
I also think it's important that lawyers are aware that they may be called to 
account and must have valid reasons (for their decisions and instructions). I 
don't second guess their decisions, it's very undermining for lawyers. 
The unit's management situation could be contrasted with that observed in the CPS. 
Lawyers in the latter agency did not appear to have regular or in some instances, 
any, contact with the head of the section and were generally disparaging in their 
views of the most senior management. Interestingly during the course of the IDTI 
study reports were published as to the style of the new DPP with particular emphasis 
upon his initiating contact with prosecutors by telephoning them to congratulate them 
on their work or to enquire as to how they were progressing. This was reported as 
having a considerable beneficial effect upon the previously demotivated staff (Gibb 
1999). 
These two examples suggest the importance of providing both professional and 
personal support to staff in promoting job satisfaction and encouraging a common 
sense of purpose, both amongst the lawyers and those with whom they work most 
closely . 
The Code for Crown Prosecutors was described as binding upon the DTI lawyers' 
decisions, 
There is a need to keep it in proportion and stick to the Code. it's not that 
we're immune to public opinion but if we are wedded to the criminal justice 
system we must remain within it (DTI 3) 
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This description drew the distinction between an emotive viewpoint and a more 
empirical standard in the interpretations that could be applied by either agency as to 
the 'public interest' requirement. There being no standardised definition as to what 
constitutes 'public interest, every agency that makes decisions based upon this 
concept can have its own definition or definitions. 
If differing definitions are applied by the 'suppliers' (the investigators - police or 10s) 
and the decision makers (the lawyers) the potential exists for mis-understanding and 
at worst conflict between the two. 
Within the DTI such potential appeared to be minimised by a number of factors. 
These were; 
" the close supervision of lawyers new to the unit 
" supervision of lawyers' decision making and 10s' investigations by senior lawyers 
reviewing the files 
" the integrated nature of the unit's investigators and lawyers and 
" the nature and extent of the contact between the IS and DTI. 
An additional reason for the ease with which both groups accepted the definition 
applied as to 'public interest' was thought to be the similarity between the 10s and 
lawyers as to the rational of their work. 
ii) notification of decisions, complaint and review mechanisms 
Since the I. S. was the unit's main source of work and its 10s were the means by 
which referrals were progressed, it may be expected that the unit's lawyers had the 
greatest contact with these two groups. The examination of the CPS and police had 
suggested this expectation would be correct in relation to the relationship between 
those two agencies. 
The most noticeable difference in the relationships between the DTI and the 
CPS/police in their sources of work and investigations was that the DTI contact is 
systernised whereas the CPS/police contact appeared to vary according to the views 
of individual prosecutors and police officers. 
The DTI system of notification was described by the Head of the unit as, 
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... we are in a sort of a sterile environment. If we come to a decision not to 
prosecute we notify the clients. If they have representations to make they do 
so. But our decision must be in accordance with the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors. I can say to them 'I know your views but we are here to be an 
independentbody'. 
In respect of both the official procedure was that a minute was sent to the referring 
body, setting out the decision and giving them 6 weeks to respond. All lawyers, 
including the Head of the unit stated that this time limit was never adhered to. 
Perceptions of role and function 
a) laners 
Many of the DTI lawyers saw themselves as prosecutors first and foremost but all 
also mentioned that there was a regulatory role to their work. 
We see ourselves as prosecutors. As part of the regulatory framework there 
are circumstances that lead to de mimimus arguments, we want to prosecute 
but use regulatory methods (DTI 2) 
This dual approach was described by one of the senior lawyers when asked about 
the official statement that the DTI role was being to "enforce the regulatory 
framework for commercial activity", 
'Regulatory' must be taken in its broadest sense ... s221 of the Companies Act, 
(requirement of keeping of proper accounting books) where someone 
breaches that they must, where possible, be prosecuted if the public interest is 
satisfied, but we also have warning letters that regulate behaviour .... we see 
ourselves, as prosecutors, as part of the regulatory framework (DTI 3). 
Another illustrated the duality of the role by example, 
I am prosecuting an insolvency practitioner for acting whilst not authorised, I 
see that as strengthening the regulatory framework (DTI 2). 
and 
I see myself as a prosecutor, I'm very clear about that. I'm enforcing 
Parliament's statutory regime. I can see that there is a regulatory function in a 
successful prosecution. (DTI 3). 
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The comments of others made it clear that different personal emphasis could be 
placed on the same work, whilst achieving the same regulatory and more usual 
criminal justice ends, 
Unlike the CPS, the DTI wears three hats, regulator, also promoter of trade 
and industry and lastly prosecutor (DTI 5) 
The comments in one of the case studies showed the extent to which the 
prosecuting role of the DTI was viewed as assisting regulatory bodies, again for the 
perceived good of the public, 
There is an obvious need for the regulators to make their presence felt ... The 
difficulty arises in whether it is in the public interest to have a trial of R and M if 
the principal malefactor has escaped prosecution ... The likely penalty to be 
imposed by (the regulatory body) may, in the particular circumstances, 
constitute sufficient penalty. (Case study C). 
As with the 10s, and unlike the lawyers in the CPS, all the DTI lawyers expressed 
strong moral judgements about their work, 
There is a need for large scale fraud to be stopped and punished, (DTI 5) 
I see myself as a prosecutor. I only enjoy the cases that I feel people have 
done something really naughty, I feel more comfortable with a high level of 
dishonesty. (DTI 4) 
and 
There is a need to protect the public. When we woke up to read Mandelson's 
statements in the press (about permitting those who had breached company 
laws and regulations to be permitted to continue to operate) and thought 'Oh 
no', to give them a second chance would require a change in the law. (DTI 6) 
Some of the respondents had been CPS prosecutors prior to joining the DTI and 
commented on their perceptions of the two 
The review stage and decision to prosecute is considered more. It's down to 
time. There is more uniformity of ability here but it is primarily down to time 
(DTI 5) 
This was clarified by the explanation that he had worked in local CPS, leaving 
specifically to concentrate on fraud. 
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b) the 10s 
Determining the official description of the work of the 10s, as with that of the lawyers, 
was made easy through the official guidance available. A copy of the final draft of 
their procedural manual was provided in response to a similar question to that posed 
to the lawyers. 
Production of this manual had been the work of the DCIO in question and he was 
justifiably proud of the result. Given the support and encouragement that the Head 
of the unit had provided it was possible that its production and quality was not 
coincidental but part of a unit wide policy of actively encouraging corporacy and self 
assessment from statistically verifiable data. 
The official description of the 10s work was, 
The principal function of the Investigating Officers Section is to carry out 
structured investigations into criminal allegations as directed by the 
Prosecution Lawyers (Investigating Officers Manual) 
and 
The Role of the Investigation Officers 
6.8.1 The Investigating Officer will have assigned to him by his Deputy Chief 
Investigation Officer files for enquiry .... The Prosecution File will contain the 
Official Receiver's report together with other various documents. The 
Prosecutions File will contain the lawyers instructions and an allocation sheet 
completed by the Deputy Chief Investigation Officer in accordance with the 
Units Allocation System ...... 
6.8.2 Lawyer's instructions on a case should be clear, targeted as to the 
offences which are to be proved and precise as to what enquiries the 
Investigation Officer is to carry out. 
6.8.3 All lawyers' instructions should be in writing. The Investigation Officer 
should be in no doubt about the number of witnesses to be seen and the 
nature of the evidence they should be asked to give. The instruction should 
also make it clear as to whether or not the defendant should be interviewed. 
The Investigation Officer should make the necessary enquiries with 
expedition and in a most effective manner. (Manual chapter 6) 
All the 10s interviewed described their role and function by direct reference to the 
unit's lawyers, describing their work as, 
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to receive queries instigated by DTI lawyers, (DTI 8) 
and, 
... to ensure that the investigations that are referred to the section by the 
lawyers are properly and effectively dealt with in a structured way. (DTI 11) 
The operation of the DTI's 10s is, within the criminal justice system, unique in two 
ways. Firstly the 10s have no statutory powers whatsoever, unlike the police in the 
CPS and SFO investigations/prosecutions. As a large number of the 10s were ex- 
police officers of considerable service, it was thought that they would be well placed 
to draw comparisons between their operation as DTI 10s and the operation of the 
police in similar matters. This proved correct, all 10s commenting upon the 
differences between the investigatory role in the two agencies. 
The second distinguishing aspect of their work was that it was entirely dependent 
upon directions of lawyers. Not only did the lawyers determine what matters were 
referred to the 10s, but the lawyers also determined the exact nature of the 
investigation, as noted in relation to referral paths within the unit. lOs commented 
that, 
We're working for lawyers entirely. (DTI 10) 
What we can't do is extend the investigation beyond what the lawyer has said 
we need (DTI 11) 
Every investigation was referred with specific written directions from the lawyers to 
the 10 as to what questions were to be asked, what witnesses were to be interviewed 
and what evidence gathered. Possibly as importantly the lawyers directed, in terms 
of hours, how long each section of the investigation was to take. This estimation of 
time related to every aspect of the case, from reading the file evidence to 
interviewing witnesses and preparing statements. 
Apart from the possible implications in terms of their employment contracts, the 
obligation on the 10s to adhere to the directions as to focus and content of the 
investigation and its duration was at the risk of incurring a financial penalty. Although 
there was a mechanism for the 10s to ask the lawyers to reconsider any of these 
decisions, there was no requirement that the lawyers accede to such requests. Any 
10 that exceeded the original allocation of time was at risk of failing to meet the 
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target for the case. Whilst this would not jeopardise their basic pay, it could lead to a 
loss of the performance related pay portion of their salary. 
Each investigation was allocated a number of units where a unit was equal to 10 
hours work. At paragraphs 20.3 - 20.6 of the 10s' manual the calculation of the units 
was detailed as based upon the DTI working year, being 223 days, with London lOs 
working 7.2 hours per day and regional 10s working 7.4. Multiplying both by the 
number of days produced the annual work hours of 1,606 and 1,650 respectively. A 
unit being 10 hours, London 10s had an annual total of 161 units allocated to them 
for their enquiries and regional 10s 165 units. 
Each case had a number of units assigned to it as a direction to the 10s as to exactly 
how long the investigation and preparation of evidence will take. Every case had 
allocated to its investigation what was termed a 'fixed element'. This was an 
established number of units apportioned to a case on the sole basis of its 
classification. Investigations of allegations of fraudulent trading and insider dealing 
matters were always given 6 units (60 hours). In this time the 10s was to read the 
file, absorb the instructions and undertake certain lines of enquiry in relation to the 
specific directions or requests of the lawyer. 
In the event of the lawyer requiring the taking of statements, each statement had a 
1.3 unit value. In effect, this equated to the 10 being on notice that they had 13 hours 
in which to prepare for an interview with a witness, travel to that witness, take their 
statement, compile it in the accepted format (typed and in proper layout) and arrange 
for its signature. 
Interviews had a similar unit allocation, so that the preparation, travel, interview, 
typing and signature of the notes of interview was to be completed within a 13 hour 
period. The formula that was applied to each file that reaches a DCIO was; 
fixed element units 
1.3 units per defendant to be interviewed 
1.3 units per witness statement to be taken 
The result of this calculation was binding upon the DCIO, as confirmed by the 10s' 
manual, 
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Normally the DCIO will have no discretion to deviate from the above formula, 
except for those cases where there are special circumstances outside the 
norm (Manual 20.9) 
Special circumstances were defined as being 
where the above pre-determined allocation criteria can not be established ... For 
example - those occasions when a lawyer asks for enquiries only; or asks for 
enquiries to trace a particular person; or to establish whether or not a particular 
activity/offence is being continued .... Units will be allocated retrospectively in 
line with the actual time spent in carrying out those duties, irrespective of what 
activity is involved (Manual 20.10) 
The fact of these directions and the certainty of their application may explain why 
delays of the duration found in the police context, were not found in the operation of 
the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. 
Relationship between lawvers and 10s 
Observations of the units operation, together with the comments of those within the 
unit, led to the conclusion that relations between lawyers and between lawyers and 
investigators were far closer than those that had been observed within the CPS or 
those observed between the police and CPS. Lawyers and 10s evidenced strong 
views of professionalism and pride in the unit's work in its general and personal 
sense. All staff had access to the officially generated descriptions of their role and 
functions. Their comments in interview suggested that they appeared aware of both 
their own and other's roles and responsibilities within the unit. Most of those 
interviewed attributed the atmosphere within the unit as originating from and 
sustained by the head of the unit. 
The head of the unit acknowledged that the unit's size and the fact that a large 
portion of its work involved fairly small cases assisted in building good working 
relations within the unit. He also emphasised the importance of lawyers and 
investigators working as part of the same team, with both groups understanding the 
different but complementary roles, functions and objectives of the other. 
We think one of the benefits of our system, and I know we are dealing with 
smaller cases, is to involve lawyers at the first. The trouble with the police, 
some of whom are very good fraud investigators, is that they don't know where 
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the case is going. We've very scarce resources, sometimes it causes friction 
between investigators and lawyers. Investigators will say 'We know what's 
going on' and lawyers say 'Yes but the case will never finish'. The lawyers 
have the final say. (DTI 1) 
All those interviewed confirmed the determining decision being that of the lawyers. 
None commented on there being a negative friction between the two roles. In this 
the findings of the study were distinctly different from those views encountered in 
both the police and CPS. Unlike the situation observed in either of these agencies, 
the views of members of the DTI appeared to be grounded in use of the formal 
referral, monitoring and negotiating processes, rather than on personal interactions. 
One of the unexpected features observed was the distinct difference in perception of 
the investigation subjects. All the lawyers stressed the need to protect the subjects' 
anonymity, be they individuals or companies. This was expressed more in terms of 
their continued operation and the role of the DTI in encouraging trade than in terms 
of the Data Protection or Official Secrets Acts. 
The 10s interviewed had a viewpoint focused more upon the moral blameworthiness 
of the subjects, commenting, 
they are all just criminals and ought to be treated like that (DTI 10), 
possibly incorporating police values into the role of the DTI as opposed to the 
lawyer's emphasis upon the harm occasioned by them. Despite this, the 10s were 
as concerned as the lawyers that the anonymity of the subjects of their investigations 
be maintained. 
Several 10s commented upon the difference between their role in the DTI and the 
one they had fulfilled whilst police officers, 
It's not like the police, where the job is to prosecute, ours is to investigate, 
there's a difference. To us it does not matter if it goes to prosecution or is 
knocked back (DTI 9) 
We're working for lawyers entirely, we're only evidence gatherers whereas the 
police have some autonomy, they can arrest and push CPS by saying 'Here's 
someone - deal with it' (DTI 10), 
the inference being that within the DTI this approach was not possible. 
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Possibly the major reasons for this can be found in the investigating system, where 
the 10s had absolutely no statutory powers of operation. In terms of their operation 
this was described as, 
they can't arrest, they can't get a warrant. (DTI 1) 
and by an 10 
It's a little hard to investigate sometimes as we've no powers (IDTI 17). 
This was a factor recognised by the lawyers, one of whom commented, 
I don't think that the present powers of investigations are sufficient. Our 10s 
are often operating with one, sometimes two, hands tied behind their back. 
They need PACE powers in order to be able to do their jobs properly. (DTI 3). 
The perspective of an 10 gave an indication as to tensions that have been 
commented upon in earlier chapters as to the relationship between the police and 
CPS, 
It is the older 10s who have a problem with not doing it on a wing and a prayer 
(DTI 10). 
although there was no direct evidence of this being so, one of these officers stating 
his view of the 10s work as, 
Our interviews are not to solicit information but to give an opportunity to 
provide explanation. We can't compel attendance (DTI 7). 
That some of the lawyers felt challenged by the 10s whilst others encouraged the 
10s to suggest means of dealing with individual investigations appeared to be 
dependent upon personality more than procedures. One lawyer commented that, in 
her view, the 10s, 
... do tend to see themselves as police officers, you should hear them talk .... A 
lot of us (the lawyers) tend to be women and younger. You can just imagine 
after we tell them 'I think that you should do this', slamming the 'phone down, 
saying 'Jumped-up liftle madam'(DTI 4) 
This lawyer stated that she had little direct contact with the 10s but had been given 
responsibility for dealing with one particular office and was encouraged to visit them 
at their offices. This appeared to have produced a more positive view, 
To my surprise I'm not cynical to an away day. Its easier to talk to someone 
who you've just sat down with and had a drink. (DTI 4) 
Another, female, lawyer said 
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Every case I get, I ring the 10 ... Generally they are right, they are experienced 
officers who know what's right, generally they are quite sensible ... Providing 
you can justify your decision against their report recommendations, they are all 
right. (DTI 6). 
but also, 
Although we are in the 90s, they aren't quite with us, for a young woman there 
is a real problem. Last time I went to'( ... ) it was like stepping back twenty 
years. There are nude photos on the walls and they have female secretaries. If 
I were there I'd complain but at their age they are not going to change. (DTI 6) 
Conversely a young male lawyer's view of the 10s was, 
... it amazes me how they won't exercise any initiative. They are very 
experienced people, I don't find a difficulty in their attitude. They just can't get 
to grips with the law ...... I think that we need police experience. There is a clear 
difference in their ability to collect, collate and obtain witness statements 
between them and the investigators of other agencies that are non-police. 
(DT15). 
This lawyer provided details of his experience in a previous post, making the point of 
what he took to be the general incompetence of the other 'investigators' in 
comparison with police officers with whom he had worked. 
An older male lawyer observed, 
All ex-police officers come with a good dollop of common sense (DTI 2) 
Observation of the office interaction, conducted when several 10s visited the lawyers' 
offices, was that all the lawyers, female and male, appeared to have a better informal 
relationship with the younger 10s than appeared to be the case in respect of some of 
the female lawyers and older 10s. The reason for this appeared to be personality 
based as opposed to grounded in any organisational culture. On professional 
matters it was noted that all communication between 10s and lawyers was 
consistently polite, clear and constructive. 
Some of the older 10s mentioned the gender of the lawyers in an almost indirect 
manner, it nevertheless being presented as a criticism, 
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One of the main problems is the high turn over of staff, the lawyers tend to be 
young women and they are here for a while, then go on maternity leave. (DTI 
11) 
Of the young lawyers of both sexes who were interviewed, there was an equal 
division in both sexes between those who did not see the unit as being their long 
term career and those who did. Some male'and female lawyers viewed their time 
within the unit as interesting but essentially a means of gaining experience and 
transferring across postings within the Government Legal Services whilst others, 
male and female, were content to stay for a number of years in the unit. In neither of 
these two groups was any reference made to gender as playing any part in their 
career preferences. Given this it was felt that there was no basis for taking past 
years' employment records to determine whether the 10's views were historically 
accurate in their basis. 
In practice, possibly chauvinistic attitudes did not appear to compromise the efficient 
working of the two groups. The same 10 who made comments of a sexually 
discriminatory nature also stating that, 
Our job is to respond to the needs of the lawyer, but that does not stop me 
from challenging them. At the end of the day, the lawyer is the one who is in 
charge. (DTI 11), 
grouping all the DTI lawyers together and making no distinction made between male 
and female, experienced and less experienced. 
That the individual could be more challenging of female lawyers than male could not 
be discounted, nor could the possibility of there being some substance to the views 
of the female lawyers quoted above. However none of the DTI respondents cited 
sexism as negatively impacting upon efficiency or working relations in dealings 
between lawyers and 10s within the unit. 
What constitutes fraud for the Leqal Services (Prosecutions) unit 
Reference to 'something really naughty' appeared to be directly linked to lawyers' 
perceptions as to potential or actual harm to the public. That an individual or 
company may have 'got away with it' once appeared to increase the likelihood of the 
lawyers deeming prosecution to be in the public interest, 
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It is difficult to accept that as an experienced broker he was not aware of the 
full implications of what he was doing ... Although no losses were 
incurred the 
way the business was carried on in violation of the provisions for the company 
to be authorised, the public were put at risk. (Case study 7) 
In another case, that was described in the Decision to Prosecute form as, 
... the latest in a string of failed freight* forwarding businesses operated 
by C 
with unfortunately the carriers that he hired suffering huge losses. Despite the 
deficiency in the company, C drew E 69,000 from the company 
the 'public interest' section reading, 
repeated company failures and fraudulent trading, (Case study Cr) 
without mention of the losses involved. 
It was not only in the research context that sentiments as to the need for regulation 
were expressed, as demonstrated by the DTI correspondence to the prosecuting 
agency of another jurisdiction that was showing a distinct lack of willingness to assist 
in the obtaining of evidence, 
One of the stated objectives of the Department of Trade and Industry is to 
'develop a fair and effective legal and regulatory framework. This is done by 
various sections of the Department, of which the Legal Services Directorate is 
a part. Prosecution, we would contend, is one way of carrying out this 
objective. (T) 
Political influen 
The Code of Code for Solicitors, published by the Law Society, governs all lawyers' 
professional conduct, and requires 
A solicitor shall not do anything in the course of practising as a solicitor 
... which compromises or impairs or 
is likely to compromise or impair any of the 
following: - 
(a) the solicitor's independence,... 
In light of this requirement of independence, it was anticipated that to question the 
respondents as to their perceptions or experiences of political interference of the 
type suggested by the media in respect of the Maxwell cases, would be potentially 
difficult or offensive. However at the time of the study there had been widespread 
media coverage of interference by the Zimbabwean Executive in criminal cases. 
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This provided a basis for asking the question from one who had worked within a 
I system of direct governmental control and direction. 
Using this approach none of the respondents appeared offended by the question, 
but more interested in its application, several commenting that they could not tolerate 
political interference in their decision making. One described their operation as, 
We are in a sort of a sterile environment. If we come to the decision not to 
prosecute we notify the clients. If they have representations to make, they do 
so. But our decisions must be in accordance with the Code for Crown 
Prosecutors. I can say to them 'I know your views but we are here to be an 
independent body'. (DTI 2) 
The same lawyer specifically referred to the Department's Aims and Objective of "to 
improve and enforce the regulatory framework for commercial activity, while 
removing unnecessary burdens on business", stating, 
We can only do this by an objective standard, we apply the Code, it sends a 
clear signal to us. 
Other lawyers described the context of their work as 
I am not interested in the policy and what goes on in the large scheme. I think 
we get on with it in a vacuum. I don't think we want Ministers breathing down 
our necks (DTI 4) 
Other concerns 
Of far more concern to the respondents was the impact of the Saunders 23 EHRR 
313 and anticipated European Court of Human Rights decisions. The effect of the 
Saunders decision is that answers obtained under compulsion can no longer be used 
by the unit in its prosecutions. This was described as being, 
... a bombshell, its had more impact upon how we operate than any statutory 
provision within the last 10 years (DTI 3) 
and 
Our department, its policy, until Saunders, was to use information that had 
been obtained by other agencies .... Saunders was the biggest change as from 
time immemorial we had been able to use answers and then we had to re-think 
how we scoped our enquiries. (DTI 1) 
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The other significant problem was considered to be the potential impact of the 
Human Rights Act as read with European Court of Human Rights decisions in 
respect of retrospective punishment. The offences prosecuted by the unit included 
breaches of the Insolvency Act that are retrospective, in that the behaviour to be 
punished would occur before the company/individual becomes insolvent. In this way 
actions are examined with hindsight. 
Given that Article 4 of the Human Rights Act provides the right to a fair trial, many 
expect this form of criminality to be found to be in conflict with the Act as it is argued 
that no-one can receive a fair trail if they are on trial for actions that occurred within 
the 2 years preceding their insolvency, as is currently permitted. 
Comparison between DTI and CPS 
Some of the DTI lawyers interviewed had worked within the CPS prior to their current 
roles and were able to compare the operation of the two in much the same way as 
the 10 compared their current role to their previous experience as police officers. 
Of the lawyers in that position, all preferred the operation of the DTI to that of the 
CPS. The group known as the "Civil Service Lawyers" is one that allows qualified 
lawyers to apply either to a particular branch of the Civil Service or to the wider body 
and, whatever the original application, thereafter to move between Directorates and 
Civil Service bodies. All the DTI lawyers had therefore sought employment within the 
DTI. 
In most instances the reason for doing so was described as wanting to concentrate 
upon fraud matters. However one lawyer stated that application had been made to 
the IDTI as a means of entering into M15, received wisdom being that the IDTI was a 
good route into the latter agency (IDTI 6). 
Some lawyers were of the view that the CPS lawyers are more involved in the 
investigative aspect of matters than was generally acknowledged, 
In the CPS about 80% of the time you are investigating as you are sending out 
memos "Do this, get that, hold an ID parade". If that's not investigating I don't 
know what is (DTI 5) 
but acknowledged that, unlike the CPS, in the DTI it was unquestionably the lawyers 
who were in charge of the investigation, 
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The lawyers here conduct investigations, as the 10 acts on the lawyer's 
instructions. At the end of the day they do what we tell them to do. (DTI 6) 
Internal manaqement 
Amongst lawyers the only division found was to be between experienced and less 
experienced DTI prosecutors. The office management structure was observed to be 
fairly informal as was the allocation of case responsibility, in that prosecutors did not 
have an inflexibly defined function, for example responsibility for long firm frauds or 
'book offences'. There appeared to be an understanding that certain individuals did 
certain work but would also deal with matters beyond those parameters. Particularly 
the more experienced lawyers tended to deal with the more complex cases whilst the 
less experienced lawyers had responsibility for specific types of less complex 
offences. 
Although the lawyers commented upon the flexibility of the system, the operation of 
the office appeared to be quite structured around responsibility for specific types of 
cases/matters. The comment, 
The roles are not as divided as they have been in the last few years. We were 
divided in groups to concentrate on specific areas, but that's been eroded 
away. (DTI 4), 
may be correct in relation to the past and in relation to division into teams but could 
not be viewed as accurately describing the work of the lawyers, all of whom 
described their work by reference to the specific type of case load with which they 
dealt. The same lawyer continued, stating, 
I look after all cases that are sent to our agents. 
Although the unit was a part of a very large Directorate, a distinct internal 
management culture of empowerment and responsibility was observed. In the stage 
of the study involving the police, repeated reference had been had to that unit's 
11 autonomy", in circumstances amounting to isolation, both from the Force and the 
CPS. Within the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit no such references were made, 
yet very individualistic systems had been introduced and operated consistently within 
the unit and in relation to its suppliers of work, without apparent comparators in the 
Directorate. Lawyers and investigators knew and acknowledged their different roles 
in a relationship that recognised the contribution of each to a shared or common aim. 
The situations of conflict of role and perceptions between investigators and 
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prosecutors observed in the police and CPS appeared significantly minimised by 
established and consistently applied procedures, known and binding on both groups 
within the unit. Opportunity for dispute as to which group had the final decision had 
been removed, by formal recognition of this being the remit of the lawyers. However 
tensions between the investigative and prosecutorial/regulatory functions could be 
eased by use of several systems, including the "marginal meetings" and the 
requirement that lawyers explain their decisions to the work suppliers and to 10s . 
The regulatory function of the unit was found to repose in the lawyers as opposed to 
the investigators. Rather than there being a divide between compliance and 
deterrence as suggested in some of the literature, the two functions were concluded 
to be co-existing easily both in perception and practice. This was found to be 
achieved through a mixture of warning letters, that were acknowledged by the 
lawyers to be of no legal force, but in keeping with one of the Directorate's main 
objectives and by use of prosecution for matters individuals assessed as being more 
blameworthy. Lawyers were observed to combine pragmatism with perceptions of 
being guardians of independent assessment as to the evidential and the public 
interest merits of referrals to the unit. 
Conclusions 
The unit had been chosen for examination on the assumption that its operation 
would provide an interesting comparator to the operation of both the police and CPS. 
This was based on a recognition that the work of the unit combines investigators and 
prosecutors in a single group. Having examined the operation of both these 
agencies prior to examining that of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit, this stage 
of the study commenced with an desire to ascertain whether the themes identified in 
the preceding agencies would be found in the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. As 
examination of the unit progressed it was concluded that whilst there were 
similarities in operation between all three agencies, the Legal Services 
(Prosecutions) unit exhibited unique features of remit; composition; operation and 
inter-agency co-operation. 
Examination of files and interviews with the unit's staff revealed the legally qualified 
staff could not adequately be described as 'prosecutors', despite this being how they 
self-referred. Whilst the official description of the unit emphasised its regulatory 
function, this was not the primary reason for the suggestion that the term 
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"prosecutor" did not properly describe the remit or operation of these staff. 
Interviews with these staff identified that they recognised the regulatory role. In 
addition a number of these lawyers operated practices that accorded with the types 
of behaviour identified by Hutter (1988), Braithwaite (1984; 1987) and others as 
being typical of regulators. It was assessed that, in practice, the unit's lawyers 
operated dual roles of prosecutors and regulators. 
Unexpectedly no indications were observed of this causing conflict, in either their 
operation or their work with the investigators. In the examinations of the operation of 
the police and CPS it had been found that a decision by a prosecutor not to refer a 
matter to trial could lead to considerable conflict between members of the two 
agencies. In the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit the lawyers' decisions were not 
only recognised as final by the investigators, a fact often grudgingly acknowledged 
as opposed to accepted by police officers, but also investigators within the unit 
recognised regulation of future commercial dealings as being a legitimate outcome 
of their work. 
It should be noted that regulation of the future was not a function of or an outcome 
available to the other agencies studied. Police officers were found to be interested in 
obtaining a "result" in relation to past conduct, where a result equated to criminal 
convictions. The approach and attitudes of CPS prosecutors were found to fall into 
two broad categories. The one approach was of a strict adherence to the remit of 
advice and review, that drew sharp distinctions between legal decisions, that were 
seen as being the remit of the CPS, and operational decisions that were viewed as 
solely the remit of the police. The second approach saw the lines between 
operational issues and legal issues as inter-twined and took a far broader approach 
to what constituted appropriate advice. 
Within the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit there was no such distinction amongst 
the lawyers. This may be suggested to be the result of a management style that 
actively required close working links between investigators and lawyers with a shared 
understanding of the hierarchy of decision making, combined with a need for 
transparent accountability for the decisions made. 
Examination of the operation of all three agencies leads to several major 
conclusions. The first is that the response of the criminal justice system to fraud was 
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unlike the treatment of any other offence failing within the criminal justice system. 
The operation of the police and CPS in relation to their respective parts of the 
response is assessed to lack co-ordination and mutually supportive remits. In 
contrast to this, examination of the operation of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) 
unit leads to the conclusion that co-ordinated and effective responses to fraud were 
feasible within the existing justice system. Investigators and lawyers in the unit were 
assisted by a shared ethos of acceptable results, which was both reactive and pro- 
active, operating within a clearly defined legal framework of specific offences. One 
of the primary conclusions of the study, described in more detail in the following 
chapter, is that the dis-functional response to fraud of the main criminal justice 
agencies is more likely than not to continue whilst the substantive law does not 
encompass a specific offence of fraud. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
ANALYSIS 
In this chapter analysis is made of the remits of the three specialised units studied 
and of the statistical data as to numbers and types of cases processed by these 
units. Examination is made of the official descriptions as to what type of complaints 
each agency was described as dealing with. Within this analysis consideration is 
made of whether each agency was stated as applying any definition of fraud and if 
so, whether there was any commonality of definitions between the agencies. 
Thereafter analysis is made of the respondents' comments as recorded during the 
interview process in relation to their work and of what constituted fraud for the 
purposes of that work, together with examination of the contents of the files or cases 
that were examined during each stage of the study. The aim of this examination is to 
determine how, in practice, complaints of fraud were being processed within the 
English and Welsh criminal justice system. In this section assessment will be made 
of the routes by which complaints could come to and be sent from the agencies and 
of the delays that could be experienced in the agencies' processing of complaints of 
fraud. 
Examination will also be made of the organisational structures of the three units and 
the possible effects this may have on referral paths of complaints and organisational 
relationships between the different agencies responsible for dealing with fraud. 
Throughout this chapter, the comments of the respondents and examination of the 
cases for which they had responsibility are considered in light of the themes that 
were identified in the literature review. Of the themes identified in the literature 
review, particular discussion is made of the "compliance v regulation" debate, in 
relation to the results obtained from the fieldwork 
Within this chapter assessment is made of the relevance of the operation of the three 
agencies and whether these agencies, together with the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), 
provide appropriate and effective processes and methods of dealing with fraud within 
the English and Welsh legal system. 
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Remits of the chosen aqencies 
Of the agencies studied, only the DTI's Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit was found 
to have a clear official statement as to what type of complaints fell within the unit's 
remit and what constituted the work of the unit. As detailed in chapter 7, the Legal 
Services (Prosecutions) unit's statement of remit was found to be based upon 
reference to specific offences. 
Official descriptions of the remit of both the CPS and police included mention of their 
having specialist units dealing with the investigation or prosecution of fraud. Unlike 
the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit, neither of these agencies' specialist units 
were found to operate as closely as did the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit to a 
specific remit. 
At the commencement of the study into the operation of the CPS Fraud Investigation 
Group (FIG) no official description of its work was found. Various prosecutors made 
mention of unspecified criteria as to what matters fell within the unit's remit. Efforts 
were made to determine the basis of these without success. However during the 
study a file was provided that contained a document titled "Criteria for referral of 
fraud cases to HQ Casework", HQ Casework being the predecessor of the FIG. This 
document specified five criteria; amount lost or at risk; national publicity; the case 
having arisen from the work of liquidators and administrators; the need for 'highly 
specialised knowledge'and international enquiries. 
Examination of this document revealed that although the first mentioned criterion 
appeared specific, neither this, nor any of the other criteria, provided the degree of 
certainty given by the official statement of the remit of the DTI's Legal Services 
(Prosecutions) unit. 
The first criterion was thought to demonstrate the lack of clarity of the tests applied 
by the CPS to determine within which of its units a matter fell. The first criterion 
stated that 'the amount lost or at risk is not necessarily an indicator of suitability for 
referral to HQ. It is an objective and recognisable signpost of the seriousness and 
likely public concern attaching to the case'. This was followed by the statement that 
case involving of and above E750,000 should be referred to HQ Casework, "so as to 
provide an opportunity of considering whether a more detailed referral is required. " 
Under the criterion 'national publicity', specific mention was made of cases of 
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corruption, an offence that need not involve an element of fraud. This did not amount 
to a direction that all cases involving that amount would automatically be dealt with 
by the specialist unit. 
At the time of the study, the status of that document was uncertain, the FIG having 
replaced HQ Casework and there being no official confirmation that the document 
transferred to applying in the FIG. As such, and in the absence of any other official 
document, it was concluded that the FIG did not have an official remit. 
It was also concluded that there could be confusion between various units within the 
CPS as to whether a fraud matter should be dealt with by the FIG or Branch CPS. 
This resulted from guidelines stating that certain amounts of loss would trigger the 
specialist unit's consideration of the case, not that the unit would automatically 
accept such cases. 
Unlike the FIG, the Commercial Branch of the police force studied was found to have 
an official remit. However this was found, as with the HQ Casework guidelines, to be 
somewhat imprecise. This document stated that "no hard and fast rules can be 
imposed" in determining which component of the force studied would have 
responsibility for investigating complaints of fraud. It made use of criteria that could 
not be quantified objectively. These included that "the investigation would entail a 
disproportionate use of divisional resources" and that "the case involves a degree of 
complexity or is in a specialist field, requiring the expertise of Commercial Branch 
staff"without stating the expertise of the unit. 
Official definitions of fraud 
During the study of their operation it was found that, despite both the CPS's FIG and 
the police Commercial Branch having remits that specifically referred to "fraud", in 
neither agency was an official definition of fraud provided. The official remit of the 
DTI's Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit did not make specific reference to "fraud", 
but to more criminal offences arising from insolvency, 
This branch ... has the principal responsibility 
for deciding whether or not to 
initiate a criminal investigation following the receipt and consideration of the 
reports outlining criminal allegations. 
Examination of the files of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit revealed that, 
unlike the police, cases were recorded by reference to specific offences. Fraud not 
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being an offence under the English justice system, the absence of use, definition or 
reference to this term by the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit was not considered 
surprising. 
Within the police it was found that terms making specific reference to fraud were 
commonly used. These included terms such as "commercial fraud", that appeared in 
the unit's remit, "long firm fraud" and "advance fee fraud", both of which were used in 
its statistical analysis of its work. None of these terms were recognised by the justice 
system as being offences. Within its own remit, the Commercial Branch 
acknowledged the difficulty of defining what it dealt with and why. 
The creation of a CPS "Fraud Investigation Unit" may be viewed as an assessment 
that "fraud" was deemed sufficiently important by the government to require an 
institutional and legal response. This assessment may be viewed as undermined by 
the absence of definition of one of the main terms in the title of the resulting 
institution and the absence of a remit that reflected organisational changes in the 
operation of the CPS. However this context supports what Calder (1994) described 
as 'state sanctioned criminology, based upon his analysis of the failure of the 
American Federal authorities to permit access to official records relating to a major 
criminal. By failing to make information available, Calder argues that the US 
authorities were effectively able to both define the "problem" and present their 
response to this as appropriate. It is suggested that this analysis can be applied to 
the English context of fraud. 
Support for application of Calder's approach to the English justice system may be 
provided by examination of the number of government promoted anti-fraud initiatives 
that occurred during the course of the study. These included publication in the media 
of the actions and successes of a number of government agencies, including the 
CPS, SFO, DTI and DHSS/Benefits Agency, in tackling various forms of fraud. 
If Calder's suggestion of "state sponsored criminology" is accepted as applicable to 
the English response to fraud, it is suggested important consequences follow. Firstly 
state agencies are able to define what constitutes the "problem" and thereafter 
implement as the "solution" still other state agencies specifically tasked with dealing 
with fraud. These may either be, as in the case of the Serious Fraud Office, police 
and Crown Prosecution Service's FIU, tasked with dealing with fraud generically, or, 
as in the case of the Financial Services Authority, with dealing with specific forms of 
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respect of complaints and cases that can be recorded. That compliance or 
deterrence is incidental to the results culturally acceptable to either agency accords 
with Hutter's (1984) analysis of the organisational constraints on enforcement 
officials' operation. 
It may be suggested that, public reassurance being a Home Office required priority 
for police forces, there is potential for prevention of fraud to alter this situation. Were 
this so, which, it is suggested, is not due to the lack of public concern with fraud in 
comparison to crimes such as robbery and burglary, this does not detract from the 
argument that there is no continuum in criminal law enforcement. The option 
available to police officers and CPS lawyers is either to enforce the law (by 
investigation or prosecution) or not. 
Analysis of the operation of the IDTI suggests that law enforcement, by lawyers as 
opposed to investigators, can occur in a manner that combines regulation and 
prosecution in a single process and system of law, as opposed to these functions 
being separate as they are in relation to the operation of the police and CPS. In 
keeping with the approach identified by Carson (1970), it was found that 
assessments of moral culpability by the unit's lawyers are directly linked to the 
likelihood of prosecution as opposed to other action being taken by that agency. The 
same was not true of the operation of the police or CPS. In these agencies account 
is taken of assessment of moral culpability in the application of the "public interest" 
test of investigation and, more overtly, of prosecution. In all three agencies this 
assessment is made in the context of considerable discretion, making comparison of 
the decision making possible. 
The same is not true of the work of the DTI investigators. These individuals do not 
have the powers of the police. Unlike police investigators, whose views can 
materially influence subsequent processing decisions, the views of the DTI 
investigators do not have a significant impact on the decision as to what form of 
action is deemed appropriate and they are obliged to comply with the directions of 
the DTI lawyers. The enforcement role within the DTI is played by the lawyers, who 
unlike their investigators, will have had no contact with those complained of or the 
complainants. There is, therefore, less relevance to suggestions that compliance is 
sought to maintain credibility in a context of not having punitive powers. 
Braithwaite states that, 
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The world over.... business regulatory agencies have a strong aversion to law 
enforcement (1989 p 564). 
It is suggested that, in the context of the operation of the DTI, this is not an accurate 
reflection of the situation. As discussed in chapter seven, notwithstanding the 
Department's focus as being primarily regulatory, lawyers within the Legal Services 
(Prosecutions) unit stated that they saw themselves primarily as prosecutors. A 
general consensus was that regulation could be achieved through prosecution, it 
being accepted that the "worse" the actions, the more likely that punishment would 
also be seen as necessary. 
Unlike the CPS, the aim of the DTI lawyers was not solely to seek punishment of past 
actions, but also to seek future compliance through punishment. A distinction 
between the two agencies is that an intended outcome of CPS processing of a case 
is to prevent further action on the part of the suspect. The aim of the DTI is to 
encourage future action, in ways that are legally acceptable. As such it is suggested 
that law enforcement can be in the forms of compliance, deterrence and prosecution 
that co-exist as progressions on a single scale of powers and, as noted by the 
respondents, prosecution can ensure future compliance. To an extent this 
assessment is supportive of Pearce and Tombs' call for a punitive regulatory strategy 
(1990 p 423). 
Where this study does not support that call is in that the results obtained do not 
indicate there to be a valid distinction made between compliance and punishment in 
relation to either corporate or individual conduct. In contrast, the operation of the 
police and CPS is assessed as supporting the proposition that where the options 
available are punishment or nothing, actions may be ignored by agencies. 
The non-availability of recordable outcomes being important, the results of the study 
also revealed the importance of any system of law enforcement operating in a 
context of the legal position being clear. As discussed below, the absence of a 
substantive offence of fraud and an allied lack of understanding as to whether a 
matter was civil or criminal and if criminal what offences could be charged, lead to 
the conclusion that debate as to the distinction between enforcement polices and 
practices is secondary to an understanding of what it is that is being enforced. 
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Fraud, corporate or "white-collar' crime 
Examination of the definitions of fraud applied within the police and CPS generally 
supported Slapper and Tombs' (1999) noting of the "invisibility" of corporate crime 
within the justice system. Within the police it will be recalled that only one of the 
respondents made specific reference to the position of the alleged perpetrator, 
making however reference to the fact that other investigators may well apply a 
different definition, 
For me it's the theft of large sums of money by people in high positions in 
business, and firms of solicitors by means of false accounting, and criminal 
deception. A bobby on the beat would give you a different definition from us. 
(PO 1) 
Whilst other officers used the term "white-collar crime" it is suggested that this was 
not used in the criminological sense but to reflect an element of sophistication in the 
commission absent from other complaints of standard offences, 
... it's investigations of financial crime, basically white collar crime, 
basically 
theft, deception, forgery in sophisticated ways. (PO 6) 
As discussed in greater detail below, the definitions applied by the police and CPS 
reflected those agencies' focus on punishment of individuals as opposed to 
regulation, deterrence and control of on-going business operations, this being a far 
greater concern of the DTI. This approach follows Kagan's (1984) analysis of the 
operation of the police in relation to the conduct of industry. In this analysis Kagan 
drew attention to the differing focuses of attention, the police acting against the 
individual in contrast to the inspectorates' focus on businesses, corporations, legal 
entities. 
Unlike the police and CPS, the DTI operation was found to be very closely linked to 
allegations of contraventions of legislation. The impact of this may be seen in the 
definitions of fraud applied by the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. 
The definitions of fraud applied by all respondents were examined in light of 
Braithwaite's (1984) suggestion of enforcement operating on a hierarchy of wrong- 
doing in which the likelihood of punishment as the desired outcome is directly linked 
to the seriousness of the offence. Within the DTI a version of this approach was 
found to predominate. As will be recalled, lawyers made direct reference to 
enforcement for more serious matters, stating there to be, 
... a need 
for large scale fraud to be stopped and punished. 
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Their perception of their role was as prosecutors with specific reference to the 
seriousness of the offences, 
I see myself as a prosecutor. I only enjoy the cases that I feel people have 
done something really naughty, I feel more comfortable with a high level of 
dishonesty. 
The different approaches applied within the DTI did not depend upon the identity of 
the alleged wrongdoer but upon the seriousness of the consequences of the 
wrongdoing. In contrast discussions with police officers in relation to project 67, 
detailed in chapter five, led to the conclusion that the professional status of the 
suspect could impact upon the decision not to follow all the powers available under a 
strict enforcement approach. The case of IN indicated that political considerations 
could also impact upon the decision-making processes. Considerations of these 
types are, it is suggested not the most important or commonly occurring factors. 
The cases studied suggest that within police and CPS decision making, seriousness 
of complaints is most commonly linked to the amount of loss suffered. However 
great the loss it was found, in both the police and CPS, that management 
considerations of the cost of an investigation could outweigh the desire of either 
investigators or prosecutors to commence or continue investigations. Given the set 
unit systems of investigation in operation in the DTI, these considerations did not 
apply to the same degree within DTI decision making. 
Notwithstanding Pearce and Tombs' (1990) dislike for an established criminology of 
differentiation between corporate and non-corporate wrongdoing, the study found 
that, in practice, distinctions could be drawn between groups of suspects that may, at 
first assessment, be based on the legal identity of the suspect. Difficulties in 
establishing the identities of the wrongdoers and the offences committed were found 
to operate equally in complaints of fraud allegedly committed by individuals acting 
together as in complaints against companies. Case files of investigators and 
prosecutors demonstrated an acceptance that a single successful prosecution was 
unlikely in matters involving a chain of separate dishonest actions, the end result of 
which was loss to the complainants. The negative cost implications of investigating 
such cases were unlikely to be countered or overcome by the prospect of a trial or a 
trial resulting in a conviction. No evidence was found in such cases of management 
decisions not to permit investigations being directly linked to the corporate or other 
nature of the suspects. Instead these decisions appeared to be linked to the 
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prospects of the costs of investigations being without "result", as defined by the 
police with reference to conviction. 
In the context of fraud in or by companies it is to be expected that a number of 
individual office holders may carry out separate acts that may only be related by 
reference to the fraudulent conclusion of the chain of acts. It may be expected that in 
themselves some of the individual acts may not, without reference to the end result, 
amount to criminal offences. In the absence of an offence of fraud, in which the 
individual acts could be linked to the end result, it is suggested that the distinction 
between corporate and individual wrongdoing is explicable in terms of the 
practicalities of obtaining a conviction. 
This is less true of regulation of fraudulent practice in business as a number of 
offences, including many of those dealt with by the DTI, place responsibility for 
corporate actions on individual office holders. This may support the findings of the 
study that the DTI operates across the boundaries of prosecution and regulation. 
The absence of this framework to the operation of the police and CPS may explain 
the findings that whilst both were found to apply degrees of enforcement in their 
operation, neither moved beyond that approach to one of regulation. 
Numbers and Wes of cases dealt with bv the chosen aqencies 
At the commencement of the study it had been intended to compare the numbers of 
cases dealt with annually by each of the units. It was also intended to compare the 
type of cases that each unit dealt with. These intentions were based on experience 
of working in Zimbabwe, where the number of police investigations of any offence 
correlated directly to the number of prosecutions and NFAs of the same offence. It 
was therefore anticipated that a direct comparison of agency caseloads would be 
possible. This was expected to form a basis upon which examination could be made 
of the rate of and reasons for matters not being processed to trial. 
It was found that such analysis would not be possible. Unlike Zimbabwean criminal 
law, fraud is not a recognised offence in the English criminal justice system. This, 
together with the fact that non official definitions of fraud operated within the chosen 
agencies, led to a conclusion of significant uncertainty as to whether a "like for like" 
comparison between agencies' work could be made. Before the empirical data 
collection commenced it was thought that there could be differences between what 
agencies defined, and therefore dealt with, as fraud. Once the data collection began 
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it was apparent that within the same office differing definitions and acceptance 
criteria operated, making reliable comparison of the work within, let alone across, the 
chosen agencies unrealistic. 
An additional effect of these factors was that, unlike the situation in Zimbabwe, a 
single complaint of fraud could be dealt with by more than one of the investigative 
and prosecuting agencies. Within Zimbabwe a complaint of fraud would always be 
made firstly to the police, assessed by the police and thereafter sent to a division of 
the Attorney-General's Office for a decision as to whether prosecution was 
appropriate. As detailed in chapters five, six and seven, it was found that in England 
and Wales a complaint could be received by any and all of the chosen agencies. 
Such a complaint could be accepted by one agency or referred to another that, in 
turn, could forward part or all of the complaint to still other agencies. In this manner a 
complaint could be investigated simultaneously by two or more agencies. Equally 
the investigating agencies could be referring their investigations of the complaint to 
differing prosecution agencies. A possible result of this was that a single complaint 
could be recorded as being dealt with by as many as four agencies. 
In the first agency studied the respondents themselves commented upon the 
unreliability of the official statistics. In an effort to make a statistical assessment of 
the unit's work, an alternative approach was adopted. This made use of the unit's 
on-going files as a sample of the number of cases and type investigations 
undertaken. 
Whilst this was possible within the police, within the CPS similar access to all the 
unit's case was not available. At this stage it was concluded that an assessment and 
comparison of the type of work undertaken by the chosen agencies would only be 
possible using case samples. Due to the lack of official definition of fraud used by 
the agencies, the focus of this analysis was a determination as to whether similarities 
existed as to what type of case each agency dealt with. 
The relevance of this was thought to be twofold. Firstly it was hoped this would 
indicate whether more than one route into and through the criminal justice system 
could operate for complaints of a similar nature. Secondly it was felt that the results 
obtained by this analysis could indicate the importance, if any, of the choice of route 
upon the progression of a complaint through the justice system. 
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As the study progressed it was concluded that the results from the statistical analysis 
originally intended would be both unreliable and meaningless in assessing the 
response of the English criminal justice system to fraud. This was therefore 
abandoned and substituted by a focus on the significance of referral paths to and 
between the agencies. 
Although it was realised that a direct comparison of agencies' caseloads would not 
have the relevance originally anticipated, alternative means of assessing annual 
caseloads were attempted. This was in an effort to determine if there was any 
correlation between the caseloads of the agencies and if so what it was. As detailed 
in chapters 4 and 5, this was also abandoned due to the results provided being 
considered unlikely to produce reliable estimates of annual caseloads, disposal rates 
and outcomes. Given the detail of the data as to numbers of cases received, manner 
of processing and outcomes obtained from study of DTI's Legal Services 
(Prosecutions), it was regretted that comparison of the caseloads of the chosen units 
had not been possible in the format originally intended. 
The Noe of fraud examined 
As discussed above, the agencies studied were found to operate imprecise 
definitions as to what constituted fraud for the purpose of their respective operations. 
Despite this, the interviews and case studies revealed some similarities in the type of 
complaints dealt with by these agencies. 
The primary similarities were found to be that the behaviour complained of was 
alleged to have been on the part of companies, businesses and individuals towards 
members of the public, causing the latter financial loss. Studies of the case samples 
within each unit led to the conclusion that none of the specialist units studied were 
primarily concerned with complaints of fraud between companies or corporate 
entities nor of frauds against government agencies. The official remit of the 
Commercial branch of the police expressly stated that the unit was responsible for 
the investigation of "most allegations of public sector corruption", listing this first on 
the unit's remit. From this statement it might have been expected that this would 
form the primary work of the unit. However as demonstrated by the statistics 
produced by the unit, it dealt with no such cases in 1993, one in 1994 (of a total of 
twenty eight cases dealt with by the unit that year) and one case in 1995 (of a total of 
forty cases). These statistics indicated that the bulk of the unit's work was 
investigations of what it described as "theft" and "deception". Examination of a 
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sample of the cases being investigated by the unit revealed that these cases, most of 
which would have fallen within the Zimbabwean common law offence of fraud, 
involved the dishonest acquisition of thousands of pounds from individual 
complainants. 
The official statements as to the remit of the FIG made clear that its primary work 
was in relation to fraud, without specification as to what types of fraud. As with the 
police, examination of a sample of the FIG caseload revealed that it too dealt mostly 
with complaints of fraud made by members of the public involving large amounts of 
money, usually in the tens of thousands. 
Given that the remit of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit of the DTI stated that 
its main responsibility was for dealing with offences of dishonesty committed in 
relation to insolvency, it was anticipated that the complaints dealt with would relate 
mainly to the operation of commercial entities. This was confirmed by discussions 
with both lawyers and investigators, together with examination of a sample of the 
unit's cases, all of which arose from the operation of business concerns or 
companies. 
The seriousness of the matters with which each agency was to deal was found to be 
largely undefined, although police investigators and lawyers made reference to 
financial limits. In the vast majority of the agencies' files and cases the victims had 
lost or stood to lose thousands of pounds as a result of the fraudulent activities 
alleged. The rare exceptions to this conclusion were matters, such as Wand R vH, 
that made direct reference to other factors directly linked to the agency's assessment 
of the "complexity" of the complaint. 
On this basis it was concluded that the amount involved was one of the main features 
that determined whether a complaint was referred to these units by those outside 
them. In many cases it was concluded that the same approach had been adopted by 
those within the unit in determining whether to accept a referral. 
However the issue of the complexity of a case could also determine its being referred 
to these units. This was noted particularly in the operation of the CPS where branch 
prosecutors had attempted to retain a matter by reference to its relative simplicity 
notwithstanding the amounts involved. That this case was taken over by the FIG 
could suggest that loss was viewed as a more significant determining factor than was 
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complexity. However this suggestion should be treated with caution since the 
request to retain the case was made contingent upon the provision of additional 
technical support. Given that the FIG had that support, one reason for its acceptance 
of the case could have been the fact of resources being more readily available within 
the FIG than in branch CPS. 
The cases examined in each agency were found to involve a number of victims 
unconnected to each other but for the fact of their being complaints about a similar 
type of activity by the suspect. From this it was concluded that the seriousness of the 
fraud dealt with by these units lay in its general societal impact, in the impact such 
action had on individuals and also in the specific impact on commercial society, both 
within the United Kingdom and in the broader commercial economy. Direct reference 
to this latter feature was included in the formal remits of the DTI whilst reassurance of 
the public was one of the objectives of the police force within which the unit studied 
existed, together with upholding the law, that could apply equally to individuals as to 
corporate entities. The requirement of the Code for Crown Prosecutors that a 
prosecution be in the public interest was felt to be sufficiently broad to cover both the 
individual and commercial impact of the investigation and prosecution of fraud. 
Further similarities between the work of the three specialist units were felt to be such 
that meaningful comparison could be made of their operation and co-operation in 
relation to the processing of fraud in the English criminal justice system. Three main 
similarities in the work of the chosen units became apparent from examination of the 
representative case samples and interviews. These were the type of fraud dealt with, 
that significant amounts of financial loss had been suffered by the complainants, of 
whom there could be a number in each case, and that the units operated within the 
criminal justice framework of the English and Welsh legal system. Comparison of the 
units' operation was further assisted by the fact that they had and operated formal 
means of passing complaints to each other. 
In addition the similarity of context and shared lack of clear definition as to what each 
agency deal with and what, in practice, each accepted as being fraud and falling 
within its remit, led to questioning whether there could be an overlapping of remits 
between the agencies studied. One of the concerns of the study was to assess 
whether in practice each agency dealt with a specific type of conduct or whether any 
of the three could deal with a matter and whether this was of any significance or 
importance. 
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The case samples of the three specialist units revealed that a complaint of fraud by a 
member of the public against a company involving loss of significant sums of money 
could be made to any of the agencies, including the CPS, and thereafter be referred 
between all three agencies. In order to assess how it was that fraud could be dealt 
with by the English and Welsh criminal justice system, the remits of the chosen 
agencies and referral paths to and from them were thought to be important. 
Outcomes 
In analysis of the progression of complaints the term "outcomes" was preferred to 
that of "results". The latter was thought to be too closely linked to the statistical data 
examined in each agency, this not always reflecting the non-numeric aspects of the 
cases 
The aims of this aspect of the study were to examine the extent to which and 
processes by which complaints, once accepted by an agency, progressed through 
that agency. These were assessed to be closely related to the referral paths that 
operated in and between agencies and it is with these that this section commences. 
A) Routes by which complaints enter the agencies 
1. Referral paths to agencies 
Experience of working in a Commonwealth jurisd iction in which the police undertook 
all criminal investigations and referred all their investigations to a single prosecution 
body led to an expectation that similarly well defined lines of referral would operate 
within the legal system on which that Commonwealth justice model was based. 
It was expected that the police would receive complaints, would investigate these 
and that the CPS would prosecute the resulting investigations. Examination of the 
first agency removed this expectation. As detailed in chapter five, the official 
statement of referral paths described that complaints could be received directly from 
members of the public or commercial concerns. Complaints could also be referred 
from police divisions within the particular Force. The official description of the unit's 
operation detailed that others including the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI); 
or the Crown Prosecution Service's (CPS) Fraud Investigation Group or self 
regulatory bodies under the supervision of the Securities Investment Board (SIB) 
could refer complaints to the unit. 
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It may be noted that whilst this document and the head of unit described the fact that 
this could occur; neither described how it could or did occur. That this was so was to 
be a recurring theme in the examination of the operation of the three agencies. This 
led to the conclusion that whilst there was clear provision for such referrals, the 
manner in which they could occur was far less circumscribed. Whilst the DTI 
investigators described themselves as certain that their work originated with the DTI 
lawyers, examination of the official manuals of the unit and case samples studied 
demonstrated that within this organisations there were gaps in understanding as to 
where and how work originated. 
Examination of the first agency studied demonstrated that the referral paths from 
agencies were not as had been expected at the beginning of the study. As detailed 
in chapter five, the statistics of the Commercial Branch operation revealed that every 
year a number of complaints of fraud received by that unit were not investigated to 
prosecution by the police but referred to other investigative agencies. Due to the 
need to maintain anonymity it was not possible in the course of this study to track 
what became of these referrals. The prospect arises of these matters not being 
accepted for further investigations or prosecution by the agencies to which they were 
referred 
Upon study of the other agencies it was concluded that several types of referral paths 
operated in practice, within, to and from agencies. Contrary to expectation, the flow 
of work to and from agencies did not support the traditional model of investigations 
going from the police to the CPS. Whilst this form of referral was found to be the 
most commonly occurring, so too was the less usual referral, as described in chapter 
six, from the CPS to the police, from the CPS to the DTI for purposes of investigation 
and from the DTI to the CPS for prosecution. 
The Southern African Commonwealth model of referral of complaints of fraud was 
not observed in the operation of the English and Welsh criminal justice agencies. 
One of the factors leading to this was thought to be the existence in the latter of a 
level of response not found within the model. This was embodied in the written remit 
of the DTI's Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit. This document placed the operation 
of the unit in the criminal justice system and at the same time made express 
reference to a regulatory function not generally associated with prosecution 
agencies. 
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The existence of a prosecution department within the DTI tasked with dealing with 
fraud committed in situations of insolvency, together with this document, suggested 
there to be routes into the criminal justice system additional to those provided by the 
police and CPS. Examination of its operation confirmed the assessment that it 
provided scope for differing methods of processing complaints, though regulation and 
prosecution to that provided by the operation of the police and CPS. 
B) Significance of a variety of referral paths to agencies 
The significance of this feature in relation to complaints of fraud was thought to lie in 
the criminal justice system having more than one agency and set of processes by 
which a complaint could be received, considered and actioned. It was concluded 
that, in practical application, the existence of alternative agencies did not equate to 
choice. The referral paths illustrated in the majority of Legal Services (Prosecutions) 
cases and those in some of the FIG cases indicate that the reporting of frauds 
occurring in circumstances of insolvency were numerically more likely to be made 
from professional bodies than from members of the public. 
This may be unremarkable in the context of the police being considered as primarily 
responsible for investigations of suspected criminal conduct. Its implication, 
however, is that members of the public, who comprised the victims in the type of 
fraud studied, do not exercise a choice as to which agency they complain, there not 
being a general public awareness of the work of the DTI in this regard. Once a 
complaint was within the criminal justice system, generally via the police, a number of 
routes were found to exist by which it could be progressed. Due to lack of 
understanding in and between agencies as to what they and each other did, referral 
of complaints may be viewed as based more upon chance than informed choice. 
Examination of cases referred between the agencies demonstrated the impact of 
police discretion and the inability of the CPS to direct whether or how a matter should 
be investigated upon the progression of a matter through the criminal justice system 
as being that investigations could be terminated or undertaken in ways that CPS 
lawyers did not perceive as conducive to successful prosecution. The importance of 
systems of checks and balances in the English legal system is well documented, 
particularly in relation to the operation of the criminal justice system. This tradition 
has been reinforced and strengthened through various pieces of legislation. The 
underlying principles of control, checks and balances introduced in the Police and 
Criminal Evidence Act and the Prosecution of Offences Act have been continued 
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through legislation, such as the Criminal Investigations and Procedures Act and the 
Regulations of Investigations Act, as well as government led examination of the 
operation of the system such as the Glidewell Report. 
In relation to the investigation of fraud, however, it was found that many of the forms 
of control existing in relation to other offences did not apply. Investigation decisions 
whilst in theory subject to close scrutiny by the head of the unit, could be retained by 
individual officers for considerable periods of time. The referral of cases could occur 
in ways that either permitted the investigating officer and the reviewing lawyer to 
work hand in glove or at arms length. On the one hand officers could choose to 
effectively end a case by referring it to certain lawyers, whilst on the other they could 
approach lawyers known to be sympathetic to what were effectively operational 
decisions as to the manner in which investigations could be conducted. 
The fact of such referrals between the police and CPS and the decision-making of 
both types of lawyer were found to be almost entirely devoid of any supervision or 
review by either agency. Non-use of ASUs or trials units for fraud matters and high 
levels of autonomy within both agencies enabled this situation to continue without 
significant interference. The Glidewell (1998) and Auld (2001) Reports suggest that 
the CPS and police should work in a context of closer contact with the other; that 
administrative processing of cases should be improve d and that lawyers should have 
the power to require the police to gather evidence. If these recommendations are 
given practical application in respect of the processing of complaints of serious fraud, 
as is suggested in the Reports, this situation may be anticipated to alter to one 
similar to that found occurring within the DTI. 
Within the DTI a prevailing culture of explanation of decisions was found, with 
procedures having been put in place to ensure the routine applications of this. 
Investigators were set both tasks and targets by the lawyers. That investigators pay 
was directly linked to these tasks and targets being completed and met may be 
viewed as encouraging compliance with both. In contrast, there was no obligation or 
compulsion upon police investigators to comply with any advice provided, usually by 
the CPS. As noted by prosecutors in the cases detailed in chapter six, the CPS did 
not have a means of seeking to obtain compliance with its advice. Should officers fail 
to meet time limits set by the CPS prosecutors, the only sanctions available to the 
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CPS were to complain to the force concerned or to discontinue the proceedings, 
arguing the likelihood of abuse of process arguments. 
Examination of the files of all three agencies revealed that referrals of complaints of 
fraud between agencies could occur at a very early stage in the processing of those 
complaints within the agency that received the complaint. These files also illustrate 
that the branch of any agency that receives a complaint of fraud need not conduct a 
full investigation into that complaint, but could refer it to specialist units, either within 
the same agency ("internal referrals") or to another criminal justice agency. 
Examination of the specialist police unit revealed that, as a direct result of one 
internal referral, Divisional CID officers had been seconded to the unit to assist in the 
investigation of the complaints referred. What is not clear from either the official 
sources of information nor from interviews with officers, is the manner in which such 
referrals were made or whether a non-specialised department would know that a 
complaint would fall within the remit of the unit. This supports the conclusion that the 
importance of referral paths for the investigation of fraud lies in the possibility of the 
public being unaware of the identity of the investigative agency most appropriate to 
investigate their particular complaint. 
Whilst it is clear. that most frauds can be dealt with by any of the agencies, it is also 
apparent that specialist units are better organised and equipped than their generic 
counterparts to process complaints of fraud. In addition examination of the cases of 
the agencies suggests that, in practice, their staff were accustomed to dealing with 
certain types of complaint by established procedures and practices. 
Specific cases in which the investigation deviated from these established procedures 
and practices were observed not to progress as smoothly or successfully (in the 
sense of resulting in a prosecution) as those in which the most usual approach was 
followed. The views expressed by most of the police investigators and CPS 
prosecutors were that their counterparts in the other agency were not especially good 
at their role. Where individual investigators within agencies were able to or had 
developed professional relationships with their prosecution counterparts, their 
comments were found to reflect increased co-operation and provision of assistance 
in specific cases 
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As discussed in chapter five, the comments of police officers in relation to referrals by 
the CPS of police investigations to the SFO indicated that such referrals could be 
included in the category of cases deviating from established procedures and 
practices. 
Referral paths from aqencies 
a) "Cross referral" 
A second type of referral of complaints of fraud was found to occur in the three 
agencies studied. This may be termed "cross-referral" whereby one investigative 
agency refers complaints for investigation to another agency. In none of the 
agencies studied did there appear to be formal procedures or a shared informal 
understanding as to how or when such referrals should occur. Thus the police 
statistics demonstrated that in 1994,5 of the 23 complaints received by the unit 
(21.7% of its cases for that year) were referred to "other agencies" without it being 
specified whether these referrals were for investigation, prosecution or some other 
action. Due to the inability of the study to track referrals between the agencies, due 
to constraints of respondent confidentiality, it could not be determined what 
happened to these cases or for how long they remained within the criminal justice 
system. 
b) CPS referrals. 
Three types of CPS referrals were noted. One occurred in the context of the police 
referring an investigation to the CPS for advice or review and in effect the CPS 
referring the matter back with specific instructions to the police. 
As detailed in chapter six, the fact and extent to which this type of referral was made 
by the CPS was assessed as being influenced mainly by prosecutors' perceptions of 
their role. Some lawyers expressed reservations as to the extent to which specific 
referrals should be made to the police, 
We have to be careful not to become part of the investigation process. We 
shouldn't say how people should be questioned in the interview room but we 
can say 'if you bring me this sort of evidence it will be admissible in court'. 
Sometimes it's a fine line. Evidence collection and operations are for the 
police but I'm happy to advise as to how it will affect the subsequent trial. (FIG 
6) 
whilst others operated more proactively in referring matters. 
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This is a clear illustration of 'taking a horse to water, but not being able to 
make it drink'. I take the view that the police are making an artificial excuse 
for refraining from investigating this matter. The real reason for not 
investigating is a simple lack of resources. The flavour of recent 
correspondence from the police indicates their wish to escape through the 
back door by asking us to condone'an abuse of process argument'(FIG 12 in 
respect of Rv B). 
In some instances of this type of referral, an apparent reluctance was noted on the 
part of the police to assume responsibility for an investigation or prosecution that had 
previously been the responsibility of another agency. This may be attributed to a 
number of factors, from concerns as to being the agency facing abuse of process 
arguments to difficulties with co-operation between police forces, described by one 
prosecutor as, 
It's difficult because the independent police forces have feuds with each 
other's Chief Constables, over drinks, twenty years ago. They are proud and 
jealous of their independence. (CPS 4) 
Jehle's suggestion that the police have "the ability to end a case by imposing some 
kind of sanction" (Jehle 2000 p 27) was found to be entirely non-applicable to 
investigation of complaints of fraud. Prior to the coming into operation of the Criminal 
Justice and Court Services Act 2000, the police had been able to issue cautions. 
Neither those cautions, nor the post-Criminal Justice and Court Services Act system 
of cautions, warnings and reprimands, are applicable to offences of fraud committed 
by adults. Home Office guidance on the administration of cautions, warnings and 
reprimands provides that these sanctions are not available to the police in respect of 
all offences or in all circumstances. Offences of fraud of the type studied, even 
where fully admitted by the suspect, do not fall within the Home Office guidance for 
the administering of a caution, warning or reprimand. By contrast the DTI can take 
action amounting to the administration of a caution in dealing with fraud, in their use 
of warning letters. 
In the absence of the possibility of such a finalisation, any refusal of the police to 
investigate complaints of suspected fraud will, in the absence of another agency 
accepting the referral, end the criminal justice system's processing of that matter. 
Given that a trial will not have occurred it would be technically possible for the matter 
to be reinstated into the criminal justice system at a latter date. However, as noted 
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previously, the CPS can not direct the police to undertake any investigation. In light 
of Article 6 of the Human Rights Act (right to a fair trial within reasonable period of 
time) and the possibility of argument that re-investigation is an abuse of process, it is 
suggested that the CPS is unlikely to attempt such re-instatement. As indicated 
above, should the recommendations of the Glidewell and Auld Reports in respect of 
fraud cases be put into effect, this exercise of police discretion could be severely 
limited. 
At present it is concluded that, in practice, there is a prospect of this type of referral 
from the CPS resulting in complaints of fraud being investigated to a degree but 
thereafter either being ended "NFA" by the police or discontinued by the CPS for lack 
of evidence. Some support for this conclusion may be seen in the statistics of the 
specialist police unit, which demonstrated a high level of "NFA" matters each year. It 
has to be accepted that there are likely to be other reasons for "NFK' results being 
recorded, particularly in light of the police statistics recording that some investigations 
were not progressed any further on the basis of "CPS advice". 
Whatever the reason for termination of investigations without formal or court action, it 
is clear that complaints of fraud that may come to the attention of one branch of the 
criminal justice system need not be referred to, accepted by or processed within that 
system. As discussed above, this situation supports the conclusion that referral of a 
matter through the "wrong" channels could effe ctively end the processing of that 
matter within the criminal justice system. 
The importance of this is that not only might it be unclear to the public what was the 
Is right" agency to which to make a complaint of fraud, but that there may be similar 
lack of clarity within the criminal justice as to what is the "right" agency through which 
to channel further investigations. In a context of often complex and large amounts of 
evidence, very large sums of money and multiple victims, it is suggested that the 
influence of chance upon the progression of a complaint of fraud through the justice 
system is unsatisfactorily high. 
Another type of referral found to occur was where matters referred to the CPS were 
forwarded by that agency to agencies including the DTI, the Official Receiver's Office 
and Customs and Excise. Cases involving this type of referral could either be for 
purpose of investigation or for prosecution. 
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In respect of the operation of the IDTI, this system of referral appeared to operate 
successfully on the part of the CPS and DTI. One reason for this may be the fact of 
the referral being a statutory obligation on the part of the CPS and the remit of the 
recipient agency specifically including acceptance of this type of work. 
Within this context clarity on the part of both agencies as to their roles predominated. 
There was no conflict between the agencies nor examples of either taking on the role 
of the other nor delays in referred matters being processed. In the context of fraud 
investigation and prosecution this situation was the exception to the general trends, 
procedures and practices observed. 
One of the conclusions of this study is that the current response of the CPS and 
police to fraud is influenced to an unacceptable degree by personal perceptions of 
those responsible for its investigation and prosecution. It is further concluded that 
the degree of variation in perceptions is to a large extent created by the lack of 
shared understanding as to what matters fall within each agency's remits. This 
situation is less apparent in the operation of the DTI, where certainty as to offences 
and responsibility of the agency is provided by specific statutory provision. These 
features are reinforced by inclusion in the unit's remit and working practices of its 
investigators and lawyers. 
Chance or choice? - individual discretion and orqanisational mandate 
Examination of the agencies' cases and interviews with their staff leads to the 
conclusion that complaints of fraud can be made to any of the agencies studied. It is 
further concluded that processing can occur along a variety of referral paths and 
approaches. That this is so is clearly due, in part, to choice. Officers chose to 
approach certain lawyers within certain agencies; lawyers chose to accept referrals 
of matters other than in accordance with formal procedures; investigators and 
lawyers chose to seek or give advice of a nature and extent that they selected. 
Although the formal systems operating in the police and CPS are predicated not on 
personal choice but personal application of set procedures within specified 
parameters, in both agencies the means of ensuring compliance with the latter was 
severely limited by absence of review of decision making. 
As examined in chapter three, the impact of discretion is an acknowledged feature of 
the criminal justice system. As such, some inconsistency of approach within 
agencies' decision making may be expected. In the context of uncertain definitions 
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and imprecisely applied remits, the numbers of "NFAed" cases were felt to be so high 
as to be indicative of some feature other than the exercise of discretion. Interviews 
with police officers and CPS prosecutors suggest that this assessment is correct and 
that the other feature could be chance. 
One of the matters examined in the CPS sample of cases contained comment that 
was thought to support this assessment that the processing of complaints was due to 
chance rather than to choice. In the CPS analysis of RvL it was noted that, 
Shortly after the commencement of the investigation it became apparent that 
the case was linked with a parallel investigation by Customs & Excise into a 
VAT fraud relating to the same company and, some time later in the case, a 
joint investigation was embarked upon with all that that entailed in relation to 
the sharing of information and evidence. 
There never seems to have been any doubt throughout the life of the case 
what were the areas to be investigated, and the shape of the investigation 
and prosecution did not materially change at any time. 
If the second paragraph is accepted, one assessment is that it is difficult to accept 
that two investigations, so similar that they could be co-joined without variation in the 
investigation or prosecution, can result other than by chance acceptance by both 
investigative bodies, rather than one agency referring the matter to the other. An 
alternative approach is to suggest that the lack of internal monitoring and reviewing 
of decisions permitted individual discretion within each agency to predominate over 
compliance with organisational mandates. In this manner chance would be replaced 
by organisational failings of internal management. 
Siqnificance in the Processinq of complaints 
Whether through chance or organisational failure, the importance of the choice of 
agency to which complaint was made is suggested to lie in the effect of the types of 
approaches that may be adopted and the referral paths used. The effect of these 
factors is revealed by the study to be inconsistency of outcome, with increased risk of 
matters being finalised without trial and increased delays where finalisation decisions 
are not made. 
In this result the outcomes sought by the different agencies are of importance. As 
discussed earlier in thisý chapter in respect of the debate on regulation, the literature 
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review indicated that the outcomes sought by the police would be beginning, 
conducting and concluding an investigation. Their concern is not primarily with 
affecting future behaviour but with obtaining a statistical result. The trend 
demonstrated within the police unit studied, of greater numbers of matters being 
finalised by way of no further action (NFAed) than processed to trial or successful 
conviction, may not be viewed as supporting the literature review. However 
interviews with officers revealed that finalisations were counted as results. Although 
not as desirable as a "win", if taken early in the investigation, finalisation by way of no 
further action, could be presented as a completed investigation, recorded as a result 
for crime recording purposes and the resources of the unit deployed to other matters. 
As such they could be administratively preferred to a case that progressed through 
investigation, to trial and thereafter did not result in a conviction. In crime recording 
terms, the early finalisation by way of no further action and an acquittal could be 
recorded as "insufficient evidence". 
That a high failure rate operates in respect of fraud prosecution and that the 
government priorities are violent crime and reduction of burglaries, may provide a 
rationale behind police managers' apparent lack of interest in accepting large scale 
frauds for investigation by their units. Examination of FIG files provides support that 
these two factors have a significant and negative impact upon police decisions to 
accept fraud complaints for investigation. 
Comparison of the investigative statistics supports the suggestion that the DTI model 
(of combined prosecutorial and regulatory roles) appears to result in fewer 
complaints being finalised before a decision to prosecution is made than does the 
police/CPS model. The stated objectives of the DTI combining to be the general 
bettering of the conduct and operation of business within the UK, it may be expected 
that this agency will place a lesser emphasis on statistical results than on an 
intangible result of improvement. Unlike the work of the DTI, that of the police and 
CPS has no means of achieving a regulatory function. As such it is to be expected 
that the focus of these two agencies will be on compliance with the law as opposed 
to regulation of continuing operation. 
The DTI's statistics demonstrate that, over a three year period, 45 %, 54% and 63% 
of matters sent for investigation proceeded to a decision to prosecute. Over a three 
year period, police statistics show that 5.55%, 16.66% and 15% of its investigations 
proceeded to a decision to prosecute. 
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Examination of both the police and CPS files demonstrated that a finalisation ("NFA") 
decision might be taken at any stage in the progression of a complaint through the 
criminal justice system. As discussed above, several important consequences attach 
to the failure of a complaint to progress to criminal prosecution. In addition to these, 
the fact that exercise of discretion may occur in the initial stages of processing of a 
complaint suggests that some instances of fraud may, notwithstanding the making of 
a complaint, avoid any criminal action or sanctions. 
In the DTI model it is suggested that this result is statistically less likely to occur. It is 
acknowledged that the DTI model is by no means a perfect model. Regard must be 
had to criticisms of delay in DTI investigations and suggestions of its lack of 
independence from ministerial control (Campbell 9 February 1994, Burrell 13 
February 1994 and Wilkins 21 October 1994). It is suggested that such criticism be 
viewed in the context of, at the time of the study, the considerable work undertaken 
by the unit to counter such suggestions. Training to increase awareness that delay in 
the processing of complaints could lead to abuse of process arguments had been 
provided. An awareness of the need to demonstrate prosecutorial independence 
was found to be encouraged. Training to avoid delay was reinforced by the unit's 
lawyers setting and monitoring case progression timetable. Demonstration of 
independence and explanation of decision making was promoted by meetings with 
investigators and those referring complaints. 
The official statistics and observation of the chosen agencies indicated that the 
current response of the criminal justice system to complaints of fraud lacks 
consistency or cohesion. The importance of this lies in the involvement of large 
sums of money, with consequences for the individual and the long term 
attractiveness of the English commercial sector. The rationale underlying this study 
originated from working in a country that manifestly was not "dealing with fraud" in 
any meaningful manner. 
That the English government is committed to sustaining the attractiveness of the 
economy may be evidenced in its creation of a new regulatory service, the Financial 
Services Authority. Unlike the government's response to fraud in general, concerns 
as to the unchecked manner in which the financial services sector had been 
operating, resulting in large scale prejudice through fraud in the sector, were met with 
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the creation of both a body of offences and an agency tasked with drawing together 
both the new legalisation and pre-existing regulatory regimes. 
Reports of the comments of the chair of the Fraud Advisory Group, George Staples, 
... authoritative estimates of the sums lost through fraud range up to 
F-12million, fraud is only a priority for a handful of police forces (Company 
Lawyer 2000 p 307), 
have yet to be reflected in a similar approach to law and practice. 
In 1999 Omerod's analysis of the then current judicial and legal climate suggested 
that overall reform of the substantive law as it related to fraud was unlikely. 
The future of fraud investi-qation and prosecution - is there a need for a specifi 
offence or creation of a single agency? 
As detailed in chapter three, fundamental to the current English legal system is the 
notion of discretionary law enforcement. Recognising this, other alternatives to the 
current police procedures and practices may be considered, based upon retention of 
the current division of investigative and prosecutorial roles and exercise of discretion. 
This would not prevent examination of the organisational structures and 
consideration of amalgamation of the prosecutorial and regulatory roles as has 
effectively occurred in the DTI and FSA. 
One of these alternatives could be the provision of shared and common training to 
specialist police and prosecutor units. Historically, the training of police investigators 
and prosecutors has occurred in isolation of each other. That this remains so was 
indicated by the Home Office provision of training on the Human Rights Act 1998. 
However, the suggestion within the Glidewell Report (1998) of far closer working 
relationships between the police and the CPS may accommodate adoption of the 
training, and thereafter operating, model provided by the DTI. 
Within the police force studied, the Glidewell Report was the catalyst for "co- 
location", office accommodation shared by police officers and CPS prosecutors and 
the creation of a "trials unit", a designated police unit staffed by officers and support 
staff with direct contact with prosecutors on a regular basis. This contact included 
twice weekly courts attended by a senior officer in the unit alongside a prosecutor for 
the purposes of agreeing disposal of the listed cases. 
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Within this operation queries as to the discretion and impartiality of investigators and 
prosecutors have been raised and discussed, with an acceptance by both of their 
autonomy and inter-dependence. Whilst some conflict of roles may be inevitable, it is 
suggested that there is potential for this model to be applied to other offences, 
including fraud. In this manner the lack of review of individual decision making 
observed in both the police and FIU could be removed without re-imposing the use of 
the OSUs and thereby increasing the procedural formalities and delays of referring 
files between agencies. A further result may be to improve the consistency of 
decision making by investigators and lawyers. 
The suggested use of the DTI model may be countered by the observation that such 
a model already operates, in the form of the SFO, which is the subject of sustained 
criticism (Mackay & Elliot 1 October 1993, Ashworth 25 October 1994, Webster 27 
October 1994, Verkaik 3 July 1998). The extent of this criticism may suggest that, 
whilst the model may work well in the DTI context, in application in the SFO, despite 
its reported 80% conviction rate (1993-4 Annual Report), it is unreliable. 
It is suggested that several significant distinctions between the DTI and the SFO 
models operate to make the two distinguishable. The former is permanently 
established and operates as a composite entity whereas the latter has a body of 
lawyers and administrative staff, with police officers being either seconded from their 
forces or the SFO working with them whilst an investigation remains in-force. The 
importance of the effect of the permanence of the DTI's establishment and the lack of 
the same in the SFO lies in the sharing of objectives between investigators and 
lawyers within the DTI and the differing objectives between the police, to investigate, 
and the SFO, to prosecute. 
In addition the DTI does not have the discretion, as does the SFO, as to which cases 
of a certain type it may accept and progress. Whilst the DTI may exercise more 
control than does the CPS as to the rate at which matters are referred to it and 
thereafter processed, it can not choose its cases in the manner of the SFO. 
Account has to be taken of the context in which complaints are made to the IDTI. In 
terms of the Insolvency Act, obligations are placed on professionals to report actions 
and inaction to the DTI. The consequences of this may be found in the seriousness 
with which such complaints are viewed and processed in comparison with complaints 
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from members of the public. Whilst within the study this was not noted, this 
suggestion can not be entirely discounted. 
Another factor not expressly examined in the study was whether differing screening 
processes were required in relation to complaints from professionals required by law 
to report their suspicions or observations, compared to complaints from members of 
the public. The results of the study suggested that some screening of complaints 
occurred in each agency. The DTI's Legal Services (Prosecutions) unit was 
statistically the most likely to process complaints internally but examination of its files 
revealed a willingness to refer the reports from professional bodies to other agencies. 
By contrast the police received the majority of complaints from members of the public 
and were the most likely to end examination of a complaint by finalisation without 
further action (NFA-ing) of it. 
The possibility of the work of the DTI being easier as a result of it originating from 
professionals has to be considered. It is suggested that allied to this consideration 
should be that of the offences referred. One possibility suggested is that the work of 
the police and CPS in filtering what are and are not appropriate cases for 
investigations and prosecution would be made simpler were there to be other 
processing options available. 
Unlike the police, CPS or SFO, the DTI operates in a framework and manner that 
combine regulatory and prosecutorial functions and powers. In its operation these 
two approaches were not as distinct and irreconcilable to each other as suggested in 
some of the literature reviewed. The work of Hawkins and Thomas (1984) suggests 
a distinction between compliance and deterrence theory (Pearce and Tombs 1999), 
although Hawkins has attacked this analysis. McBarnett and Whelan's analysis that 
It is in the nature of the legal process that there can be two sides to every 
case, competing interpretation of what the law means or how it should be 
applied. (1999 p13), 
continues the suggestion that there are two, and no more, separate types of 
approach to discretionary decision making within the criminal justice system 
The operation of the Legal Services (Prosecutions) section of the DTI did not support 
this assessment. The operation of this unit and the FSA may be viewed as 
supporting the conclusion that within the English justice system a model exists that 
combines both functions. 
260 
One of the main conclusions drawn in this study was the apparent lack of co- 
ordination of effort and approach between the police investigators and the CPS 
prosecutors. The impact of lack of a shared understanding as to what it was that both 
agencies dealt with was evident in the comments of those interviewed. The 
examination of the DTI suggested that this should not be attributed to divisions 
between the functions of investigators and prosecutors. Within the context of the DTI 
the two functions appeared to operate much more closer and with less perceived 
conflict or disagreement than was observed in the relationship between the police 
and CPS. 
As detailed in chapter four, the comments of a number of the police officers 
interviewed suggested high levels of frustration as to the lack of understanding of 
their role and co-operation, as they perceived it, from some prosecutors. It was 
concluded that the approaches of both police and prosecutors were grounded in their 
organisational remits and practices that did not, in themselves, promote the sharing 
of objectives. Within the DTI there was an accepted distinction in function and role 
between the investigators and prosecutors but far less tension in the co-operation of 
their respective roles. 
However, it is suggested that improvement of the conduct of investigations and 
subsequent prosecutions of complaints of fraud may require fundamental changes 
within the legal system. Whilst the procedural operation or even the creation of a 
creation of a single body on the model of the DTI, using a range of approaches, 
across regulation and prosecution may improve the situation, it is suggested that the 
lack of clarity as to what is being processed is fundamental to the current response. 
The current response of the justice system to fraud makes no provision for a multi- 
agency approach. There are no focus groups or court user groups to influence the 
manner in which fraud matters are processed. Neither investigators nor prosecutors 
view the other as partners in dealing with fraud. As yet indication has still to be given 
as to the response of the government to the recommendations of the Auld Report 
(2001). In relation to the large volume of relatively minor criminal matters, some of 
the Glidewell Report recommendations, in respect of closer working between the 
police and CPS, are being put in place in most police and CPS areas. However, in 
relation to fraud, use of CJUs and access to locally based specialist prosecutors, has 
yet to occur. 
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Even in matters of a non-criminal nature, such as those involving anti social 
behaviour, the operation of the police, local authorities and the courts, possibly 
together with those affected and the subject, are routinely linked. In these contexts 
each agency has a framework of legislation within which it operates together with an 
appreciation that they act as partners, yet retaining organisational discretion and 
independence. In relation to fraud there is no comparable situation. 
Underlying the possible improvement to the response to fraud is the suggestion that 
there should be a substantive offence of fraud. In his analysis of the Law 
Commission's response to the Government raising the issue of the need for a 
general offence of fraud, Ormerod does not place much emphasis upon the making 
of the question (1999 p 789). More emphasis is placed upon the opposition to 
general offences (p 796 and following). Since the 1998 Law Commission response 
and Ormerod's analysis of it, it is suggested that there has been a significant shift in 
executive and legislative perspectives. 
Additionally, the operation of the criminal justice agencies has significantly altered 
with the introduction of the 1999 statutory requirements for "Best Value" (Local 
Government Act 1999). Unlike Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) this 
system is statutory and increasingly affects the performance of all public agencies. 
Within the police and CPS this has resulted in increased inspection by the Audit 
Commission and greater attention being paid to the implementation and meeting of 
performance targets. At an administrative level, the introduction of a specific offence 
of fraud could assist these criminal justice agencies streamlining and co-ordinating 
their operations in keeping with the recommendations of the Glidewell Report. 
Were there a common definition and expectation as to what it is that each would deal 
with, it may be expected that the prospects would be improved of achieving an allied 
commonality as to how it is that the agencies would deal with it. Given that the one 
agency is investigating the matters upon which the other will advise, review and 
eventually prosecute, there is a procedural logic in the two agencies operating 
complementary procedures as to the acceptance of fraud cases and these being 
known, understood and applied by staff of both agencies. This assessment appears 
to have been the basis applied to proposals to co-ordinate the operation of the police 
and CPS in relation to routine cases. Within the Auld Report (2001) these 
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suggestions have been specifically applied to the investigation and prosecution of 
fraud, however, they have yet to be put into procedural policy or practice. 
Prior to any implementation of these recommendations, it is suggested that the DTI 
provides a model upon which such a system could operate. Use of this model would 
require alteration of the substantive and procedural laws so as to incorporate this 
agency's continuum of responses and operation in the context of responsibility for 
enforcement of sPecific offences. 
A substantive offence 
In his analysis of the Law Commission's 1998 work "Legislating the Criminal Code, 
Fraud and Deception: A Consultation Paper', Ormerod (1999) notes that the 
response of the legislature to developments in criminality within commercial activity 
have been "piecemeal" and criticises the Commission for continuing this approach in 
its, 
apparent preference for a series of very specific reforms to the array of 
existing deception offences. (1999 p 789) 
It is not the aim of this study specifically to analyse the various and, in part, 
competing, models of a general offence of fraud as discussed by Ormerod and 
others, including Sullivan (1989), Smith (1995), and Aldridge (1994), or to present 
any alternative framing of such offence. However, as noted by Hutter (1988) the 
impact of the substantive law upon the operation of those within the chosen 
agencies, in relation to policy and practice, can not be ignored. One of the primary 
conclusions drawn from the examination of the agencies is that, in practice, the need 
for a general offence, as discussed in theory by Ormerod, remains pressing; brief 
analysis of such an offence is required. 
Ormerod's analysis of the theory of the law identifies that Preddy [1996] AC 815 
created gaps in the present law. The present study concludes that the practical 
effect of these is considerable uncertainty within the police as to the nature of the 
criminality being investigated and the elements of the offence that require proving. 
Lack of certainty as to the nature and standard of communication between 
investigators and prosecutors aggravates this situation. The result can be 
considerable delays in investigation and decisions by the CPS to discontinue criminal 
proceedings on the ground of either insufficiency of evidence or likelihood of abuse of 
process arguments as a direct result of delay in processing complaints of fraud. 
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Ormerod identifies two models of a general offence; one based on dishonesty and 
the other on deception. The first model is grounded in the mens rea of the actor in 
that the offence would be committed where an individual acts dishonestly, causing 
another to suffer financial prejudice. This is correctly criticised as being, in effect, an 
a priori argument and, given that the "dishonesty' of any act can not be fully defined, 
other than by reference to its effects, the benefits of a general offence are lost. The 
second model, based on the actus reus of the actor, is criticised as being, 
so broad that it will subsume the existing offences of deception (Ormerod 
1999 p 810). 
It is an unstated implication that this result is undesirable. Accepting that such an 
offence would be very broad, it is questioned as to whether this result is necessarily 
problematic. It is suggested that generality (or removal of a multiplicity of specific 
offences, many created in response to a particular type of behaviour) can provide 
clarity. This may benefit not only those working within the criminal justice system, but 
also those engaged in commercial activity, by providing certainty as to the 
parameters of the criminal law and protection of those conducting legal business, in 
whatever form, with others. 
Ormerod's suggestion (1999 p 802), that the offence of fraud as operates in South 
Africa (that is substantially similar to that operating in Zimbabwe) would provide a 
basis for consideration for the development of a general offence of fraud within the 
English criminal justice system, is supported. It is suggested that in such an offence 
there is sufficient requirement of mens rea as to satisfy the jurisprudence of the 
Human Rights Act, in that the act itself must be a mis-representation, together with 
flexibility of actus reus as to respond appropriately to ever developing forms of 
criminality in commercial activity. It is suggested that the creation of such an offence, 
together with reform of the practical operation of the main investigative and 
prosecutorial agencies, could produce significant improvements in the current 
response of the English criminal justice system to complaints of fraud. 
Conclusion 
This study began with an expectation that the English criminal justice system's 
policies and practices in response to allegations of fraud would provide a template for 
development of an improved response to similar allegations occurring in countries 
such as Zimbabwe. It concludes with an assessment that, whilst there is much that 
can properly be praised within the operation of various agencies within the English 
criminal justice system, the response of that system to complaints of fraud is less 
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than perfect. The study reveals that discretionary decision making on the part of 
investigators and prosecutors is greatly influenced by individuals' perceptions of the 
nature of the alleged illegality and of their and others' roles within the criminal justice 
system. Communication between the police and CPS is largely determined, not by 
procedures, but by the personalities of those who happen to have responsibility for 
any particular case. Notwithstanding the recommendations of the Glidewell Report 
(1998), formal links between these two agencies, in relation to dealing with 
complaints of fraud, remain conducted at "arm's length". It is a matter for conjecture 
as to whether the recommendations of the Auld Report (2000) will see the adoption 
of other Glidewell recommendations being implemented in respect of the 
investigation and prosecution of fraud by the police and CPS. Similarly, it is open to 
debate as to whether, if the fraud-specific recommendations of the Glideweli and 
Auld Reports are implemented, fraud will assume a higher priority within the criminal 
justice system than is presently the case. 
The findings of the present study suggest that the police do not view investigation of 
fraud as a high priority. This may be explained, in part, by the amount of time and 
resources occupied in investigations that do not fall within the Home Office lists of 
priorities and by the lack of certainty as to what it is that CPS would require as 
evidence. Delay was found to be commonplace in the processing of complaints of 
fraud within the police and CPS. 
Examination of the practices operating within the chosen agencies leads to the 
conclusion that there was significant potential for complaints of fraud of a similar 
nature to be processed in very different ways, notwithstanding that the processing 
involved the same two agencies; the police and CPS. In addition, it was assessed 
that there is further potential for significant differences to occur in the processing of 
complaints of a similar nature as a result of the choice of agency to which complaint 
was made. The combination of these factors leads to the conclusion that the current 
response of the English criminal justice system to fraud is uncoordinated and 
hindered by a lack of clarity as to what it is that is the subject of examination. It is for 
these reasons that re-examination of the substantive law, together with that of the 
various agencies' operation, as may be achieved by implementation of the 
recommendations of the Auld Report (2000), are the main conclusions of this study. 
These conclusions accept that this will require changes in well-established 
criminological thought, in relation to a substantive offence and notions of separation 
of the investigative and prosecutorial functions and roles. Given the current political 
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and social climate, it is suggested that such changes are both desirable and possible 
and that the model of the DTI may be of assistance in achieving them. 
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